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Kurzfassung  
Katastrophen beeinträchtigen das Funktionieren einer Gemeinschaft oder Gesell-
schaft schwerwiegend, führen zu menschlichen, materiellen, ökonomischen und 
ökologischen Verlusten großen Ausmaßes und erfordern nationale oder internatio-
nale Hilfe zur Bewältigung. Die Ursachen können technischen, menschlichen oder 
natürlichen Ursprungs sein. Kerntechnische Unfälle stellen erhöhte Anforderungen 
an die Entscheider, da die Freisetzung von radioaktiven Substanzen zu langfristi-
gen und auch grenzüberschreitenden gesundheitlichen Risiken für den Mensch 
und zur Kontamination der Umwelt führen kann. Ein kerntechnischer Unfall kann 
in mehrere Phasen eingeteilt werden, die durch unterschiedliche Maßnahmen zum 
Schutz der Bevölkerung charakterisiert sind. Entscheidungen über geeignete Maß-
nahmen in der Frühphase werden durch eine sehr hohe Unsicherheit in entschei-
dungsrelevanten Informationen erschwert. In den späteren Phasen eines Unfalls 
liegt die Schwierigkeit in der Vielzahl möglicher Maßnahmen und sich teilweise 
widersprechenden Interessen der zu berücksichtigenden Akteure.  
Entscheidungsunterstützende Methoden und Systeme können bei der Auswahl  
geeigneter Maßnahmen helfen. Deren Entwicklung ist Teil der Vorsorgeforschung, 
um die Bewältigung einer Katastrophe und die Wiederherstellung normaler  
Lebensbedingungen zu unterstützen. Die Unfälle in Tschernobyl und Fukushima 
haben die Wichtigkeit einer guten Vorbereitung und Bereitstellung notwendiger 
Werkzeuge aufgezeigt, insbesondere, um dann im Ereignisfall schnell und umfas-
send reagieren zu können.  
Im Rahmen dieser Arbeit wird eine Entscheidungsunterstützungsmethode vorge-
stellt, um geeignete Maßnahmen zum Schutz der Bevölkerung zu identifizieren. Die 
Arbeit ist Teil der Vorsorgeforschung mit dem Fokus auf kerntechnische Unfälle. 
Die entwickelte Methode berücksichtigt (i) das Problem der Unsicherheit in der Ent-
scheidungsfindung, (ii) die Einzigartigkeit der betrachteten Ereignisse, (iii) die 
strukturierte Integration von Erfahrung und Expertenwissen, (iv) die Durchfüh-
rungsreihenfolge der Maßnahmen, (v) die Integration von Akteuren mit unter-
schiedlichen Präferenzen und (vi) die Möglichkeiten der Anwendung mit Hilfe  
eines computergestützten Werkzeugs. 
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Den Kern dieser Methode bildet das Fallbasierte Schließen (CBR), ein Paradigma 
zur Problemlösung, welches auf der Annahme basiert, dass ähnliche Probleme ähn-
liche Lösungen besitzen. CBR löst Probleme mit Hilfe von Erfahrungswissen und 
orientiert sich an der Entscheidungsfindung von Experten in unsicheren und zeit-
kritischen Situationen. CBR beruht auf dem Prinzip, in einem aktuellen Ereignis auf 
ähnliche Ereignisse und deren Maßnahmen zurückzugreifen, um Lösungen für den 
aktuellen Problemfall zu erarbeiten. Aufgrund der geringen Anzahl historischer  
Ereignisse wird dieser Ansatz durch die Entwicklung geeigneter Szenarien erwei-
tert, um ein breites Spektrum an möglichen Ereignissen abzudecken. Ferner wird 
auf Basis von Petri-Netzen ein Modell entwickelt, um die Durchführungsreihen-
folge von Maßnahmen festzuhalten. Die abschließende Bewertung mehrerer Hand-
lungsalternativen erfolgt multikriteriell, um insbesondere viele Akteure mit unter-
schiedlichen Präferenzen anzusprechen. Die Arbeit wird durch eine prototypische 
Implementierung abgerundet und zeigt damit die Anwendbarkeit der entwickelten 
Methode auf. 
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Abstract  
Disasters are characterized by severe disruptions of the society’s functionality and 
adverse impacts on humans, the environment, and economy that cannot be coped 
with by society using its own resources. Their causes can be of technical, human, or 
natural origin. Nuclear disasters pose greater demands on decision-makers, since 
the release of radioactive substances may lead to long-term and transnational health 
risks for humans and environmental contamination. A nuclear disaster can be  
divided into several phases that are characterized by different measures for protect-
ing the public. During the early phase, decision-making is challenged by a great 
uncertainty in decisive information, whereas during the later phase, the difficulties 
lie in a multitude of possible measures and stakeholders with partially competing 
objectives that need to be taken into account. 
Decision support methods and systems can help determine measures for respond-
ing to and recovering from nuclear disasters. The accidents in Chernobyl and  
Fukushima particularly emphasized the need for a better preparedness and devel-
opment of tools to react quickly and comprehensively in case of an incident. 
This thesis presents a decision support method that identifies appropriate measures 
for protecting the public in the course of a nuclear accident. The method takes into 
account (i) the issue of uncertainty in decision-making, (ii) the exceptionality of this 
type of disaster, (iii) the structured integration of experience and expert knowledge, 
(iv) the implementation order of measures, (v) the integration of stakeholders with 
different preferences, and (vi) the applicability by means of a prototype. 
The core of the method is case-based reasoning, a problem-solving paradigm that 
utilizes knowledge from previously experienced problematic situations, which par-
ticularly corresponds to the decision-making behavior of experts under time pres-
sure and uncertainty. The idea is to reuse measures of similar accidents and to com-
bine them in an appropriate way to cope with a current disaster event. Due to few 
events in the past, the approach is enhanced by the development of scenarios to 
cover a wide range of possible kinds of accidents. Furthermore, combinations of 
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measures are modeled with the help of Petri nets to take their order of implemen-
tation into account. A subsequent multi-criteria assessment of different decision  
alternatives particularly addresses the issue of various preferences that need to be 
respected in the final decision. A prototype demonstrates the applicability of the 
method presented. 
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1 Introduction  
Large-scale disasters are characterized by severe disruptions of the society’s func-
tionality and adverse impacts on humans, the environment, and economy that can-
not be coped with by society using its own resources (UNDRR, 2017). Disaster man-
agement deals with “the organization, planning and application of measures 
preparing for, responding to and recovering from disasters” (UNDRR, 2017). Deci-
sion-making concerning appropriate measures during and in the aftermath of dis-
asters can be demanding and complex owed to a highly dynamic environment, a 
limited time frame, uncertainty, and presence of multiple stakeholders with possi-
bly competing objectives (Paton & Flin, 1999; van Borkulo, Scholten, Zlatanova, & 
van den Brink, 2005). Decisions can be made fast and intuitive, by remembering an 
appropriate procedure, which can be more time-consuming, or analytically where 
several possible courses of action need to be evaluated to select the best option 
(Paton & Flin, 1999). All three decision styles may be applied in the framework of 
disasters depending on the time and information available. Research on the behav-
ior of experts in such situations emphasizes the importance of experience and solu-
tions of known situations and particularly their reuse for tackling a current problem 
(Klein, 2008; Klein, Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 2010; Meso, Troutt, & 
Rudnicka, 2002; Paton & Flin, 1999). Being part of disaster management and espe-
cially preparedness, the development of decision supporting methods and systems 
can help identifying appropriate measures to respond to and recover from disasters.  
This thesis develops a decision support method built upon an experience-based de-
cision-making style which is enhanced by analytical approaches. This method is 
particularly elaborated by means of nuclear accidents. These types of disasters pose 
greater demands on decision-makers, since the release of radioactive substances 
may lead to long-term and transnational health risks for humans and environmen-
tal contamination. In the framework of nuclear accidents, disaster management is 
divided into on-site and off-site nuclear emergency management. This thesis partic-
ularly focuses on the latter and on measures outside a nuclear power plant that con-
cern the population being potentially affected.  
1 Introduction  
2 
1.1 Decision-Making in Nuclear Emergency Management 
The Chernobyl accident in 1986 initiated many developments towards a coherent, 
harmonized, and sensitive response to nuclear emergencies to counter confusion in 
the public, support an effective implementation of measures, and reduce stress lev-
els of the affected population, that, besides radiation impacts, may have negative 
health effects as well (Papamichail & French, 2013). In off-site emergency manage-
ment, a  
measure is an action intended to reduce or avert contamination (deposition of radio-
active material) or likelihood of contamination of a specific target.1  
Decision-making concerns the identification of a  
management strategy or strategy in short, which comprises several measures 
taking into account their order of implementation. A strategy aims at reduc-
ing the level of radiation exposure to human and, especially in the longer 
term, returning to normal living conditions.  
A decision is a choice of a measure or of several measures including their com-
bination to a strategy out of a set of possible measures, in consideration of the 
objectives defined in nuclear emergency management.  
The specific measures and objectives are explained in more detail in Chapter 3. The 
term ‘strategy’ is a common notion in nuclear emergency management and con-
cerns short- as well as long-term decisions. Since short-term measures intend to pro-
tect people from long-term consequences as well, a strategy always takes long-term 
objectives into account. As an example and which is explained more in detail in 
Chapter 3, an objective in nuclear emergency management is to protect people from 
radiation-induced health effects (somatic and hereditary) such as cancer induction. 
Decision-makers aim at balancing health risks against the gravity of intervening in 
people’s lives. For example, they decide between evacuation and advising people 
                                                          
1 This definition is based on the definition of ‘management option’ of (Nisbet et al., 2010). For clarity, 
the notion ‘measure’ is chosen throughout this thesis, which is a common notion in the field of appli-
cation as well. 
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to stay indoors. Evacuation is the most effective but also very disruptive measure. 
Hence, a strategy containing evacuation or staying indoors, determines the funda-
mental procedure of protecting the public. A plan would then present concrete steps 
for implementing the strategy. In case of evacuation, a schedule which groups are 
to be evacuated at which time would be specified more in detail. For example, the 
evacuation of hospital patients is in general complicated and requires a detailed 
preparation and a plan, respectively, in advance of an accident. Also, for the later 
phases of a nuclear accident when the focus is on decontamination, for example, the 
strategy would specify the measures to enable the affected population to return to 
their homes and particularly to normal living (see also Chapter 3). The concrete im-
plementation of the measures and which parts of the affected areas should be re-
garded first, would be part of a plan. The strategy would rather state to clean up the 
playgrounds first, for example.  
Decision support systems for off-site emergency management were built to predict 
the evolution and impact of a release (of radioactive material), the effectiveness of 
measures, and to support decision-making on recovery strategies. In particular, the 
early stages of such an accident demand fast decisions and reliable information 
whereas decisions on later recovery actions involve heterogeneous groups of stake-
holders and various decisive factors that need to be taken into account (Bertsch, 
Treitz, Geldermann, & Rentz, 2007). Particularly, stakeholder involvement and pub-
lic participation have emerged as important research topics (Papamichail & French, 
2013). Despite the constant work on the issues pointed out so far, the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear power plant accident in 2011 revealed new problems, such as long-
lasting releases and a foregoing tsunami that destroyed infrastructure and commu-
nities and caused a high death toll (Papamichail & French, 2013). Hence, learning 
and applying lessons learned may be limited without suitable adaptation mecha-
nisms or by focusing too much on the specifics of the incident to be learned of 
(Papamichail & French, 2013). 
Numerous papers focusing on different aspects of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
power plant accident have been published since 2011. For instance, they investigate 
lessons that have been learned so far (Labib & Harris, 2015; Nakamura & Kikuchi, 
2011; Omoto, 2013), focus on resilience engineering (Hollnagel & Fujita, 2013) or 
policy (Aoki & Rothwell, 2013), integrate social and technological aspects 
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(Pfotenhauer, Jones, Saha, & Jasanoff, 2012), or discuss the contribution of infor-
mation behavior to the disaster (Thatcher, Vasconcelos, & Ellis, 2015). Furthermore, 
the accident is compared to former nuclear accidents (Aoki & Rothwell, 2013; 
Konoplev et al., 2016; Mousseau & Møller, 2014; Steinhauser, Brandl, & Johnson, 
2014) and safety goals for reducing seismic and tsunami risks are subjects of re-
search as well (Saji, 2014). Also, assessments of environmental impacts are reviewed 
or presented (Song, 2018; Strand, Sundell-Bergman, Brown, & Dowdall, 2017) or 
monitoring results were summarized (Matsuda, Mikami, Sato, & Saito, 2017; Wada 
et al., 2016). In addition to retrospective analyses, the status of remediation (Hardie 
& McKinley, 2014) and findings concerning decontamination (Shiba et al., 2013) are 
presented. The overall objective of existing work is to understand causes and con-
sequences of the disaster and to learn from this experience to be better prepared for 
possible nuclear accidents in the future. 
With regard to emergency management, response during the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear power plant accident was impaired by the foregoing earthquake and tsu-
nami that caused a lack of electricity supply and extensive damage of transport in-
frastructure. Furthermore, inter alia, missing detailed pre-planned arrangements 
concerning protective actions as well as inconsistent information and some uncoor-
dinated decisions of the local and national governments contributed to the confu-
sion and uncertainty of the public emphasizing the need to enhance emergency pre-
paredness (Callen & Homma, 2017; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
2015b; Sihver & Yasuda, 2018). The latter particularly calls attention on severe acci-
dents also possibly linked to natural disasters. Furthermore, a lack of experience 
concerning decontamination challenged decision-making on appropriate strategies 
(Hardie & McKinley, 2014). Further issues that arose during the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear power plant accident were lack of cooperation at the European level and 
diverging as well as non-harmonized response in Europe, which lead to confusion 
amongst the public (ENCO for European Commission DG ENER, 2014; 
Investigation Committee on the Accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of 
Tokyo Electric Power Company, 2012). In summary, the complexity of the disaster, 
a lack of preparedness, missing experience, time pressure, and various stakeholders 
and decision criteria to be taken into account, complicated decision-making on ap-
propriate strategies for response and recovery within Japan as well as worldwide. 
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This thesis focus on developing a method that supports decision-making on appro-
priate response and recovery strategies in the course of nuclear accidents. 
Most decision support tools and methods for nuclear emergency management so 
far emerged from the Chernobyl accident and are mainly simulation-based or pur-
sue other approaches such as multi-criteria methods. In the following, decision sup-
port systems as well as decision support methods and concepts in respect of select-
ing appropriate measures are presented. 
1.1.1 Decision Support Systems and Methods in Nuclear 
Emergency Management 
Several comprehensive computerized systems for off-site nuclear emergency man-
agement resulted from projects partly financed by the European Commission, 
where several institutions from different European countries participated. These 
systems particularly account for the choice of measures and their effectiveness. Pure 
dispersion models and monitoring systems for situation awareness have not been 
regarded in this overview. 
The Real-time On-line Decision Support System for Off-Site Emergency Manage-
ment in Europe JRodos (Ehrhardt & Weis, 2000; Ievdin, Trybushnyi, Zheleznyak, & 
Raskob, 2010) provides support for all stages of a nuclear accident. The system de-
termines the dispersion and deposition of material released and models the transfer 
of radioactive material to feed- and foodstuff and to man. Furthermore, decision 
support concerning the choice of measures is provided. ARGOS (Hoe et al., 2009) is 
the equivalent to JRodos and both systems are installed throughout Europe and in 
some countries outside Europe. MOIRA (A Model-Based Computerised System for 
Management Support to Identify Optimal Remedial Strategies for Restoring Radio-
nuclide Contaminated Aquatic Ecosystems and Drainage Areas) (Gallego et al., 
2000) supports decision-making on radionuclide contaminated aquatic ecosystems. 
Apart from supra-regional decision support systems, local systems, such as SPEEDI 
for Japan, which has a worldwide version WSPEEDI (Chino, Ishikawa, & 
Yamazawa, 1993), or the NARAC system developed at the National Atmospheric 
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Release Advisory Center in the United States (Bradley, 2007), are in use. Compre-
hensive decision support systems such as JRodos particularly take into account rec-
ommendations of national and international commissions (ICRP, 2007). 
Besides simulation-based systems, decision support by means of measure assess-
ment is a subject of research. The focus is on multi-criteria methods (Geldermann et 
al., 2009; Kiker, Bridges, Varghese, Seager, & Linkov, 2005; Papamichail & French, 
2000, 2013; Ríos-Insua, Gallego, Jiménez, & Mateos, 2006; Zeevaert, Bousher, 
Brendler, Hedemann Jensen, & Nordlinder, 2001), secondary effects of measure  
application (Rafferty, 2001), or optimization algorithms to find response actions 
(Georgiadou, Papazoglou, Kiranoudis, & Markatos, 2010; Yumashev & Johnson, 
2017). Especially multi-criteria approaches are useful in the aftermath of a disaster 
or to be applied for preparedness to support decision-making. Multi-criteria  
decision analysis in general comprises several methods to support decision-making 
taking into account a variety of possibly conflicting objectives (Belton & Stewart, 
2002), which is particularly the case when deciding on long-term decontamination 
strategies. 
A further branch of research is the development of scenarios (French, Argyris, 
Haywood, Hort, & Smith, 2017), also in combination with multi-criteria methods 
(T. Comes, Wijngaards, & Van de Walle, 2015). The notion of ‘scenario’ is defined 
in Chapter 2.4 more in detail. However, the general idea is to allow a variety of 
possible event developments to be investigated during preparedness instead of fo-
cusing on a reasonable worst case scenario (French et al., 2017). 
Furthermore, handbooks for assisting the management of contaminated inhabited 
areas, food production systems, and drinking water in Europe following a radio-
logical emergency (J. Brown, Hammond, & Kwakman, 2009; Nisbet et al., 2010, 
2009) resulted from the project EURANOS (European approach to nuclear radio-
logical emergency management and rehabilitation strategies) with updated ver-
sions for United Kingdom (J. Brown, Watson, Nisbet, 2015; Nisbet & Watson, 2015a, 
2015b) and corresponding tools (Public Health England, 2015). They serve as guide-
lines for planning, response as well as training purposes and assist the strategy con-
struction process. The handbooks are generic and comprehensive and the contained 
knowledge is used in this thesis as well. 
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To particularly counter the harmonization issues in Europe in the course of the  
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident, the heads of the national nuclear 
and radiation safety regulators in Europe published a new approach which respects 
national arrangements but promotes the alignment of decisions across borders 
(HERCA & WENRA, 2014). In order to handle uncertainty in the early stages of an 
accident, a scheme referred to as the ‘HERCA-WENRA approach’, was presented. 
Recommendations concerning protective actions (evacuation, sheltering, and  
iodine thyroid blocking – further explanations in Chapter 3.1.1), were made keeping 
in mind four criteria, namely, ‘risk of core melt’, ‘containment integrity’, ‘wind  
direction’, and ‘time of release’. The HERCA-WENRA approach provides an outline 
on protective actions and particularly looks at severe accident scenarios from a more 
general point of view. Especially during the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant 
accident, estimations on the source term could not be made due to the loss of on-
site power. Hence, the local decision support system for protective actions could 
not be run. Another example to counter the above mentioned cooperation and har-
monization issue is NERIS - an European platform on preparedness for nuclear and 
emergency response and recovery, involving amongst others, authorities, opera-
tors, technical support organizations, non-governmental organizations, and  
research institutes (NERIS, 2014). Objectives are to share the knowledge throughout 
Europe, to achieve a better harmonization, and to support the development of tools 
and methods. 
Open issues 
The decision support systems and methods listed so far, help in selecting appropri-
ate measures and constructing a strategy. However, there is no system that directly 
identifies a strategy that can be further discussed. Hence, strategies need to be con-
structed with each new event by hand with the help of, for example decision sup-
port systems such as JRodos, to determine effectiveness values for chosen combina-
tions of measures.  
In general,  
an event is an occurrence of an incident that triggers the necessity of constructing 
and implementing a strategy. The term comprises historical and fictitious nu-
clear accidents. 
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The method of this thesis aims at automating strategy construction by identifying 
appropriate strategies directly serving as discussion basis. This solution particularly 
counters the lack of experience on the choice and combination of measures, which 
has shown in Japan in respect of long-term decontamination strategies. 
Furthermore, uncertainty is still a crucial issue in nuclear emergency management 
where the key uncertainties relate to the source term and the weather prognosis 
(French et al., 2017), which are mandatory for the simulation systems. Current re-
search focuses on constructing scenarios or improving simulation systems and 
multi-criteria decision analysis tools. Within the frame of this thesis, these ideas are, 
amongst others, taken up and integrated into a comprehensive decision support 
method. In addition to uncertainty and as has shown in Japan, decision-making in 
the beginning of such an accident is complicated by time pressure and a highly  
dynamic environment. This thesis particularly addresses these issues by taking a 
new direction through rough accident classifications and hence complements exist-
ing simulation-based decision support systems that require source term estimations 
and weather prognosis and hence numerical input data. 
Another open issue is the structured and automated reuse of experience and expert 
knowledge. As could be seen in Japan, experience concerning decontamination was 
sparse and demonstration projects to test certain measures, reports on former  
nuclear accidents, and handbooks provided the basis for decisions on strategies. 
This thesis particularly presents a solution that automatically reuse already existing 
knowledge for the right purpose.  
Addressed users 
The organization of emergency management is country-specific, differs in terms of 
whether decisions are made locally or nationally and at which level technical sup-
port is provided (Carter & French, 2005). Although the main activities (‘Monitor-
ing’, ‘Technical support and advice’, ‘Decision-making’, ‘Implementation of 
Measures’, Communication’) seem to be the same, a national decision-making cen-
ter tends to have structured advice including a technical evaluation group and pos-
sibly a social and economic advisory group giving advice to decision-makers. Local 
decision-making centers seem to be more variable with regard to advisory groups, 
strategic meetings and smaller ad hoc groups (Carter & French, 2005). The users 
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addressed by the work of this thesis are experts of radiation protection and nuclear 
safety providing technical support and advice of responsible authorities in decision-
making. 
1.2 Objectives of the Thesis 
The research question of this thesis is: How can decision-making in nuclear  
emergency management be supported taking into account the issues of time pres-
sure, uncertainty, multiple stakeholders as well as the exceptionality of the under-
lying events?  
This thesis aims at developing a decision support method that addresses the issues 
in emergency management that came up during and after the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear power plant accident. In particular, the objective of this thesis is to develop 
a decision support method, which 
 Identifies appropriate strategies: Measures as well as their implementation 
order are to be identified.  
 Provides support during all phases of a nuclear accident: Important infor-
mation for decision-making as well as strategies differ in the course of an  
accident. The decision-support method needs to take the different phases and 
their specialties into account.  
 Handles uncertainty: A key problem is uncertainty, especially in the  
beginning of an accident and before any radioactive material is released,  
respectively.  
 Integrates experience and expert knowledge: Knowledge on historical 
events and of experts should be the core of the method. 
 Takes into account multiple stakeholders: Especially in the later phases of 
an accident, the different objectives need to be respected in the decisions on 
strategies. 
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 Supports the harmonization work in Europe and interaction with existing 
tools: As mentioned before, the Fukushima accident revealed some difficul-
ties concerning response in Europe. Parts of this work resulted from the  
European project PREPARE2 where a close cooperation with experts from dif-
ferent European countries took place. In particular, this thesis aims at com-
plementing and building upon existing tools. 
 Is applicable in the context of emergency management. A prototype partic-
ularly should demonstrate the applicability of the presented method. 
To answer the overarching question, case-based reasoning (CBR), a problem-solv-
ing paradigm, which utilizes knowledge of previously experienced problematic sit-
uations (Aamodt & Plaza, 1994) is combined with the development of scenarios. 
The experience-based decision-making style is particularly new in nuclear emer-
gency management and corresponds to the behavior of experts under time pressure 
and uncertainty (Klein, 2008; Meso et al., 2002; Paton & Flin, 1999; Riesbeck & 
Schank, 1989). The notion of ‘scenario’ is not consistent in the literature resulting in 
diverse typologies and scenario construction techniques (Börjeson, Höjer, Dreborg, 
Ekvall, & Finnveden, 2006). In context of this work, a scenario is understood as a 
fictitious event underlying the same structure as a historical event (see Chapter 2.4). 
The idea is to determine possible accidents and appropriate strategies in advance to 
promote preparedness. Furthermore, the similarity concept and the adaptation 
mechanism of CBR allow for handling situations, which are not completely antici-
pated. The modeling of strategies is realized with the help of Petri Nets (Peterson, 
1981) taking into account the implementation order of measures. A multi-criteria 
assessment (Belton & Stewart, 2002) additionally supports the users in their final 
decision. The latter particularly addresses the issue of multiple stakeholders to be 
involved in decision-making. 
The decision support method identifies appropriate and comprehensive strategies 
during all phases of a nuclear accident (accident phases are defined in Chapter 3.1) 
                                                          
2 PREPARE – Innovative integrated tools and platforms for radiological emergency preparedness and 
post-accident response in Europe. https://resy5.iket.kit.edu/PREPARE/ 
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with the help of some outline data and on the basis of expert knowledge and expe-
rience. Also with reference to the problems that arose in Japan, this work aims at 
complementing existing decision support systems at times source term estimations 
are not available, providing first brief estimations on the area size where protective 
actions, based on pre-calculated scenarios, are to be implemented, and first sugges-
tions on strategies for the recovery phase. 
As mentioned in the introductory words, most decision support tools are simula-
tion-based or assist the construction of a strategy. This work takes a new direction 
and appeals to figuring out possible scenarios in advance to reuse them in future. 
This thesis provides a basic configuration of the set of attributes describing an acci-
dent as well as the similarity function and adaptation mechanism. Thus following 
limitations need to be clarified: 
 Flexibility is maintained deliberately: As can be seen in the course of this 
work, decision-making during nuclear emergencies is not only complex but 
also demands flexible integration and adjustments of decisive parameters. 
Hence, the rather common attribute-value based case representation and the 
local-global principle for the similarity assessment are central for this work. 
Other different and more complicated approaches are used in CBR at the  
expense of flexibility and understanding of the results which hence would be 
counterproductive. 
 Implementation is prototypical: As mentioned above, one objective of this 
work is the implementation of the presented method to show the principle 
applicability. Other issues, such as computational performance could be con-
sidered more in detail but are beyond the scope of this work. 
 Decisions are made by humans: This method should support the decision-
making process by identifying possible strategies serving as discussion  
basis. It is not intended to have the final say or making human decision or 
opinion redundant. 
 Decision support method represents an important building block: This 
work considers a part of the decision-making procedures and steps that need 
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to be taken in case of a nuclear emergency. The focus of this work is on deci-
sions on measures to protect the public or mitigate the radiological conse-
quences to the affected people in conjunction with re-establishing their nor-
mal lives. 
The decision space during crisis response can be divided according to the extent 
how cause and effect are discernable and understood (French & Niculae, 2005). Rec-
ognizing patterns and particularly recognition-primed decision-making (Klein, 
1993) to which CBR can be associated to, is assigned to the known space where 
cause and effect are known and predictions can be made. The events this thesis is 
dealing with leave the known space and particularly issues such as social or politi-
cal impacts need to be taken into account (French & Niculae, 2005). However, more 
and more knowledge on nuclear accidents is gained over the last years and despite 
the exceptionality of each event, one may not be completely left beyond the known 
space. Particularly scenario-building helps to be prepared for future events by 
thinking of possible accidents and event developments that might happen. In gen-
eral, CBR is considered as beneficial, if domain knowledge is incomplete (Leake, 
1996b) and decision-making during crises by those who are experienced are char-
acterized by recognition-primed decision-making (Klein & Clinton-Cirocco, 2010). 
Since crucial aspects such as public perception or public reassurance can be implic-
itly considered in the scenario-building, CBR in combination with scenarios is not 
regarded as to be associated to the known space only. Furthermore, the resulting 
CBR application is one component of a larger platform that tackles issues discussed 
for crisis management decision support systems, namely they focus primarily on 
short-term consequences and very detailed modeling neglecting collaboration, 
judgment building, and public communication (French & Niculae, 2005). Hence, the 
results of this thesis should not be seen as a complete decision support system that 
answer all the needs at hand but provide a discussion basis for measures that are 
gained with the help of models developed in close collaboration with experts. 
1.3 Publications within the Scope of the Thesis 
Several articles were published in conference proceedings and journals addressing 
parts of the research proposal. The early publications are associated to the non- 
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nuclear field and resulted from the KRITIS project3 supported by the Center for Dis-
aster Management and Risk Reduction Technology (CEDIM), the RiKoV4 project, 
and CEDIMs Forensic Disaster Analysis (FDA)5. These publications discuss mainly 
CBR related questions and present results with regard to the modeling and as-
sessing of strategies. However, experience and results gained in the non-nuclear 
field contributed to the final outcome presented in this thesis. The research leading 
to these results has received funding from the European Atomic Energy Commu-
nity Seventh Framework Programme FP7/2012-2013 under grant agreement 323287. 
Research is particularly conducted in the frame of the European project PREPARE 
(Innovative integrated tools and platforms for radiological emergency prepared-
ness and post-accident response in Europe) that aimed at closing gaps that have 
been identified in nuclear and radiological preparedness following the first evalua-
tion of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident. The project was headed 
by the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) and 46 institutions participated. The 
author of this thesis participated in a work package that aimed at developing meth-
ods to be integrated in an emergency management tool of European dimension for 
collecting, sharing, and exchanging information about an on-going nuclear or radi-
ological event, and analyzing potential consequences. Part of the results, especially 
the decision supporting component of the emergency management tool, is pre-
sented in this thesis. The author particularly created this thesis as part of the work 
at the Institute for Thermal Energy Technology and Safety of KIT. 
In the following, the publications are listed according to their type. Publications 
marked with * include self-given presentations. 
 
Journal articles 
Raskob, W., Möhrle, S., & Bai, S. (2016). Knowledge Database and Case-Based Rea-
soning. Radioprotection, 51(HS2), S185–S186. 
                                                          
3 http://www.cedim.de/english/1959.php 
4 http://www.rikov.de/ 
5 https://www.cedim.de/english/2863.php 
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Raskob, W., Möhrle, S., Bai, S., & Müller, T. (2016). Overview and Applicability of 
the Analytical Platform. Radioprotection, 51(HS2), S179–S180. 
Moehrle, S., & Raskob, W. (2015). Structuring and Reusing Knowledge from His-
torical Events for Supporting Nuclear Emergency and Remediation Manage-
ment. Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence, 46, Pt. B, 303–311. 
Conference articles and presentations 
Moehrle, S., Bai, S., Mueller, T., Munz, E., Trybushnyi, D., & Raskob, W. (2019). 
Triggering Events and Distributed Responsibilities, Capabilities of Web-
based Decision Support in Nuclear Emergency Management. In 4th NERIS 
Workshop, Adapting nuclear and radiological emergency preparedness, response and 
recovery to a changing world. Dublin, Ireland. (pp. 122-130). 
Lin, L., Moehrle, S., Muenzberg, T., & Raskob, W. (2014). A Decision Support  
Approach: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Security Measures by Scenario-
Based Multi-Criteria Analysis. In K. Thoma, I. Häring, & T. Leismann (Eds.), 
Future Security 2014: 9th Security Research Conference. Berlin, Germany (pp. 
266–273). 
Raskob, W., & Möhrle, S. (2014). Knowledge Databases as Instrument for a Fast 
Assessment in Nuclear Emergency Management. 3rd International Conference 
on Radioecology & Environmental Radioactivity (ICRER 2014). Barcelona, Spain. 
*Moehrle, S. (2014). On the Assessment of Disaster Management Strategies. In S.R. 
Hiltz, M.S. Pfaff, L. Plotnick, & P.C. Shih (Eds.), 11th International Conference 
on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management (ISCRAM 2014).  
Pennsylvania State University, USA. 
Münzberg, T., Müller, T., Möhrle, S., Comes, T., & Schultmann, F. (2013). An Inte-
grated Multi-Criteria Approach on Vulnerability Analysis in the Context of 
Load Reduction. In T. Comes et al. (Eds.), 10th International Conference on In-
formation Systems for Crisis Response and Management (ISCRAM 2013).  
Baden-Baden, Germany. 
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*Moehrle, S. (2013a). Modeling of Countermeasures for Large-Scale Disasters  
Using High-Level Petri Nets. In T. Comes et al. (Eds.), 10th International Con-
ference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management (ISRAM 
2013). Baden-Baden, Germany. 
*Moehrle, S. (2013b). Towards a Decision Support System for Disaster Manage-
ment. In R. D. J. M. Steenbergen et al. (Eds.), Safety, Reliability and Risk Analy-
sis: Beyond the Horizon - Proceedings of the European Safety and Reliability Confer-
ence, ESREL 2013. Amsterdam, The Netherlands (pp. 239–246). 
Lin, L., Brauner, F., Münzberg, T., Meng, S., & Moehrle, S. (2013). Prioritization of 
Security Measures Against Terrorist Threats to Public Rail Transport Sys-
tems Using a Scenario-Based Multi-Criteria Method and a Knowledge  
Database. In M. Lauster (Ed.), Future Security 2013: 8th Security Research Con-
ference. Berlin, Germany (pp. 195–204). 
*Moehrle, S. (2012). Generic Self-Learning Decision Support System for Large-
Scale Disasters. In L. Rothkrantz, J. Ristvej and Z. Franco (Eds.), 9th Interna-
tional Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management  
(ISCRAM 2012). Vancouver, Canada. 
Invited talks 
*Raskob, W., & Möhrle, S. (2017). Nuclear Emergency Response and Big Data 
Technologies. Invited talk on BDE Workshop on Big Data in Climate Action,  
Environment, Resource Efficiency and Raw Materials. Brussels, Belgium. 
Book articles 
Moehrle, S. & Raskob, W. (2019). Reusing Strategies for Decision Support in Disas-
ter Management – A Case-based High-level Petri Net Approach. In S. Y. 
Yurish (Ed.) Advances in Artificial Intelligence: Reviews, Book Series, Vol. 1. IFSA 
Publishing, S.L. (Barcelona, Spain). 
Posters 
Moehrle, S., Bai, S., Mueller, T., Munz, E., Trybushnyi, D., & Raskob, W. (2018). 
Web-based decision support system for emergency management – System 
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architecture and enhancement possibilities. In 4th NERIS Workshop, Adapting 
nuclear and radiological emergency preparedness, response and recovery to a chang-
ing world. Dublin, Ireland. 
Raskob, W., Müller, T., Möhrle, S., & Bai, S. (2016). The Analytical Platform of the 
PREPARE project. In 14th Congress of the International Radiation Protection  
Association (IRPA). Cape Town, South Africa. 
*Möhrle, S., Schoknecht, A., Raskob, W., & Oberweis, A. (2015). Ontology-Based 
Retrieval for Cased-Based Decision Support in Nuclear Emergency Manage-
ment. In 12th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response 
and Management (ISCRAM 2015). Kristiansand, Norway. 
Möhrle, S., & Mühr, B. (2015). Case-Based Damage Assessment of Storm Events in 
Near Real-Time. In Geophysical Research Abstracts, EGU2015-12293, General 
Assembly European Geosciences Union 2015 (Vol. 17). Vienna, Austria. 
Möhrle, S., & Raskob, W. (2014). Case-Based Analytical Support for Rapidly  
Assessing Natural Disasters. In 14. Forum Katastrophenvorsorge. Leipzig,  
Germany. 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 introduces the foundations of the de-
cision support method, which basically combines several methods. The integrated 
approach comprises the core method CBR, the development of scenarios, multi-cri-
teria decision analysis, and Petri nets. Each topic presented in this chapter includes 
overviews of related work. The following chapters present the key results of this 
thesis. At first, an overview of the developed decision support method of this thesis 
is given in Chapter 3. Assumptions made are clarified and the novelty of the  
approach is emphasized. The following chapters particularly present the compo-
nents of the decision support method more in detail. Chapter 4 explains the devel-
opment of the structure of the case base and especially expert participation as well 
as the development of the case model. This chapter closes with data collection. 
Chapter 5 presents how the similarity between two accidents is determined. The 
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reuse step of solutions of similar cases is explained in more detail in Chapter 6. Here, 
the merging of several Petri nets as well as a subsequent multi-criteria assessment 
of several strategies is presented. Chapter 7 is dedicated to the implementation of 
the developed method and shows the achievement of the objectives in the frame-
work of an evaluation. Chapter 8 concludes this thesis with a summary of the main 
results, evinces some limitations, and discusses future research topics and how 
open issues could be solved. 
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2 Foundations and Related Work  
The first part of this chapter motivates the usage of case-based reasoning (CBR) as 
core method of the decision support method developed in this thesis. This section 
gives an overview of the main aspects of CBR and introduces some concepts that 
are relevant for the work of this thesis. As an adjacent research field, Case-base 
planning (CBP) is shortly introduced as well. The application of CBR and CBP in 
disaster management is discussed, respectively. Thereafter, the notion of a scenario 
is clarified and their development in the framework of this thesis is motivated. Fur-
thermore, the purpose and use of multi-criteria decision analysis in disaster man-
agement is explained. Afterwards, modeling languages for strategies, particularly 
Petri Nets, are introduced. The foundation chapter concludes with a summary and 
discusses the methods chosen for handling the issues discussed in Chapter 1. 
2.1 Case-Based Reasoning 
CBR, which has its origins in cognitive science, is a problem-solving paradigm that 
utilizes specific knowledge of previously experienced problem situations to solve a 
new problem. The main assumption of CBR is that similar problems have similar solu-
tions. Specific knowledge that might be reused in similar situations contrasts with 
generalized knowledge to be applied by humans via inference. In general, a case is 
an experience of a solved problem and particularly contains the specific knowledge 
to be reused. Typically, a case consists of a problem and corresponding solution 
part. The problem part contains information to decide whether a case is reusable. 
The solution part contains information useful for reusing a case (Richter & Weber, 
2013). CBR can be described by a cycle of solving a problem and learning from this 
experience (Figure 2.1). Learning is an inherent by-product since the experience 
made in the course of problem-solving is retained (Aamodt & Plaza, 1994).  
At first, the problem to be solved needs to be identified and described. This descrip-
tion represents a new case or query for CBR. The first step of the cycle is to retrieve 
the most similar case or cases. Subsequently, the knowledge captured in the  
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retrieved cases are reused to solve the new problem. Afterwards, the solution pro-
posed is revised and possibly tested or repaired. Finally, the case base, which is a 
collection of stored cases, is updated by retaining the new experience and the con-
firmed solution, respectively. 
 
Figure 2.1:   CBR Cycle (Aamodt & Plaza, 1994, Figure 1) 
Each step can be viewed as a task to be achieved, which in turn involves several 
sub-tasks, which yet have various methods to be realized (Figure 2.2). Tasks are in 
bold letters, methods in normal letters. Plain lines denote task decompositions, 
which are complete. The top-level task is problem-solving and learning from expe-
rience. CBR is the way to accomplish this task and the four major tasks correspond 
to the steps illustrated in the cycle. The method set is incomplete and suggests  
alternative solutions to fulfill the tasks.  
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Figure 2.2:   Task-method decomposition of CBR (Aamodt & Plaza, 1994, Figure 2) 
Besides previous cases, a CBR system includes knowledge in terms of vocabulary 
and in particular knowledge representation, similarity measures, and adaptation 
knowledge (Richter, 1995). The vocabulary provides means to communicate the  
domain knowledge and is central for all commonly called ‘knowledge containers’  
(Figure 2.3). Indicated by the arrows, the knowledge is distributed over the contain-
ers and they depend on each other to solve the tasks (Richter, 1995). In the following, 
the knowledge containers are introduced in more detail. 
 
Figure 2.3:   Knowledge containers in case-based reasoning (Richter, 1995) 
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2.1.1 Vocabulary and Knowledge Representation 
The vocabulary chosen is the basis for describing the current problem and previous 
cases as well as for implementing similarity measures and adaptation mechanisms 
that means representing knowledge in a CBR system. The notion of knowledge is linked 
to experience and learning and is hence of dynamic nature (McInerney, 2002), being 
distinguished from data and information (Davenport & Prusak, 1998). Whereas 
data are objective facts that become information when a meaning is added, 
knowledge can be understood as expertise and assumptions gained from experi-
ence to be applied for evaluation and creation of more experience, practices, or val-
ues (Davenport & Prusak, 1998). Knowledge being more tacit (Polanyi, 1958) can be 
made explicit by sharing, explaining, recording, or documenting and hence creating 
a knowledge artifact (McInerney, 2002). With respect to CBR, the knowledge repre-
sentation refers to the content and structure of the case base and the appropriate 
organization and indexing for later retrieval and reuse, however in line with the 
general domain knowledge that may be useful for adaptation (Aamodt & Plaza, 
1994). Cases in form of texts, images, speeches, sensor data, or conversations  
are found in CBR systems whereas most commonly the attribute-value representa-
tion is used, to which the other representations may also be reduced to (Richter & 
Weber, 2013): 
Definition 2.1 Attribute/Attribute-value representation 
For a given set of objects 𝑈, an attribute 𝐴 assigns to each object 𝑢 ∈  𝑈 some 
value taken from 𝑑𝑜𝑚(𝐴), which is the domain of 𝐴. An attribute-value  
representation depicts a finite vector of attributes. 
Attribute domains can be numerical, textual, or an enumeration of symbols. The 
attribute types may also be classified according to different scales of measure: nom-
inal, ordinal, interval, and real and their corresponding operation possibilities  
(Table 2.1). Furthermore, attributes may be single-valued or many-valued. 
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Table 2.1:   Attribute types categorized according to different scales of measure 
Attribute 
type 
Description 
Mathematical  
operation 
Example 
Nominal Enumerable values =,≠ Seasons 
Ordinal Ordered values =,≠,≥,≤ School grades 
Interval 
Degree of difference 
between values deter-
minable, arbitrary 
zero value 
=,≠,≥,≤,+,− 
Temperature 
on Celsius 
scale 
Ratio 
As interval with 
unique zero value 
=,≠,≥,≤,+,−,∕,⋅ Speed 
 
The foundation for the attribute-value representation of cases is the local-global 
principle (Richter & Weber, 2013): 
Definition 2.2 Local-global principle 
The local-global principle says that each object 𝑂 is globally described by some 
construction operator ?̃? from the local elements: 𝑂 =  ?̃?(𝐴𝑖|𝑖 ∈ 𝐼), with 𝐼  
being an index set for the local elements 𝐴𝑖. 
According to this principle, objects can be described by elementary or local descrip-
tion elements, which can be assumed to be the attributes. In respect of similarity 
calculation, according to this principle it is possible to decompose the entire simi-
larity computation in local parts as well (Richter & Weber, 2013; Stahl, 2003). Hence, 
in the framework of similarity calculation, the local-global principle is very useful 
for complex case representations that consist of various attributes with different  
attribute types. 
An overview of different case representations can be found in the literature 
(Bergmann, Kolodner, & Plaza, 2006; Richter & Weber, 2013) as well as specialized 
applications (Bergmann, Wilke, Vollrath, & Wess, 1996; El-Sappagh & Elmogy, 
2015; B. Sun, Xu, Pei, & Li, 2003; Tran & Schönwälder, 2007). 
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As mentioned before, a case is typically divided into a problem and solution part. The 
distinction is not mandatory but useful for the purpose of this thesis. Hence, the 
description of a case comprises the description of a problem and its solution.  
The corresponding case base may be organized flat, object-oriented, by trees and 
graphs, hierarchies and taxonomies, or set-oriented. Except for the flat representa-
tion, the cases are linked through case features and all of these examples use  
attribute-values (Richter & Weber, 2013).  
In the context of vocabulary and knowledge representation, completeness and effi-
ciency are of major importance (Richter & Weber, 2013). Completeness refers to the 
coverage of all relevant properties and inclusion of all important concepts. Effi-
ciency refers to the effort of formulating knowledge with the given representation 
formalism and how efficient retrieval and computing similarity is. When introduc-
ing the results of this research (Chapter 3 and following), these two requirements 
are discussed more in detail. 
2.1.2 Similarity Measures 
Before introducing the notion of similarity and similarity measures mathematically, 
the meaning and purpose of ‘similarity’ need to be clarified. In general, two objects 
of interest are similar in a certain respect depending on what the focus is on, which 
can be appearance, content, or where they are physically located. Hence, one may 
always ask for the dimension in focus making similarity a subjective and applica-
tion dependent concept. Furthermore, gradiations are possible, that means one  
object A is at least similar to an object B as A to C is. This particularly defines a 
partial order relation where objects can be ranked due to their similarity to a certain 
object 𝐴. Hence, the nearest neighbors to A can be found on the top of the list, the 
objects, which are most similar to A. The nearest neighbor concept is particularly 
used widely in CBR applications following the intuition that closer means always 
better and, in the context of problem-solving, more useful (Richter & Weber, 2013). 
Relational models are independent of the representation of the objects to be ana-
lyzed. This changes when similarity needs to be expressed quantitatively in order 
to distinguish subtler between the similar objects. Usually, similarity measures are 
introduced returning a number between 0 and 1 to express the similarity between 
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two objects. The maximal similarity value is 1 which, in respect of problem-solving, 
hints to the highest usefulness of the solution returned back. This does not neces-
sarily mean, that the two problems to be analyzed are identical, but rather being the 
same in context of the questioning or with regard to the information available. An 
object being represented by certain features may lack information when searching 
for similar objects. In this case one would add the basis on which similarity is as-
sessed instead of solely the similarity value. Also with regard to problem-solving, 
in addition to the information situation, the task to be fulfilled may be referenced to 
when announcing the similarity value of two problem descriptions: 
Denote d1 and d2 two problem descriptions where l1 denotes the solution de-
scription of d1 and d2 has an empty solution part. The similarity value of d1 and 
d2 is 𝑥 ∈ [0,1] means it is assessed on the basis of information available and 
with the objective to find a solution to solve problem d2. The value x indicates 
the usefulness of l1 to solve d2. 
Similarity measures are used for implementing the retrieve step of CBR. They  
operate on problem descriptions. Thus a variety of possibilities exist for definition. 
Since the attribute-value representation is central for this thesis, attribute-based 
similarity concepts are regarded only. Representing similarity with the help of func-
tions particularly includes similarity and distance measures where distance-based 
similarity measures may be defined. They can typically be specified with the help 
of base functions that are monotonic increasing and decreasing for negative and 
positive distance, respectively (Stahl, 2003). Here, a subtraction of query features 
from the case features is assumed, for instance. In order to be a metric, distance 
measures need to fulfill several properties which could be discussed for similarity 
measures as well but which are not fulfilled in general. For this purpose, let 𝑃  
denote the set of problem descriptions.  
Definition 2.3 Similarity measure 
A similarity measure for 𝑃 is a function 
𝑓: 𝑃 × 𝑃 → [0,1]. 
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A value of 1 means maximal similarity whereas 0 means there is no similarity  
between the two problem descriptions. Typical properties investigated are: 
Reflexivity: 𝑓 is reflexive:⇔ ∀ 𝑥 ∈ 𝑃 ∶ 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑥) = 1. If it holds 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) = 1 ⇒ 𝑥 = 𝑦, the 
similarity measure is called strong reflexive. 
Symmetry: 𝑓 is symmetric:⇔ ∀𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑃: 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑓(𝑦, 𝑥). 
As mentioned before, similarity refers to the solutions of the cases, of which the 
most suitable are searched for. If the case base contains cases whose solutions are 
actually not useful for solving the corresponding problem, the reflexivity is vio-
lated. However, these cases might be valuable experiences in terms of indicating 
potential pitfalls. The strong reflexivity would exclude alternative solutions and 
hence might not be reasonable. Whether the symmetry property is valid depends 
on the application domain and if the problem description of the query has the same 
meaning as the problem description of the case used for comparison (Stahl, 2003). 
For example, lessons learned in the first situation may be useful for a second situa-
tion but lessons learned in a second situation may not be useful for the first one 
(Bergmann, 2002). The fulfillment of the strong reflexivity, symmetry as well as the 
triangle inequality is demanded for distance measures to be a metric. Distance 
measures and similarity measures can be treated mathematically equivalently by 
applying bijective order-inverting mappings 𝑔 (Burkhard & Richter, 2001). The 
translation of the triangle inequality of distance metrics to similarity measures 
would be 
𝑔(𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦)) + 𝑔(𝑓(𝑦, 𝑧)) ≥ 𝑔(𝑓(𝑥, 𝑧)) 
with order-inverting functions 𝑔. For example, 𝑔(𝑥) = 1 − 𝑥 leads to 
Triangle inequality: 𝑓 fulfills the triangle equality:⇔ ∀𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑃: 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) + 𝑓(𝑦, 𝑧) ≤
1 + 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑧). 
Nevertheless, the metric property is not mandatory for distance or similarity 
measures (Burkhard & Richter, 2001) 
In case of more complex case representations where different attribute types are 
involved, the local-global principle facilitates the modeling of similarity measures 
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by decomposing the similarity assessment. Local similarities between attribute val-
ues are considered and then composed to a global similarity for the entire cases. 
Hereby, the linear independence of the attributes is presumed, particularly since 
the global similarity measure only access the local similarity values but not to the 
actual attribute values. If two attributes are linear dependent, the similarity only 
changes in one direction, due to a change of a certain attribute value, if the depend-
ent attribute changes its value, too. In order to dissolve linear dependency, virtual 
attributes may be introduced that explicitly describe the dependency (Richter & 
Weber, 2013).  
Definition 2.4 Local similarity function 
A local similarity function for an attribute 𝐴 is a function 
𝑓𝐴: 𝑑𝑜𝑚(𝐴) × 𝑑𝑜𝑚(𝐴) → [0,1]. 
In order to express the individual importance of attributes, weights can be intro-
duced:  
Definition 2.5 Attribute weight vector 
For attributes 𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛 describing the problems, 
?⃗⃗? = (𝑤1 , … , 𝑤𝑛) with 𝑤𝑖 ∈ [0,1] and  ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 = 1 
denotes the attribute weight vector, where each 𝑤𝑖  is called the attribute weight 
for 𝐴𝑖. 
There are different weight models such as globally valid, case specific, or user spe-
cific that can be combined, if required (Stahl, 2003). Attribute weights play a crucial 
role in the retrieval step. Furthermore, they are also used to compensate imperfect 
attribute choices to describe the problems at hand where several methods exist to 
assign weights automatically with little or no domain knowledge (Wettschereck & 
Aha, 1995). Weights and particularly retrieval can be improved through learning 
(Bonzano, Cunningham, & Smyth, 1997; S. W. Lin & Chen, 2011) or optimization 
(Ahn, Kim, & Han, 2006; Z. Liao, Mao, Hannam, & Zhao, 2012; Shin & Han, 1999; 
Wu, Li, & Liang, 2013; A. Yan, Shao, & Guo, 2014; Zhang, Coenen, & Leng, 2002). 
Moreover, weights can also be determined systematically with the help of domain 
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experts (Park & Han, 2002). The overall objective here is to improve similarity  
assessment, also by considering similarity functions locally and globally (Stahl, 
2003; Stahl & Gabel, 2006). In contrast to modeling similarity functions  
directly, learning methods that incorporate qualitative feedback, establish an order 
between the cases without determining exact distances between them (Cheng & 
Hüllermeier, 2008). 
Definition 2.6 Global similarity function 
Assuming the problems are described by attributes 𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛, a global similar-
ity function for 𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛 is a function  
𝑓: 𝑃 × 𝑃 → [0,1] 
which is represented by some aggregation function 𝜎: [0,1]2𝑛 → [0,1] that  
aggregates the local similarities: 
𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝜎(𝑓𝐴1(𝑥1, 𝑦1), … , 𝑓𝐴𝑛(𝑥𝑛 , 𝑦𝑛), ?⃗⃗? ), 
where 𝑥𝑖 denotes the value of x for attribute 𝐴𝑖, 𝑓𝐴𝑖  the local similarity meas-
ure for 𝐴𝑖, and ?⃗⃗?  the attribute weight vector. 
The local-global principle gives rise to an axiom for composite measures, which is 
the global monotonicity axiom that states that a higher global similarity results by at 
least one higher local similarity (Burkhard & Richter, 2001): 
𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) > 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑧) ⇒ ∃𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛} ∶ 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖) > 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖). 
As mentioned before, distance measures can be transformed to similarity measures 
by appropriate functions. This can be done for local as well as global similarity 
measures. However, transformation and aggregation do not commute in general. 
The representation formalism for local and global similarity measures depends on 
the respective attribute types and case representation (Boriah, Chandola, & Kumar, 
2008; T. W. Liao, Zhang, & Claude, 1998; Richter & Weber, 2013). Furthermore, there 
are global measures that handle numerical and nominal input values at the same 
time which are called heterogeneous distance functions (Wilson & Martinez, 1997). 
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Often, domain knowledge is structured and made explicit with the help of ontolo-
gies. An ontology specifies a conceptualization of knowledge (Gruber, 1993) con-
taining the objects of interest and their relationships. Retrieval mechanisms differ, 
such as focusing on the path length for similarity calculation (Zhao, Cui, Zhao, Qiu, 
& Chen, 2009), combining hierarchical and path-based approaches (Y. Guo, Peng, 
& Hu, 2013), or concentrating on concept-based approaches (Recio-García, Díaz-
Agudo, González-Calero, & Sánchez-Ruiz-Granados, 2007) with the addition of fill-
ers of common attributes (Assali, Lenne, & Debray, 2009). Some CBR systems are 
enhanced by Fuzzy Set Theory (Zadeh, 1965) and particularly use fuzzy retrieval 
and fuzzy integral, respectively, to account for the interactiveness of features and 
improve the commonly used weighted average model to determine the overall sim-
ilarity (Lee, Barcia, & Khator, 1995; X. Z. Wang & Yeung, 2000). Fuzzy set theory is 
particularly interesting with regard to uncertainty issues concerning attribute val-
ues. Another example is a hybrid similarity measure taking into account crisp sym-
bols, crisp numbers, interval numbers, fuzzy linguistic variables, and random vari-
ables (Fan, Li, Wang, & Liu, 2014).  
The knowledge contained in similarity measures strongly depends on the vocabu-
lary chosen and if semantics of the attributes is taken into account. The local 
measures consider the knowledge each attribute contains whereas the aggregation 
function controls their influences on the overall solution. Local and global similarity 
measures together need to reflect the meaning of a useful solution in the application 
domain and for the user, respectively. However, the adaptation knowledge is  
responsible as well to improve the solution of an already solved problem. 
2.1.3 Adaptation Knowledge 
As shown in Figure 2.2, two possibilities exist for reusing the solution of the already 
solved problem: either the retrieved problem is the same under the conditions dis-
cussed in Chapter 2.1.2 to the current one and its solution is successful, then the 
solution can be copied, or there are slight differences in the problem descriptions 
and the solution has to be adapted. Adapting a solution can again be realized in two 
ways: either the previous solution strategy is used to generate a new solution, which 
is called derivational reuse (Aamodt & Plaza, 1994), or the solution itself is taken 
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and transformed, what is meant by transformational reuse (Aamodt & Plaza, 1994), 
where the transformation is implemented by rules (Richter & Weber, 2013): 
Φ1 ∧ ⋯∧ Φ𝑛 ⇒ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
where Φ𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 are preconditions referring to the attribute values that need to 
be fulfilled to perform an action. An action can be formalized as an operator  
𝑜𝑝: 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 → 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 
where a state refers to a case description or parts of it. Operators may add, delete, 
or modify attribute values and be iterated. Particularly, several operators 𝑜𝑝𝑖 , 𝑖 =
1, … , 𝑛 may be concatenated in order to get the desired result: 
𝑜𝑝 = 𝑜𝑝𝑛 ∘ ⋯ ∘ 𝜊𝑝1 
where the preconditions of each operator must not be violated by the results of the 
preceding operator.  
If adapting a solution is difficult or not possible, query changes may pose another 
alternative particularly when they are insufficiently formulated (Richter & Weber, 
2013). Here, rules may be applied to a problem description such as computing at-
tribute values that are not specified or queries need to be corrected due to incon-
sistency, implausibility, or self-interest of the initiator of the CBR application. Fur-
thermore, similarity and adaptation efforts may contrast to each other. That means 
a high similarity value does not implicate low adaptation costs. An idea is to  
account for the application costs of the necessary operator sequence in the final sim-
ilarity value. Hence, the search for the most useful case would extend the search 
space by all possible adaptation operator sequences. The search may not terminate 
and hence should stop when the solution is sufficiently good. Heuristics may help 
to reduce the search space and realize an efficient adaptation (Richter & Weber, 
2013). In general, measures to determine how well CBR works for a specific prob-
lem-solving topic can be appropriate (see Chapter 2.1.4).  
Another form of adaptation is to reuse the solution process. For example in the field 
of planning, the path of decisions can be replayed by instantiating the specific vari-
ables in order to get a new plan. Thereby, decisions are reconstructed (Richter & 
Weber, 2013; M. M. Veloso & Carbonell, 1993). Particularly for plans, adaptation can 
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be categorized to transformational and derivational adaptation. The latter corre-
sponds to plan replay and transformational analogy refers to transformation oper-
ators converting existing plans into new ones (Hammond, 1986; Muñoz-Avila & 
Cox, 2008). 
Adaptation does not only affect a single case but might regard several retrieved 
solutions as well. Sometimes a problem needs to be decomposed into several sub-
problems that are analyzed separately or several cases and their solutions are nec-
essary to solve the current problem. Each solution may then be adapted and inte-
grated into an overall solution afterwards. For this work, cases are decomposed 
(Chapter 3.1.1) and several solutions are reused as well (see Chapter 6). 
Solutions can be adapted manually by the user or automatically by the system. For 
the latter, adaptation knowledge can be gained in advance or during the problem-
solving process. Furthermore, learning techniques play an important role for  
acquiring adaptation knowledge as well, primarily by using domain knowledge 
and the case base (Craw, Wiratunga, & Rowe, 2006; Hanney & Keane, 1996; 
Jarmulak, Craw, & Rowe, 2001; Li, H., Li, X., Hu, D., Hao, T., Wenyin, L., & Chen, 
2009; Wilke, Vollrath, Althoff, & Bergmann, 1997). For example leave-one-out  
retrieval experiments help generating adaptation examples by pair-by-pair case 
comparisons and by considering attribute value and solution differences, respec-
tively, which are generalized by learning algorithms afterwards. Particularly, simi-
larity values restrict the interesting candidates. Another learning technique refers 
to learning the number of neighboring cases to perform the weighted majority vot-
ing (Michie, Spiegelhalter, & Taylor, 1994) by applying leave-one-out tests as well 
(Wettschereck & Aha, 1995). However, besides choosing an appropriate algorithm 
and learning adaptation knowledge, the question how to integrate new adaptation 
knowledge into the available knowledge needs to be taken care of as well (Wilke et 
al., 1997). In addition, knowledge discovery techniques support semi-automatic ad-
aptation knowledge acquisition (D’Aquin et al., 2007) or CBR can be applied to the 
adaptation process for learning and reapplying adaptation knowledge (Kinley, 
2001; Leake, Kinley, & Wilson, 1995). 
Different methods of adaptation can be classified according to domain knowledge 
requirement, type of adaptation knowledge, and if learning capabilities are  
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included (Mitra & Basak, 2005). Figure 2.4 classifies adaptation knowledge distin-
guishing between static and dynamic adaptation, particularly between rule-based 
and model-based approaches and if the whole adaptation case or path towards ad-
aptation is stored. Furthermore, weights being part of model-based approaches or 
ranking the retrieved cases may be inductively gained by the system. 
 
Figure 2.4:   Types of adaptation knowledge (Mitra & Basak, 2005, Figure 4) 
Figure 2.5 gives a brief overview of the different adaptation methods and their char-
acteristics. The methods are depicted on a white background, the different classes 
are illustrated in grey rectangles. Adaptation methods found in the survey use  
genetic algorithms, Bayesian networks, are guided by constraint satisfaction, un-
derlie a substitution-based model, apply derivational replay, use substitutions and 
transformations or calculate average values taking all relevant cases as input (rank-
ing retrieved cases). Particularly the knowledge intensity distinguishes the different 
methods and if learning mechanisms are incorporated. Adaptive adaptation meth-
ods use machine learning techniques to learn adaptation knowledge whereas non-
adaptive methods use static rules. Implementation dependent methods can be  
implemented in an adaptive and non-adaptive way, which is depicted by the dotted 
lines in Figure 2.5. The upper part illustrates classification based on domain 
knowledge requirement whereas the lower part indicates learning capabilities. 
2.1 Case-Based Reasoning 
33 
 
Figure 2.5:   Classification of adaptation methods based on domain knowledge requirement and learn-
ing capabilities (Mitra & Basak, 2005, Figures 2 and 3) 
2.1.4 Evaluation Measures 
The core of the CBR approach is a case base that stores knowledge to be applied in 
the frame of a newly occurring problem. With regard to case acquisition, initial 
cases need to be provided, on which the system builds on further knowledge. The 
case base competence outlines the range of problems the CBR system can solve and 
may indicate if further cases are necessary to achieve a certain performance level or 
if other knowledge containers need to be enhanced (Leake & Wilson, 2011). Several 
empirical approaches estimate competence either by using the existing case base so 
far or uniformly sampling the problem space to test whether the sampled points are 
expected to be solvable and for which a criterion need to be defined. These  
approaches can particularly be used to predict marginal coverage benefit of next 
case addition as well as the number of cases required for maximal coverage (Leake 
& Wilson, 2011). Case base competence is particularly used during maintenance 
where knowledge is added, deleted, or modified (Smiti, 2011; Smyth & McKenna, 
2001) where several approaches for modeling competence exist (Massie, Craw, & 
Wiratunga, 2005; Smiti & Elouedi, 2013; Smyth & McKenna, 1998, 1999). 
Another method to evaluate a CBR system is to estimate the confidence in the solu-
tion by using information from the case base and values that are calculated as part 
of the CBR process (Cheetham, 2000; Cheetham & Price, 2004; García, Orozco, & 
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Arcos, 2007) or specifically to assess the confidence in adaptation rules (Jalali & 
Leake, 2013). ‘Trustworthiness’ is a synonymous concept supporting the user 
whether to use the suggested solution or not and whether the query falls within the 
realm of expertise of the case base (Chua & Tischer, 2004; Horsman, Laing, & 
Vickers, 2012; A. Yan & Wang, 2015). Another concept is the ‘reliability’ of a sug-
gested solution that is the estimated probability that the solution is correct whereas 
the ‘compatibility’ reflects to what extent the case library supports the main  
assumption that similar cases have similar solutions (Xu, Wang, Ma, & Lin, 2010). 
This assumption may be challenged, for example, for classification tasks at class 
boundaries or if relevant factors affecting the solution are not integrated in the case  
representation. 
In general, a variety of approaches to evaluate CBR systems exist ranging from 
measuring the quality of the generated solutions to, for example, computation time 
(Oehlmann, 1998). Furthermore, besides evaluating one CBR system and particu-
larly to which degree an application problem has been solved, the notion of evalu-
ation may also refer to comparing different systems as well as comparing system 
development methodologies (Althoff, 1995). In the frame of this work, evaluation 
and particularly the evaluation method are discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. 
2.1.5 Uncertainty in Attribute Values 
In real world problems, one may not assume that case descriptions are complete 
and each attribute value is available in a clear-cut manner but rather that the classi-
cal true-false paradigm often does not apply. Some description parts are missing, 
values are not known exactly or are vaguely described. Or, instead of exact values, 
the degree of a property or its probability is known (Richter & Weber, 2013).  
Although cases are verified before entering the case base, it is not guaranteed that 
for each case the same amount of information is available. Hence, some attribute 
values might be missing or could not be described in the same precise manner as 
for other cases. The same goes with current problems being formulated incom-
pletely, for example. Hence, uncertainties in the case base as well as query formu-
lation have impacts on the similarity calculation, the reuse step, and obviously on 
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the final result. To sum up, the crucial point here is the uncertainty that arises in the 
solutions which at least partly originates from uncertain initial descriptions. 
When analyzing uncertainty in the context of decision-making, it is naturally con-
nected to blocked or delayed action and depends on the decision-making model to 
be employed (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). A classification approach would be accord-
ing to its issue and source. So, for decision-makers, the situation, the outcome, and 
the alternatives are uncertain caused by incomplete information, insufficient under-
standing, and undifferentiated alternatives (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). Three strate-
gies are suggested to cope with uncertainty: (1) to reduce uncertainty by collecting 
additional information, deferring decisions or extrapolating with statistical meth-
ods, making assumptions or even predictions and scenario-building, respectively. 
Another approach is to react beforehand by controlling the source of variability; (2) 
to acknowledge uncertainty through consideration when evaluating options or 
completely avoid uncertainty by preferring clear outcomes; (3) to suppress uncer-
tainty by denial or rationalization (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). 
Hence, the notion of uncertainty is used differently. Within the scope of this thesis, 
the focus is particularly on uncertainty in attribute values, the representation possi-
bilities and how to integrate them in the CBR cycle. One may distinguish between 
missing, vague, and probabilistic information. Vague information cannot be  
described in a clear-cut manner and may also refer to imprecisions resulting from 
measurement errors. For probabilistic information probability values reflect the cor-
rectness of a value. Incomplete information refers to missing values and is handled 
like information gaps. The objective is to extent modeling efforts and make uncer-
tainty, at least in the retrieve and reuse step of CBR, transparent. To overcome other 
sources of uncertainty such as insufficient understanding and undifferentiated al-
ternatives, may be alleviated by additional information and support in the problem-
solving process or by integrating additional methods such as multi-criteria decision 
analyses (see Chapter 2.5).  
The following chapter gives a brief overview on possibilities to represent uncer-
tainty in attribute values and outlines consequences for retrieval. Other uncertain-
ties that are linked with the method itself and the design of a CBR system, may be 
alleviated with the help of different evaluation measures (Chapter 2.1.4). 
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Vague information 
Besides measurement errors, human usage of language is often prone to imprecise 
statements. Instead of exact temperatures, for instance, descriptions such as ‘cold’ 
or ‘warm’ are used. Different approaches may be used to handle such kind of  
information.  
Multi-valued logic 
The classical two-valued logic can be extended to finitely many or even infinitely 
many truth values (fuzzy logic), at first introduced by Jan Lukasiewicz (McCall, 
1973; Woleński, 2004). The number of possible values may depend on the applica-
tion domain, for example, suggesting no more than nine levels of distinction in  
ordinary human discourse (Schwartz, 1991). In case of a manageable amount of 
truth values, the similarities between them can be defined explicitly. 
Interval arithmetic 
Unprecise values may also be expressed with upper and lower bounds, which can 
be further processed by means of interval arithmetic (Moore, Kearfott, & Cloud, 
2009). However, if a variable appears repeatedly in a formula, precision decreases. 
The interval width would be extended artificially. Another possibility to process 
intervals in the retrieve step is to examine interval intersections. One may note here, 
that intervals may intersect or one interval lies completely in another. The intersec-
tion width would be the same but possibly not the interpretation. If the query inter-
val is subsumed of the case interval, the case may be more interesting than just in-
tersecting query and case intervals. Similarities may also be determined between 
values and intervals and vice versa considering how symmetrical an interval  
encloses a value taking the interval width into account (Shi, Xin, & Dong, 2011). 
Fuzzy Sets 
Fuzzy sets (Zadeh, 1965) enhance ordinary sharp sets in which objects are either 
included or not. Given a set X as universe of discourse with elements x, a fuzzy set 
A of X is described by a membership function 𝜇𝐴: 𝑋 → [0,1], where 𝜇𝐴(𝑥) represents 
the degree of membership of x in A. Basic definitions for sets such as union, inter-
section, and complementation as well as containment and emptiness are extended, 
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always referring to membership functions (Zadeh, 1965). Integrating fuzzy sets into 
CBR and in particular into case representation and retrieval refers to membership 
functions as well (Bonissone & Cheetham, 1997; Dvir, Langholz, & Schneider, 1999). 
For retrieval, the integral method takes the intersection of the areas between the 
membership functions and the x-axis into account, assumed that the two fuzzy 
functions are not disjoint. The crisp method would regard the distance between the 
maxima of the membership functions (Richter, 2004). However, the shape of the 
curves would be irrelevant, hence making a combination of both approaches rea-
sonable (Richter & Weber, 2013). Furthermore, similarities between crisp and fuzzy 
values may be assessed by corresponding degrees of membership. Different mem-
bership functions can be defined for different attribute-value pairs and hence mak-
ing this approach case-specific. 
Rough Sets 
Another mathematical concept to handle imprecision is rough set theory (Pawlak, 
1982). In contrast to fuzzy set theory, imprecision is expressed by a boundary region 
of a set instead of a partial membership. A famous example is the classification of 
cases given their attribute values. If a crisp classification is impossible, rough set 
theory allows lower- and upper-set approximations and cases belonging to a 
boundary between certain cases (Sankar K. Pal & Shiu, 2004). The lower approxi-
mation contains all objects that certainly belong to a specific set whereas the upper 
approximation contains all objects that possibly belong to that specific set. The 
boundary region that contains objects that neither can be assigned to that specific 
set nor cannot be assigned to it, poses the uncertainty area. If the boundary region 
is nonempty, the corresponding set is rough, otherwise the set is crisp. The role of 
that area is to give the user additional information and possibilities for precaution-
ary actions (Richter & Weber, 2013). 
Central for rough set theory is the indiscernibility relation, where attribute values 
of two objects are identical in relation to a considered subset of attributes (Rissino 
& Lambert-Torres, 2009) expressing the fact that some objects may not be discerna-
ble due to lack of knowledge. With respect to CBR, rough sets are typically used for 
feature weighting and selection and particularly memory size reduction 
(Fernández-Riverola, Díaz, & Corchado, 2007; Chun-che Huang & Tseng, 2004; Y. 
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Jiang, Chen, & Ruan, 2006; Z. Jiang et al., 2016; Salamó & López-Sánchez, 2011) or 
for developing a general similarity relation (Greco, Matarazzo, & Slowinski, 2006). 
Probabilistic information 
Probabilistic information deals with information whose correctness cannot be guar-
anteed, and that may underlie a certain probability distribution. The challenge here 
is to identify appropriate probability distributions to quantify uncertainty. Proba-
bility values for certain attribute values can, for example, enter the attribute weights 
to take into account their uncertainty in the similarity calculation. In order to handle 
probabilistic issues in CBR, other approaches such as Bayesian Networks (F. V. 
Jensen, 1996; Pearl, 1988) can be integrated. A Bayesian network models a set of 
variables and their conditional probabilities with a directed acyclic graph and pro-
vides its own inference mechanism. For instance, a hybrid system may handle com-
mon situations as well as outliers (Bruland, Aamodt, & Langseth, 2011) or Bayesian 
networks can be used for structuring the case base and calculate similarity (Gomes, 
2004). Requiring a more in-depth domain knowledge, Bayesian networks contrast 
with the more heuristic philosophy of CBR. However, an appropriate integration in 
the CBR cycle or hybrid systems, respectively, may complement CBR in terms of 
probabilistic issues. 
Incomplete information 
One may think of several reasons, why problems can only be partially described, 
such as non-availability at a specific date, high procurement costs, effort, or  
expenditure of time. For countering incomplete information, initial descriptions can 
be refined or methods can be implemented to handle incrementally-built case  
descriptions, particularly for conversational CBR (Carrick, Yang, Abi-Zeid, & 
Lamontagne, 1999). In the following, several possibilities to handle unknown attrib-
ute values are presented to be applied to ordinal attribute types. The detailed over-
view can be found in (Bogaerts & Leake, 2004). 
Default Difference 
Here, a fixed default difference value is assigned whenever a feature is unknown. 
For a local similarity function, a value of 1 represents a very optimistic view 
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whereas 0 assumes the worst case scenario. A local similarity function 𝑓𝐴 is hence 
adapted to 
𝑓?̃?(𝑞𝐴, 𝑐𝐴) = {
𝑘, 𝑐𝐴 𝑜𝑟 𝑞𝐴 𝑢𝑛𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛
𝑓𝐴(𝑞𝐴, 𝑐𝐴), 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
with 𝑘 ∈ [0,1], 𝑞𝐴 the attribute value of the query for attribute 𝐴, and 𝑐𝐴 the attribute 
value of the case for attribute 𝐴. If cases in the case base are completely described, a 
change in the default value does not affect the ranking of similar cases. However, 
decreasing 𝑘 may favor stored cases for which more features are known, particu-
larly if the query as well as descriptions of stored cases are only partially described. 
Furthermore, values of 𝑘 need to be manually updated, especially to be aligned with 
the case base. 
Full Mean 
Here, missing values are replaced with the mean (or mode in case of symbolic  
attributes) of the corresponding attribute values. Denote 𝐶𝐵 the set of cases of the 
case base for which the attribute values are known. If the set is empty, a default 
value 𝑘 ∈ [0,1], is taken again: 
𝑘∗ = {
∑ 𝑐𝐴𝑐∈𝐶𝐵
|𝐶𝐵|
,  𝐶𝐵 ≠ ∅
𝑘, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
Where 𝑐𝐴 is the value of the case for attribute 𝐴. Hence, a corresponding local simi-
larity function is as follows: 
𝑓?̃?(𝑞𝐴, 𝑐𝐴) = {
𝑘, 𝑐𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑞𝐴 𝑢𝑛𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛
𝑓𝐴(𝑘
∗, 𝑐𝐴), 𝑞𝐴 𝑢𝑛𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛
𝑓𝐴(𝑞𝐴, 𝑘
∗), 𝑐𝐴  𝑢𝑛𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛
𝑓𝐴(𝑞𝐴, 𝑐𝐴), 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
with 𝑘 ∈ [0,1], 𝑞𝐴 the attribute value of the query for attribute 𝐴, and 𝑐𝐴 the attribute 
value of the case for attribute 𝐴. If 𝑞𝐴 and 𝑐𝐴 are unknown, it might be better to 
choose a default value instead of replacing 𝑐𝐴 and 𝑞𝐴 with 𝑘
∗, which would lead to 
maximal similarity.  
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Full mean ignores feature’s distribution and dependencies between features. This 
should be partially tackled with the Nearest neighbor mean and Region mean, pre-
sented in the following. The computing effort for Full mean and Default difference 
is low, yet they both produce comparatively poor results (Bogaerts & Leake, 2004). 
Nearest Neighbor Mean 
In alignment with CBR, Nearest neighbor mean predicts attribute values based on 
values of the nearby cases. If values are missing, the approaches presented before 
may be applied. If attributes are interdependent, filtering the case base according to 
attributes correlated to the missing one enhance weighted nearest neighbor  
approaches (Jagannathan & Petrovic, 2009). Nearest neighbor mean is an expensive 
approach, since for each unknown attribute value, a retrieval before the actual CBR 
retrieval has to be conducted. However, the results are better than of Full mean or 
Default Difference (Bogaerts & Leake, 2004). 
Region Mean 
Region mean works with the positive aspects of Full mean and Nearest neighbor 
mean by clustering the case base to determine prototypes containing mean values 
of the corresponding classes. In the retrieve step of CBR, the missing value of an 
attribute is replaced by the value of the nearest prototype. Since the prototypes are 
calculated offline, the online computation is faster for Region Mean than for Nearest 
neighbor mean with similar error values (Bogaerts & Leake, 2004). 
Further approaches 
To handle unknown values, one may impute values that contribute to the similarity 
in an optimistic or pessimistic way that means maximizing or minimizing the final 
similarity values. Furthermore, values with the highest likelihood may pose an ap-
propriate candidate (Richter & Weber, 2013). However, this approach may face a 
general problem in application domains of CBR, which is poor domain knowledge. 
If probability distributions are not taken into account and the domain of an attribute 
is known, one may estimate similarity by trying out all possible values for the spe-
cific attribute of which the value is unknown. 
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2.1.6 Advantages and Drawbacks of CBR 
CBR offers many application possibilities and has been applied in various fields. 
One may distinguish two styles of CBR that are problem-solving and interpretive 
(Kolodner, 1992). The first style uses old solutions as a guide to solve new problems, 
which particularly depends on adaptation processes. Application examples are 
planning, diagnosis, or design tasks, or for explanation. With the interpretive style, 
new situations or solutions are evaluated, for example in situations, when compu-
tational methods are not available or cannot be run due to many unknowns. Old 
cases are used for classifying situations, argumenting classifications, justifying so-
lutions, interpretations, or plans as well as predicting the effects of a decision or 
plan (Kolodner, 1992). Interpretation and problem-solving should not be consid-
ered separately but rather interpretive CBR as useful and crucial component of 
problem-solving (Kolodner, 1992).  
Popular application areas of CBR are medical and technical diagnosis, call centers, 
electronic commerce, or law (Kolodner, 1992; M. Lenz, Bartsch-Spörl, Burkhard, & 
Wess, 2004). Furthermore, CBR is combined with other reasoning approaches such 
as rule-based reasoning, model-based reasoning, constraint satisfaction problem-
solving, information retrieval or planning, amongst others for legal systems, plan-
ning nutritional menus, harmonizing melodies, speech synthesis, diagnosing heart 
failures or auditory diseases, for architectural design, decision support for manag-
ing patients with diabetes, or coloring industrial plastics (Marling, Rissland, & 
Aamodt, 2005). Further prominent research fields are route and project planning or 
tutoring systems (Greene, Freyne, Smyth, & Cunningham, 2010) as well as business 
process management, software process reuse, and trace-based reasoning (Montani 
& Jain, 2014). CBR for crisis and disaster management are particularly presented in 
section 2.3. 
As outlined above, CBR is used for many different application areas. An advantage 
is that CBR allows for solving a problem quickly and solutions do not need to be 
generated from scratch (Kolodner, 1992; Leake, 1996a). This is especially advanta-
geous when a problem being difficult to be solved once, is stored for later reuse 
avoiding a difficult reasoning the next time. Furthermore, CBR allows problem-
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solving in domains that are not fully understood (Kolodner, 1992). This is particu-
larly useful in situations when certain combinations of problem characteristics have 
not happened before and a system that is based on a causal model would reach its 
limit. The proposed solutions may serve as starting point, even if they are not opti-
mal or even wrong. Also, similar problems can also help to avoid mistakes 
(Kolodner, 1992). Furthermore, the solutions gained with CBR are based on prior 
cases and are hence explainable. User acceptance and transparency of the solutions 
derived are important factors for the later success in practice (Leake, 1996a). 
Despite of the intuitive approach of CBR, the implementation meets several chal-
lenges. If a strong domain theory is not available or difficult to formalize, adapting 
existing high quality solutions may lead to good results (Cunningham, 2005). How-
ever, insufficient adaptation processes may weaken the quality of retrieved solu-
tions and approaches such as rule-based or model-based approaches may be more 
appropriate (Cunningham, 2005). In general, adaptation is a crucial step in CBR that 
need to be carefully implemented. Otherwise the user may be unconsciously biased 
assuming solutions from previous cases are right without transferring them to the 
new problem situation (Kolodner, 1992). 
2.2 Case-Based Planning 
In planning, the task is to find a course of actions to achieve a specified set of goals 
given initial situations and constraints. These actions are described by operators 
changing the state of the world provided certain preconditions are met. In a classical 
generative planning process, the space of possible operators is traversed to solve a 
given problem where case-based approaches reuse plans often by making modifi-
cations (Bergmann, Muñoz-Avila, & Veloso, 1996). In case-based planning (CBP), 
the solution of case plays a major role for the reusability of that case and hence for 
the similarity assessment, particularly the preconditions that need to be satisfied for 
successfully applying the plan (Bergmann et al., 1995; Spalazzi, 2001). For reuse, as 
mentioned in section 2.1.3, either retrieved plans are modified with the help of, for 
example, domain dependent heuristics or the solution is used as a guide to construct 
a new plan. The revise and retain phase distinguish from case-based approaches for 
analytical tasks. The resulting plan is corrected with respect to the domain model 
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and therefore needs to be validated in the real world. Furthermore, goals as  
well as the solution trace need to be identified and stored for future reuse 
(Bergmann et al., 1995). 
Case-based planners are developed for various application domains, such as diag-
nosis and therapy or logistics. In an exhaustive survey, various CBP systems with 
diverse facets are presented (Spalazzi, 2001). They differ in terms of plan represen-
tation that can be purely featural or relational, such as abstractions, specializations 
or partonomic relations, or are logic-based. Furthermore, CBP systems either store 
plans or derivational traces or use an indexing scheme for retrieval referring to 
goals, initial situations and failures. The reuse step ranges from non-automatic to 
transformational, and derivational adaptation. As in other planning systems or gen-
eral case-based reasoning approaches, plans need to be revised that includes evalu-
ation and repair. Plan retention comprises decisions on what to store and how to 
eventually re-organize the plan memory for future retrieval.  
Updated overviews regard systems as a whole (Borrajo, Roubíčková, & Serina, 
2015) or focus on adaptation (Muñoz-Avila & Cox, 2008) as well as further develop-
ments of specific systems (Bonisoli, Gerevini, Saetti, & Serina, 2015; Borges, Dordal, 
Osmar, Ribeiro, Ávila, & Scalabrin, 2015; Garrido, Morales, & Serina, 2016). 
CBP systems are specializations of CBR systems. This thesis goes beyond purely 
planning and aims at providing decision support in a more general manner. In par-
ticular, the type of decision support varies in the course of the event, which is  
explained more in detail in Chapter 3. 
2.3 Application in Disaster Management 
As presented before, CBR and CBP are applied in various fields. The following sec-
tion particularly deals with applications in disaster management. ‘Emergency man-
agement’ and ‘disaster management’ are sometimes used synonymously (UNDRR, 
2017) and is therefore taken into account in the literature review. The focus is on 
systems to be applied during response and recovery. 
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In general, a CBR system for disaster management supports information and 
knowledge sharing, minimizes stress by automating response processes and work-
flows, and prepares information such as lessons learned prior to a disaster (Otim, 
2006). With varied specialized focus, CBR is utilized in various emergency response 
systems. For example, mobile technology is used to share information and to pro-
vide advice and assistance (Amailef & Lu, 2013). Here, short emergency messages 
are collected and analyzed automatically to be aggregated to a new problem de-
scription for CBR. Ontologies are used for case representation and similarity assess-
ment. The system presented covers a range of disaster events such as bioterrorism, 
chemical agent, radiation, and terrorism and hence, in contrast to this thesis, the 
attributes have a more general character. Furthermore, the modeling of strategies in 
combination with their assessment differentiate this thesis from related work. 
CBR is also embedded in a sequential group decision process combined with a 
Bayesian forecasting model to gain the prior distribution of absent features (Shen, 
Huang, Zhao, & Jin, 2008). Without explicitly modeling solutions, the setting is gen-
eral, addressing uncertainty and dynamics in emergency situations. Also, fuzzy sets 
are popular to handle uncertainty during case retrieval and web crawlers can be 
used to gather information of solutions of previous disasters (Chao Huang, Huang, 
Zhong, & Chen, 2013). Relations between the attributes describing the event, and 
crawled texts explaining the solutions, can be displayed by associating rules that 
are translated into fuzzy sets aiming at adapting solutions with fuzzy reasoning 
(Chao Huang et al., 2013). 
Spatial and temporal features such as geospatial data including maps, images with 
time stamps, and terrain information as well as critical infrastructure, and key re-
sources are important for describing a disaster case (F. Wang & Huang, 2010). The 
focus here is exclusively on similarity functions handling geospatial data such as 
points or polygons. 
Besides general decision support approaches, CBR can be found in the context of 
environmental emergencies including environmental pollution, biological security, 
and radioactive pollution (Z. Liao, Mao, Liu, Xu, & Hannam, 2011). The authors 
particularly concentrate on oil spills, integrate GIS technology, and provide an in-
depth list of attributes to describe environmental emergencies. In contrast to this 
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thesis, the course of the emergency is not regarded. Solutions are oil cleaning meth-
ods that need to be adapted according to the contaminated objects, such as water 
surface, retaining walls, rock slopes, water plants, and beaches. Similarity is calcu-
lated by aggregating local similarities for each attribute taking into account numer-
ical as well as symbolic attributes, where unknown attribute values are excluded 
from calculation. Attribute weights are elicitated with the help of experts by deter-
mining their relative importance and adaptation is realized partly by rules as well 
as expert modifications. In contrast to this thesis, cleaning measures or their combi-
nation are not explicitly modeled (see Chapter 2.6). 
Further environmental pollution accidents such as in river regions (L. Guo et al., 
2009) are interesting application fields for CBR as well, utilizing the Analytical  
Hierarchy Process (Saaty, 1980) for determining weights for generally assessing 
similarity and without specifically modeling solutions. More sophisticated similar-
ity measures are illustrated in a case study in the field of gas explosions (Fan et al., 
2014) focusing on the retrieve step of CBR. 
Another example is an interactive planning and scheduling assistant for hazardous 
material incidents where solution adaptation is partly carried out by the user 
(Gervasio, Iba, & Langley, 1998). Plans are represented by a tree where actions are 
equipped with time intervals and a set of resources providing capacity and quantity 
constraints. There are no causal links between actions. The assistant focus on deter-
mining initial candidate solutions retrieved from previous cases, adaptation mech-
anisms by expanding and deleting subtrees based on a set of rules, and providing a 
simulator for implementing and monitoring responses. The added value of a semi-
automatic system in contrast to a fully automated approach is particularly empha-
sized (Iba & Gervasio, 2000). For similarity calculation, matching features are 
counted focusing rather on adaptation and planning assistance. 
Furthermore, case-based support is provided in shipboard flooding emergencies 
where a set of prioritized counter-flooding tanks are searched for to handle flooding 
onboard ships and particularly to bring the ship into an upright position again 
(Ölçer & Majumder, 2006). The authors particularly combine CBR with multi-attrib-
ute decision-making, where research is particularly tailored to crises onboard ships. 
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Applications for the fire rescue service pose a vital research field for CBR as well 
(Avesani, Perini, & Ricci, 2000; Chakraborty, Ghosh, Maji, Garnaik, & Debnath, 
2010; Krasuski & Kreński, 2009; Krupka, Kasparova, & Jirava, 2009; Lewis, 2004). 
For example, an advanced interactive planning system where CBR and constraint 
reasoning is combined is in use to fight forest fires (Avesani et al., 2000). Particu-
larly, temporal issues are considered and interactive adaptation possibilities are 
provided. Plans are represented as a hierarchy of domain dependent information. 
The root represents the global plan that is composed of sub-plans for different fire 
front sectors and the leaves pose the actions. The temporal sequence can be de-
scribed by an action graph where the user can insert or remove actions. The work 
of this thesis shares the division of an affected area into sub-areas but aims at  
compiling additional aspects that influence decisions on plans besides time  
and resources. 
Other approaches that concern fire rescue services omit solution modeling or only 
adapt numerical values (Chakraborty et al., 2010), focus mainly on system architec-
ture or ontologies (Krasuski, Maciak, & Kreński, 2009; Kreński, Krasuski, & Łazowy, 
2011), or case representation and retrieval (Krupka et al., 2009). CBR and particu-
larly the retrieval step are proposed in conjunction with developing a decision sup-
port system for fighting industrial fires (Auriol et al., 2004). CBP and especially the 
retrieval step is suggested for plan generation in conjunction with forest fire fighting 
where a plan tree structure for case representation is proposed (Rollón, Isern, 
Agostini, & Cortés, 2003). 
CBR is proposed as decision support in flood crises focusing on retrieval (Luo, Xu, 
Shi, Jamont, & Zeng, 2007) and representing emergency plans as rules (Shen & 
Zhao, 2010) or as decision support in typhoon disaster management focusing on 
case specification and spatial awareness elements (X. Zhou & Wang, 2014).  
The DIAL system is a case-based planner for disaster response plans, where re-
search particularly focus on automated case or response plan adaptation (Kinley, 
2001; Leake et al., 1995). Besides the disaster response plan that contains disaster 
characteristics, actions and performing individuals or groups (role fillers), memory 
search cases and adaptation cases are stored, containing search processes for find-
ing relevant information for adaptation and traces of case adaptation. In order to 
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retrieve plans of similar situations, features such as type of disaster, location or pri-
mary victims are regarded. When retrieving a plan, some role fillers may be directly 
mapped into the new situations whereby the user evaluates further role fillers af-
terwards. If possible, the system then uses prior knowledge to guide the solution 
process for the identified role filler problems. Hence, the adaptation is eventually 
case-based or realized rule-based or even manually. The DIAL system provides sev-
eral learning methods including similarity assessment being guided by estimated 
adaptation costs. It is a pioneering work in the field of emergency response plan-
ning and case-based reasoning. Decoupling case learning and adaptation learning 
increases the effectiveness of a CBR system, since experience from adaptation may 
help to overcome current adaptation problems, although the corresponding re-
sponse plan is not appropriate in the current context (Leake et al., 1995). The work 
of this thesis investigates the modeling of a disaster or nuclear accident, respec-
tively, in more detail taking into account the changing appropriate measures, and 
explicitly models emergency strategies. 
In summary, research on CBR and CBP in disaster management has special focus, 
either with regard to methodical issues or concerning the application domain or 
does not model strategies. CBR is particularly new in nuclear emergency  
management. 
2.4 Enhancing the Case Base by Scenarios 
Within the scope of this work, few past events exist that could enrich the case base 
and hence the core of the CBR system. Therefore, scenarios are generated to enhance 
the case base. The notion of scenario, generally describing possible future states and 
developments, is not consistent in the literature resulting in diverse typologies and 
scenario construction techniques (Börjeson et al., 2006). Without referring to actual 
construction techniques, scenarios can be characterized according to their goal, pro-
cess design, and content (van Notten, Rotmans, van Asselt, & Rothman, 2003). The 
goals might be exploration or decision support where process design refers to for-
mal or intuitive methods to construct scenarios, which could be of complex or sim-
ple nature. Scenario development techniques can be also categorized according to 
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their historical roots referring to intuitive and hence non-quantitative or probabilis-
tic approaches as well as a third prospective thinking approach for long-term stra-
tegic planning originated in France (Bradfield, Wright, Burt, Cairns, & Van Der 
Heijden, 2005). Furthermore, future states can be categorized as possible, probable, 
and/or preferable leading to further categories of scenario studies, namely ‘predic-
tive’, ‘explorative’, and ‘normative’ (Börjeson et al., 2006). These classes are based 
on questions: “What will happen?”, “What can happen?” and “How can a specific 
target be reached?” Each of these categories are further divided resulting in six 
types of scenarios (see Figure 2.6). Predictive scenarios comprise forecasts that are 
based on the most likely developments, and what-if scenarios regarding several 
forecasts on the condition of some specified events that are developed from the pre-
sent situation on (Börjeson et al., 2006). Explorative scenarios are elaborated with a 
long-term horizon where a set of scenarios are worked out and profound and struc-
tural changes are explicitly regarded. They are either driven by external factors that 
are beyond the control of the relevant actors or are of strategic nature, describing 
consequences of a decision depending on which future development unfolds 
(Börjeson et al., 2006). The latter particularly takes internal and external factors into 
account. Instead of absolute goals, target variables are defined (Börjeson et al., 2006). 
Normative scenarios are distinguished by preserving or transforming system be-
havior being necessary to reach a certain target. Hence, for the latter, a marginal 
adjustment is not sufficient and rather back casting is necessary that means envi-
sioning the desired target and work backwards since the actual structure is seen as 
a problem (Börjeson et al., 2006). Several scenario techniques exist, either, for exam-
ple, on a general level (Börjeson et al., 2006) or more specific (Bishop, Hines, & 
Collins, 2007). 
In the context of this thesis, scenarios are elaborated by considering varying acci-
dent characteristics, environmental conditions and locations, corresponding 
measures to prevent or reduce contamination or the likelihood of contamination of 
a target, and their effectiveness. They are of the same underlying structure as his-
torical events. Hence, the scenarios in the frame of this thesis are of explorative char-
acter. In summary, following understanding applies: 
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Scenarios describe possible accidents and their developments as well as ap-
propriate measures and their effectiveness, and are subject to the same struc-
ture as historical disasters. The term of ‘cases’ refers to historical disasters 
and scenarios equally. Hence, for case-based support, knowledge of histori-
cal events and scenarios is used, even though in different ways (see Chapter 
3). 
 
Figure 2.6:   Scenario typology (Börjeson et al., 2006, Figure 1) 
2.5 Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis for Additional 
Support 
Similarity measures enable to rank retrieved cases automatically according to their 
closeness to the current problem. However, the solution of the most similar case or 
cases are not necessarily most appropriate in solving the current problem, since suc-
cessful and less successful solutions may be stored in the case base. Further, the 
assumption that similar problems have similar solutions can be limited, amongst 
others, by the inability of a similarity measure to capture the usefulness of a case for 
a current problem or to identify the relevance of a feature in solving a problem as 
well as the absence of relevant features (Kar, Chakraborti, & Ravindran, 2012). In 
addition to approaches already presented in Chapter 2.1.5 to handle uncertainty in 
attribute values, another idea is to provide additional decisive criteria, particularly 
when several strategies are available, in the framework of a multi-criteria decision 
analysis (MCDA). 
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MCDA covers various methods supporting decision-making taking into account 
multiple objectives (decision criteria) in a transparent manner (Belton & Stewart, 
2002; Triantaphyllou, 2000). MCDA comprises Multi-Objective Decision-Making 
(MODM) where several objectives are optimized simultaneously, and Multi-Attrib-
ute Decision-making (MADM), where the most preferable option is chosen from a 
discrete set of decision alternatives. The latter particularly covers several methods 
that differ in modeling of intra-criteria preferences (Bertsch, 2007), where perfor-
mance scores of different alternatives with respect to one criterion are regarded. In 
the scope of this work, multi-attribute value theory (MAVT) belonging to MADM, 
is introduced only, since the values to be processed in decision analysis are deter-
ministic and MAVT is successfully applied in the related research field as well as in 
combination with CBR as can be seen later in this chapter. 
The key steps of MAVT, summarized in Figure 2.8, are as follows: First, the deci-
sion-problem is structured hierarchically comprising an overall goal, multiple cri-
teria, attributes, and decision alternatives (Figure 2.7). Particularly, for the set of 
attributes, following properties are desirable (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976): The set should 
be complete and operational with meaningful attributes that support the understand-
ing of the alternatives. A set of attributes is regarded as complete, if it clearly indi-
cates to which degree the overall objective is met. Furthermore, the set should be 
decomposable and hence attributes can be analyzed independently from each other. 
Also, the non-redundancy to avoid double counting of impacts as well as minimum 
size of the set of attributes pose further properties important to be checked. 
 
Figure 2.7:   Hierarchical arrangement of objective, criteria, attributes, and decision alternatives 
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After problem structuring, the elicitation of the relative importance of the criteria 
follows. Thereafter, the elicitated information is aggregated resulting in a ranking 
of the decision alternatives. If desired, sensitivity analyses may be conducted. These 
steps are interactive and may be repeated, if necessary. 
 
Figure 2.8:   Key phases of MAVT (Bertsch, 2007, Figure 2.1) 
In the following, a formal framework for MAVT is set up (Bertsch, 2007): 
Definition 2.7 Score of decision alternatives 
Let 𝑙 denote the number of the decision alternatives, 𝑚 the number of criteria, 
and 𝑛 the number of attributes, 𝑙, 𝑚, 𝑛 ∈ ℕ+. For each decision alternative 
𝑑𝑎𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, … 𝑙 the score with respect to a specific attribute 𝑎𝑡𝑗, 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑛 is  
defined as 
𝑥(𝑑𝑎𝑖 , 𝑎𝑡𝑗) ≔ 𝑥𝑖𝑗 . 
These values can be summarized in a decision table (Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2:   Decision table of MAVT (Bertsch, 2007, Table 2.1) 
Attributes [Units]/ 
Decision alternatives  
𝑎𝑡1 [𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 1] 𝑎𝑡2 [𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 2] … 𝑎𝑡𝑛 [𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑛] 
𝑑𝑎1 𝑥11 𝑥12 … 𝑥1𝑛 
𝑑𝑎2 𝑥21 𝑥22 … 𝑥2𝑛 
… … … … … 
𝑑𝑎𝑙  𝑥𝑙1 𝑥𝑙2 … 𝑥𝑙𝑛 
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In order to compare different alternatives with respect to several attributes under-
lying different units, the scores need to be mapped to a common scale by a  
value function: 
Definition 2.8 Value function 
A value function for an attribute 𝑎𝑡𝑗 is defined as  
𝑣𝑗 = {
ℝ → [0,1]
𝑥𝑖𝑗 ↦ 𝑣𝑗(𝑥𝑖𝑗) 
, 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑛 
where 𝑥𝑖𝑗  denotes the score of an decision alternative 𝑑𝑎𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑙 with  
respect to attribute 𝑎𝑡𝑗, 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑛. 
The value functions represent the intra-criteria preferences that reflect how differ-
ences in the scores of the alternatives with respect to one criterion are judged ena-
bling to compare different attributes on a common scale (Belton & Stewart, 2002; 
Bertsch, 2007). Here, the ‘best’ and ‘worst’ outcomes correspond to 1 and 0, respec-
tively. Various possibilities exist to model value functions, such as applying linear 
or exponential functions (Bertsch, 2007). Inter-criteria preferences or the relative  
importance between different criteria, are modeled by weights on each level of the 
attribute tree, enabling to rank the different alternatives (Belton & Stewart, 2002; 
Bertsch, 2007). Hence, the final weight of each attribute is a product along the path 
from the objective to each attribute in the attribute tree (Bertsch, 2007). For the 
weight vector 𝑤 = (𝑤1, … , 𝑤𝑛) it holds 
∑𝑤𝑗 = 1
𝑛
𝑗=1
 
with 𝑤𝑗 ≥ 0, 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑛. There are different methods for weight elicitation (Belton & 
Stewart, 2002), where in context of this work a direct allocation of weights  
is assumed. 
The overall scores of the alternatives are calculated taking into account the weights 
and value functions. For example, the overall value for alternative 𝑑𝑎𝑖  can deter-
mined by means of an additive aggregation 
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𝑣(𝑑𝑎𝑖) = ∑𝑤𝑗𝑣𝑗(𝑥𝑖𝑗)
𝑛
𝑗=1
. 
The aggregation by a weighted sum is commonly used and easy to understand by 
decision makers from different fields (Belton & Stewart, 2002) assuming that attrib-
utes are mutually preferentially independent (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976): An attribute 
𝑎𝑡1 is called preferentially independent of another attribute 𝑎𝑡2 if preferences for cer-
tain outcomes and consequences, respectively, of 𝑎𝑡1 do not depend on the level of 
outcome of 𝑎𝑡2 (Clemen & Reilly, 2001). If the same applies vice versa, the two  
attributes are mutually preferentially independent. Several attributes 𝑎𝑡1, … , 𝑎𝑡𝑛 are 
mutually preferentially independent if every subset of these attributes is preferen-
tially independent of its complementary set (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976). 
When proposing a solution, information on the achievement of defined objectives 
and on how they are derived is essential. In case of several available solutions, a 
ranking facilitates decision-making, in particular with the help of visualization, for 
example by stacked-bar charts that illustrate the contributions of the individual cri-
teria and attributes to the performance scores, respectively. Furthermore, sensitivity 
analyses may help to investigate the influence of the preference parameters on the 
results and, amongst others, help to build consensus or understanding (French, 
2003). One may investigate how sensitive the ranking is to changes in the criteria 
weights and to changing attribute values focusing on the best alternative or on 
changes in the ranking of any alternative, as well as determining smallest changes 
that cause actually a ranking change (Triantaphyllou, 2000). 
As discussed before, applying MAVT intends to complement the case-based  
approach for problem-solving by evaluating each alternative solution in a quantita-
tive manner. The aim is to provide a broader discussion basis and to support the 
understanding and trust in the determined solutions. A reasonable inclusion of 
MAVT is after adaptation and before revision within the CBR cycle. 
Several approaches combine CBR and MCDA such as for stock analysis in the fi-
nancial market (Sushmita & Chaudhury, 2007), for ranking alternatives (before  
adaptation) in the frame of tropical cyclone forecasting (San Pedro & Burstein, 
2003), for decision support in case of supply chain interruptions (Merz, Hiete, 
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Bertsch, & Rentz, 2007) or to prioritize security measures against terrorist threats to 
public rail transport systems (L. Lin, Brauner, Münzberg, Meng, & Moehrle, 2013; 
Müller, Meng, Raskob, Wiens, & Schultmann, 2015) aiming at identifying the most 
preferred solution of some set of pre-selected cases. MCDA is also applied in the  
retrieval phase of CBR (Armaghan & Renaud, 2012), particularly for calculating 
weights (Alptekin & Büyüközkan, 2011), enhancing similarity assessment (Li & 
Sun, 2009), particularly by combining multiple similarity metrics (Lamontagne & 
Abi-zeid, 2006), or CBR is used for preference elicitation in MCDA (Chen, Kilgour, 
& Hipel, 2011). 
Furthermore, explicitly for disaster and emergency management, MCDA methods 
are applied for flood risk management (de Brito & Evers, 2016; Hansson, Larsson, 
Danielson, & Ekenberg, 2011), nuclear remediation management (Geldermann et 
al., 2009), evacuation decisions (Kailiponi, 2010), emergency medical service assess-
ment (Kou & Wu, 2014), as part of an incident information management framework 
(Peng, Zhang, Tang, & Li, 2011) or in the frame of helicopter mission planning dur-
ing a disaster relief operation (Barbarosoğlu, Özdamar, & Cevik, 2002). MCDA is 
particularly beneficial for nuclear emergency management in general (Papamichail 
& French, 2013). 
Several further approaches for assessing disaster management strategies can be 
found in humanitarian aid by means of a crisis performance measurement system 
with the dimensions relevance, efficiency, satisfaction, expectation, impact, and 
agility, that have to be aligned with the specific situation by corresponding indica-
tors (Rongier, Lauras, Galasso, & Gourc, 2012). This specific application area is com-
bined with performance measurements of commercial supply chains as well work-
ing with resource, output, and flexibility, as well as different metrics such as costs, 
response time, or types of supplies (Beamon & Balcik, 2008). Several approaches 
concentrate on one specific aspect to evaluate measures and support decision-mak-
ing, such as the effectiveness of a strategy in the frame of earthquake mitigation 
measures using loss and response parameters (Gupta & Shah, 1998) or to evaluate 
emergency response operations in command and control taking into account  
human and property loss in conjunction with time after initializing response efforts 
(D. E. Brown & Robinson, 2005). Additional research investigates cost-optimal  
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response actions (Hild, Fischer, Ott, & Glökler, 2010) or supports planning by cal-
culating the duration and required resources of relief measures by means of key 
performance indicators (Moellmann, Engelmann, Braun, & Raskob, 2011). Another 
important concept is the robustness of decisions on strategies, since several options 
are possible on how the event will evolve or how environment will change. The 
objective is to select a strategy, which performs sufficiently well for many different 
scenarios (T. Comes, Hiete, Wijngaards, & Schultmann, 2010). All these solutions 
for assessing disaster management strategies are taken into account in the develop-
ment of the multi-criteria assessment that is presented in Chapter 6.2.  
As summarized above, plenty of successful MCDA and particularly MAVT appli-
cations, also in conjunction with CBR, exist in different research fields. The major 
advantages lie in the structured procedure for analyzing different information 
streams and thus preserving transparent decision-making as well as facilitating con-
sensus finding in groups (Bertsch, 2007; Geldermann et al., 2009). In contrast to pure 
cost-benefit analysis, the strength of MCDA is the deliberate integration of subjec-
tivity of decision-making by taking stakeholders preferences into account (Bertsch, 
2007). In the frame of this work, parameters related to CBR as well as to future  
uncertainties are integrated in the multi-criteria decision support (see Chapter 6.2). 
2.6 Modeling Disaster Management Strategies 
A strategy consists of several measures which have a logical and temporal order of 
implementation. Furthermore, besides having a specific objective, a measure is  
directed towards a certain object. This means that for an object only certain 
measures can be applied to achieve the objective. Further factors that influence the 
choice of measures may also be taken into account. This information is especially 
important for the reuse step of CBR, not only to propose correct solutions but also 
to support understanding from the user side. Petri Nets (PNs) that are introduced 
in the following section, are a generic approach to model strategies. As presented 
later, adaptation and where appropriate, merging of several solutions should be 
possible, favoring the usage of PNs. Application areas and other approaches to 
model strategies are presented afterwards. Related work refers to general modeling 
as well as merging of PNs. 
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2.6.1 Petri Nets 
Petri nets are a graphical and mathematical modeling tool useful for describing and 
analyzing information processing systems as well as for visual communication 
(Murata, 1989). They originate from the early work of Carl Adam Petri (Petri, 1962) 
and are defined as follows (Murata, 1989): 
Definition 2.9 Petri Net 
A Petri net is a tuple 
𝑃𝑁 =  (𝑃, 𝑇, 𝐹,𝑊,𝑀0) 
where: 
 P and T are finite sets of places and transitions. 
 𝑃 ∩ 𝑇 =  ∅ and 𝑃 ∪ 𝑇 ≠ ∅. 
 𝐹 ⊆ (𝑃 × 𝑇) ∪ (𝑇 × 𝑃) is a set of arcs (flow relation). 
 𝑊:𝐹 → ℕ+ is a weight function. 
 𝑀0: 𝑃 → ℕ is the initial marking. 
Places are represented by circles, transitions by rectangles, and arcs are labeled by 
weights. The state of the system, which is called a marking 𝑀:𝑃 → ℕ, is reflected by 
the distribution of tokens, represented by black dots, over places. The input and out-
put places of transitions are defined as follows: 
- • 𝑡 =  {𝑝|(𝑝, 𝑡) ∈ 𝐹} is called the set of input places of transition 𝑡, 
- 𝑡 • =  {𝑝|(𝑡, 𝑝) ∈ 𝐹} is called the set of output places of transition 𝑡. 
The dynamics of the system can be described by marking changes caused by firing 
a transition. A marking is changed according to following transition rule (Murata, 
1989): A transition 𝑡 is enabled if and only if each input place 𝑝 of 𝑡 contains at least 
𝑤(𝑝, 𝑡) tokens where 𝑤(𝑝, 𝑡) denotes the weight of the arc from 𝑝 to 𝑡. An enabled 
transition may fire. The firing of 𝑡 removes 𝑤(𝑝, 𝑡) tokens from each input place 𝑝 
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and adds 𝑤(𝑡, 𝑝) tokens to each output place 𝑝 of 𝑡 where 𝑤(𝑡, 𝑝) is the weight of 
the arc from 𝑡 to 𝑝. 
There are different types of nets, which can be grouped into Low-and High-level 
PNs (LLPNs and HLPNs). In LLPNs tokens are indistinguishable. In HLPNs (K. 
Jensen & Rozenberg, 1991; Klink, Li, & Oberweis, 2008; K. Lenz & Oberweis, 2003), 
tokens have individual characteristics and can be therefore distinguished. Each 
place, transition, and arc is defined with respect to different token types. HLPNs 
allow for a more compact description than LLPNs. For practical applications, they 
are preferred to LLPNs (Oberweis & Sander, 1996). In the frame of this thesis, 
HLPNs are used to model strategies. Hence, following the standard documentation 
(International Organization for Standardization, 2000, 2004), the semantic model for 
HLPNs is introduced here in more detail. For this, the notions of multisets and their 
comparison are clarified in the first place:  
A multiset 𝐵 over a non-empty basis set 𝐴 is a function 
𝐵: 𝐴 → ℕ 
where 𝐵(𝑎), 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 is called the multiplicity of 𝑎. A multiset 𝐵 may be represented 
as a symbolic sum of basis elements scaled by their multiplicities 
𝐵 = ∑ 𝐵(𝑎)′𝑎𝑎∈𝐴 . 
Multiset comparison is defined as follows: For two multisets 𝐵1, 𝐵2 ∈ 𝜇𝐴 it holds 
𝐵1 ≤ 𝐵2:⇔ ∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐴, 𝐵1(𝑎) ≤ 𝐵2(𝑎) 
where 𝜇𝐴 denotes the set of multisets over 𝐴. 
A high-level Petri net is defined as follows (International Organization for 
Standardization, 2000):  
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Definition 2.10 High-level Petri Net 
A High-level Petri Net is a tuple 𝐻𝐿𝑃𝑁 = (𝑃, 𝑇, 𝐷, 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒, 𝑃𝑟𝑒, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑀0) where 
 P and T are finite sets of places and transitions. 
 𝑃 ∩ 𝑇 = ∅. 
 D is a non-empty finite set of non-empty domains where each  
element of D is called a type. 
 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒: 𝑃 ∪ 𝑇 → 𝐷 is a function used to assign types to places and to 
determine transition modes. A transition mode is a pair comprising 
the transition and a value from the transition`s type. 
 𝑃𝑟𝑒, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡: 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆 → 𝜇𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐶𝐸 are the pre- and post-mappings with 
 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆 = {(𝑡,𝑚)|𝑡 ∈ 𝑇,𝑚 ∈ 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒(𝑡)} 
 𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐶𝐸 = {(𝑝, 𝑔)|𝑝 ∈ 𝑃, 𝑔 ∈ 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒(𝑝)} 
where 𝜇𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐶𝐸 is the set of multisets over the set 𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐶𝐸. 
 𝑀0 ∈ 𝜇𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐶𝐸 is a multiset called the initial marking of the net. 
Hence a marking 𝑀 ∈ 𝜇𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐶𝐸 is a multiset.  
Enabling a single transition mode and concurrent enabling of transition modes are 
defined as follows (International Organization for Standardization, 2000): 
Definition 2.11 Enabling of a single transition mode 
A transition mode 𝑡𝑟 ∈ 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆 is enabled at a marking 𝑀:⇔ 𝑃𝑟𝑒(𝑡𝑟) ≤ 𝑀. 
Definition 2.12 Concurrent enabling of transition modes 
A finite multiset of transition modes 𝑇𝜇 ∈ 𝜇𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆, is enabled at a marking 
𝑀:⇔ 𝑃𝑟𝑒(𝑇𝜇) ≤ 𝑀 where the linear extension of 𝑃𝑟𝑒 is given by 
𝑃𝑟𝑒(𝑇𝜇) = ∑ 𝑇𝜇(𝑡𝑟)𝑃𝑟𝑒(𝑡𝑟)𝑡𝑟∈𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆 . 
All transition modes in 𝑇𝜇 are said to be concurrently enabled if 𝑇𝜇 is enabled. 
A marking is changed according to following transition rule (International 
Organization for Standardization, 2000): 
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Definition 2.13 Transition rule 
Given that a finite multiset of transition modes 𝑇𝜇 is enabled at a marking 𝑀, 
then a step may occur resulting in a new marking 𝑀′ given by 
𝑀′ = 𝑀 − 𝑃𝑟𝑒(𝑇𝜇) + 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑇𝜇) 
where the linear extension of 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 is used. A step is denoted by 𝑀[𝑇𝜇〉𝑀
′or 
𝑀
𝑇𝜇
→𝑀′. 
2.6.2 Further Approaches for Strategy Modeling 
in Disaster Management 
For analyzing existing approaches to model disaster and emergency management 
activities, papers in the areas of disaster recovery planning/strategies, disaster and 
accident rescue (processes), disaster/emergency response (activities), post-disaster 
rebuilding, disaster/emergency management, and emergency plans were studied 
with regard to modeling and the possibility of automatic processing. 
The coordination of disaster response activities, for example, can be supported by 
an activity management system (Franke, Charoy, & Ulmer, 2010). Also, optimiza-
tion approaches are applied in the frame of disaster management (L. Yan, Jinsong, 
Xiaofeng, & Ye, 2009) as well as performance analyses of post-disaster rebuild pro-
jects (Kim & Choi, 2012) without explicitly modeling strategies.  
Modeling emergency management measures and plans by processes is a broad and 
important field using Event Driven Process Chains (La Rosa & Mendling, 2009), 
Workflow Management Systems (Jansen, Lijnse, & Plasmeijer, 2010; Rueppel & 
Wagenknecht, 2007; Sackmann & Betke, 2013; Sell & Braun, 2009) with an own  
approach for modeling workflows focusing on resources (J. Wang, Tepfenhart, & 
Rosca, 2009) or particularly Business Process Model and Notation (Betke & Seifert, 
2017). Especially in the latter publication, the need for extensions to consider  
domain specific requirements such as different types of resources, their usage, 
states, spatial allocation as well as interdependencies are emphasized. A review on 
process-oriented approaches to disaster response management particularly reveals 
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a lack of process modeling language fitting this specific domain (Hofmann, Betke, 
& Sackmann, 2015). 
PNs are used for various emergency management applications: generalized sto-
chastic PNs are used e.g. for modeling traffic accident rescue processes (Ju, Wang, 
& Che, 2007), and stochastic PNs are applied for performance analyses of coal mine 
emergency processes (Ma, Li, & Chen, 2011), emergency response decision-making 
processes (Shan, Wang, & Li, 2012), and urban response (Zhong, Shi, Fu, He, & Shi, 
2010). Colored PNs, in particular, are used to model emergency plan business pro-
cesses (W. Huang & Tong, 2011) and emergency response in the course of chemical 
accidents with continuous places and transitions (J. Zhou, 2013). They are used in 
combination with a queuing system for resource use (J. Zhou & Reniers, 2016) and 
in the framework of critical infrastructure protection (Cheminod, Bertolotti, 
Durante, & Valenzano, 2013) or for modeling the patients flow in an emergency 
medical department (Dilmaghani & Rao, 2009). Further examples of PNs are emer-
gency management modeling in railway stations (Karmakar & Dasgupta, 2011), 
modeling of industrial fire management process (Bammidi & Moore, 1994), or acci-
dent modeling (Nývlt, Haugen, & Ferkl, 2015) whereat the difficulty is to transfer 
text into a formal model (Hill & Wright, 1997). Moreover, PNs have a huge potential 
in the field of risk analysis and accident modeling with the possibility of expressing 
common concepts into PN formalisms (Vernez, Buchs, & Pierrehumbert, 2003). PNs 
are particularly used in nuclear power plant emergency management, which aims 
at reducing the number of false evacuations (Tavana, 2008). 
The PN applications presented so far focus on specific emergency response pro-
cesses (i.e., in the framework of a specific accident scenario) for performance analy-
sis or for execution support. In respect of strategy modeling, the research of this 
thesis has a different focus and which is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.4.1. 
The papers by (W. Huang & Tong, 2011; J. Zhou, 2013; J. Zhou & Reniers, 2016) are 
thematically close to the approach of this thesis. They report on working with 
HLPNs and distinguishable tokens according to different resource types and the 
level of the fire state (J. Zhou, 2013). The application domain of nuclear emergencies 
can be found in (Tavana, 2008) who models a specific emergency management pro-
cess addressing actions within a nuclear power plant with the help of LLPNs. 
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The combination of PNs and CBR is subject of research as well. PNs are used, for 
example, in the course of establishing a database and case retrieval is based on  
similarity calculations between markings (Lim et al., 2016). PNs also serve as  
mean to gain parameters that can be used in the case retrieval (Dharani & Geetha, 
2013) or are used to model cases (Weber & Ontanón, 2010; Yang, Kwon Jeong, Oh, 
& Tan, 2004). 
In summary, PNs are used in a variety of emergency management applications and 
are regarded as being suitable to model strategies in a structured and unambiguous 
manner. Furthermore, they enable an automated reuse in the framework of CBR 
and have analysis capabilities of structure and dynamic behavior and allow for 
analyses of resources. The latter is particularly interesting if several strategies are 
available for selection. 
2.6.3 Merging Petri Nets 
In this chapter, related work with regard to the reuse step of CBR is presented. As 
outlined before, the possibility of merging several solutions retrieved should be 
given. Since PNs are chosen for strategy modeling, the areas analyzed were process 
merging/PN merging and synthesis of processes. 
Working with Event-driven Process Chains (EPCs), merging and uniting processes, 
respectively, can be realized with the help of maximum common connected sub-
graphs (La Rosa, Dumas, Uba, & Dijkman, 2010, 2013). Furthermore, EPCs can be 
reduced to their active behavior by considering and merging function graphs 
(Gottschalk, van der Aalst, & Jansen-Vullers, 2008). PNs are used for merging work-
flows on schema level, where the merged workflow net is the union of the original 
workflow nets being merged at specific merge points/places that are not specified 
further (S. Sun, Kumar, & Yen, 2006).  
Processes may be also presented by a temporal formalism and merged at the lan-
guage level (Bulanov, Lazovik, & Aiello, 2011). Another approach is to detect and 
resolve element and control flow differences between process models by decom-
posing a process model into fragments (Küster, Gerth, Förster, & Engels, 2008). In 
general, identifying correspondences is a key technique in process merging, such as 
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by developing matchers that identify corresponding activities between two models 
(Weidlich, Dijkman, & Mendling, 2010). In particular, the classification of differ-
ences between processes needs to be discussed, since the purpose of process inte-
gration influences the determination of equivalence of activities and roles between 
two processes (Dijkman, 2007). 
PN synthesis techniques can be divided into bottom-up, top-down, hybrid and knit-
ting approaches. In the framework of bottom-up process synthesis (Jeng & 
DiCesare, 1993) systems are composed of incomplete sub-systems (modules) with 
the prominent application area of manufacturing systems (Cortadella, Kishinevsky, 
Lavagno, & Yakovlev, 1995). For synthesis, places are merged (Agerwala & Choed-
Amphai, 1978; Narahari & Viswanadham, 1985) as well as common transitions, 
places, and paths (Ding, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). PNs are synthesized from modules 
that are modeled by strongly connected state machines (Jeng, 1995), colored PNs 
(Arjona, Bueno, & López-Mellado, 2010), generalized PNs (Koh & DiCesare, 1991), 
labeled partial orders/scenarios (Fahland & Woith, 2009; Mauser, 2010), or state-
based models (Cortadella et al., 1995). Process synthesis is particularly embedded 
in the disaster response field by modeling adaptive disaster response processes, in 
which the behavior is synthesized by scenarios at run-time (Fahland, 2009; Fahland 
& Woith, 2009). Here, transitions (places) are merged if they are labeled equally and 
have equally labeled predecessors. In general, synthesis techniques may be suscep-
tible to a possible loss of control in behavior of the composed system (Jeng & 
DiCesare, 1993). A further related research area is the composition of PNs (Guillen-
Scholten, Arbab, de Boer, & Bonsangue, 2006; Hsieh & Chiang, 2011; Peres, 
Berthomieu, & Vernadat, 2011; Peťko & Hudák, 2012) either via common places, 
transitions, and arcs or specific nodes. The idea of merging at equally labeled nodes 
is particularly taken up in the framework of this thesis. 
2.7 Discussion of the Methods Chosen 
Addressing decision-making and decision support in (nuclear) emergency manage-
ment opens up many possibilities for realization depending on the focus in mind, 
ranging from general system design issues to elaborated methods and algorithms. 
Research reported in this thesis pursues the development of a decision supporting 
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method that can be applied when the possibility of an emergency situation is iden-
tified up to and including recovery. The results being presented in the following 
chapters cover a wide range of issues beginning with the general decision support-
ing paradigm to detailed solutions for specific problems. Prior to that, the choice of 
components building the solution is discussed. 
Generally, three basic decision-making styles may be distinguished depending on 
uncertainty and time available. Firstly, when information is scarce and little time is 
available to decide, decisions of those who are experienced in managing crises  
result from recognition-primed decision-making (Klein, 2008; Paton & Flin, 1999) 
being more intuitive and based on heuristics without comparing several alterna-
tives. Being assigned to naturalistic decision-making, field studies with decision-
makers under difficult conditions such as limited time, uncertainty or high stakes, 
were conducted to find out how people in real world settings actually decide. Es-
pecially the usage of experience and pattern matching in combination with mental 
simulations to evaluate a course of action within the current context is highlighted. 
Simulations lead to initiating a certain action, adapting it or considering other  
actions. Recognition-primed decision-making challenges the idea to find the best 
possible option and combines intuition with analysis (Klein, 2008). In general, this 
type of decision-making style is feasible for experts, addresses highly complex prob-
lems in dynamic environments, and corresponds to the idea of CBR (Meso et al., 
2002). Secondly, if more time and information are available, decision-makers may 
remember appropriate rules or procedures to apply. Thirdly, the analytical style as 
the most time consuming decision style, requires much information to select the 
best option out of several alternatives (Paton & Flin, 1999).  
All three decision styles may be used during a disaster depending on the decision 
level or specific situation (Bouafia & Zahari Khairi, 2017; Paton & Flin, 1999; Sinclair, 
Doyle, Johnston, & Paton, 2012). The main difference between analytical and recog-
nition-primed approaches is that for the latter the main effort and challenge lies in 
situation assessment whereas for the first approach the focus is on the choice of an 
option (Sinclair et al., 2012). However, all three styles are valuable for different pur-
poses and are to be included in this thesis. 
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CBR as core method 
Due to the nature of events regarded, CBR is chosen as the main decision support-
ing component, particularly to meet the uncertainty issue in respect of decision-
making during the early stages of a nuclear emergency as well as promoting pre-
paredness, in particular for recovery. For the latter, the aim is to handle issues of 
multiple measures and stakeholders but also little real world experience. According 
to the handbooks (for example, Nisbet et al., 2010) there are clear steps how to pro-
ceed when constructing a strategy (see Chapter 3.1.2) and constraints to take care of 
when choosing a measure. However, the exceptionality of each event, also with re-
gard to users’ preferences, requires decision supporting methods beyond fixed pro-
cedures. The multitude of measures and the need to decide in a societal consensus 
as well as negative experiences with implementation make advanced and automa-
tization efforts highly valuable. 
Contrasting to simulation-based systems, the case-based approach is particularly 
new in nuclear emergency management. Being aware of further development pos-
sibilities in various CBR-related directions, this research lays the foundation for ap-
plying experience-based decision-making in nuclear emergency management and 
particularly presents a prototype to show the applicability of the method.  
Scenarios as extension of the case base 
The shortage of documented historical events suggests to work with scenarios to 
prepare for possible future events and store existing expert knowledge in a struc-
tured manner. This approach particularly includes the usage of operational decision 
support systems such as JRodos that help constructing a strategy. Hence the work 
of this thesis motivates to develop strategies in advance to be better prepared in 
case of an accident. 
Rules for complementing the similarity based approach 
Although it might be somewhat contradictory to apply rules at times where almost 
nothing is known about the situation, the scheme integrated in this thesis is a Euro-
pean approach (HERCA & WENRA, 2014) and is based on four criteria that charac-
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terize the emergency situation in a very general manner. Hence, before any similar-
ity calculation, the rules should help to roughly classify the situation and rapidly 
identify protective actions (see Chapter 5.1). This approach does not preclude the 
possibility to apply CBR. However, the similarity calculation favors a rough classi-
fication of the source term since the scenarios in the database result from JRodos 
simulations that are, amongst others, based on a source term. The rule-based  
approach does not integrate the source term or any classification of it.  
Petri nets as modeling language for strategies 
Petri nets provide means to describe a course of actions formally and unambigu-
ously. Modeled as Petri net, a strategy can be further analyzed according to re-
sources and also processed automatically in the reuse step of CBR. PNs are widely 
and successfully used and provide simulation capabilities useful for the purpose of 
this thesis. 
MCDA for enhanced decision support 
The multitude of decisive factors promotes the idea to combine CBR with MCDA 
to identify appropriate strategies. MCDA deliberately allows subjectivity, takes us-
ers’ preferences into account, and supports participatory decision-making in a 
transparent manner. Analyses of nuclear events, discussions with experts as well as 
literature review strengthened the suitability of MCDA for additional decision sup-
port. As can be seen in chapter 6.2, applying MCDA in the frame of this work par-
ticularly refers to automatically determined values that are gained from the strategy 
modeling component, further promoting the automatization initiatives of this the-
sis.   
The following chapter gives an overview of the whole method proposed, the as-
sumptions on which it is based on, how the single components work together, the 
varying challenges of decision-making during an accident and how the presented 
solution provides support and complements existing systems. 
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3 Case-Based Decision Support 
In order to answer the research question posed in section 1.2, a case-based decision 
support method enhanced by multi-criteria decision analysis is proposed. CBR is 
diversely applied in non-nuclear disaster management (section 2.3) which encour-
ages to expand research to the nuclear field. In particular, experience gained in non-
nuclear projects enters research on nuclear accidents and particularly the results of 
this work as outlined in the following. 
First, CBR was applied in a general frame covering different kinds of disasters 
(Moehrle, 2012) particularly as part of the KRITIS project1 supported by the Center 
for Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Technology (CEDIM). The objective 
was to support decisions on appropriate measures in case of a disaster, which was 
described by attributes that were inspired by the Tactical situation object (TSO) – a 
message structure for disaster and emergency management (CEN, 2009a, 2009b). 
The idea of TSO is to support the transfer of information between computer-based 
systems by encoding disaster/emergency relevant terms in an XML schema. TSO 
provides the relevant attributes to describe a disaster or emergency and defines a 
basic vocabulary for disaster management with unique expressions. The codes are 
arranged hierarchically providing a basic categorization of event features. So far, 
rail accidents involving hazardous and non-hazardous goods, fire disasters, chem-
ical accidents, transport accidents, and power failure have been analyzed. The so-
lutions were stored as temporarily ordered lists of measures. In case of an incident, 
the user could compose appropriate measures based on retrieved cases and partic-
ularly their solutions. This step included deleting inappropriate measures and sup-
plementing necessary ones manually. This work constitutes the first steps in devel-
oping a generic decision support system for large-scale disasters. However, besides 
further necessary automatization developments, the employed attributes were too 
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general to describe an event in depth and the case base needed to be enhanced. An-
yhow, since presenting potential solutions to handle a current disaster, the decision-
making process as well as the implementation of measures were speeded up. 
Research on security measures against terrorist threats to public rail transport sys-
tems combined CBR with scenarios and MCDA (L. Lin et al., 2013; L. Lin, Moehrle, 
Muenzberg, & Raskob, 2014) and was part of the RiKoV2 project. The focus was on 
preventive measures to reduce the risk or mitigate the consequences of terrorist at-
tacks. Due to the variety of possible scenarios, related measures, and diverse expec-
tations of passengers, public authorities, and operators of the public railway 
transport systems, a prioritization approach for security measures was elaborated. 
For instance, levels of security may increase costs and public authorities and pas-
sengers may not tolerate the implementation of all kinds of security measures. Sev-
eral historical attacks were analyzed and stored in a database. CBR had the pre-
selection task of security measures where MCDA was used for prioritization among 
them afterwards. Again, TSO inspired the choice of attributes but was enhanced by 
event type dependent characteristics. For the evaluation of security measures, crite-
ria such as physiological effectiveness, costs, and legal aspects were taken into ac-
count. In the frame of this work, all values needed for conducting MCDA were re-
quested from the stakeholders. However, the whole approach supported a 
transparent and comprehensible decision-making process and particularly focused 
on strategic planning issues as well as developing an integrated framework. Re-
search on evaluating the effectiveness of security measures was further deepened 
by integrating a process model describing the steps of an attack. The idea was to 
explore possible variations of a baseline scenario due to the implementation of  
security measures at several process steps and to evaluate the effectiveness of 
measures by means of efficacy, costs, and public acceptance and particularly 
MCDA. Both, the execution of the operation plan of the perpetrator and the effects 
of security measures were integrated in the process model. Here, experts’ assess-
ments on the probability of each variation would be necessary but enables to com-
pare several strategies systematically taking into account plausible future develop-
ments. 
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Research was then further conducted in the frame of CEDIMs Forensic Disaster 
Analysis (FDA)  that was concerned with near real-time analyses of disasters and 
their impacts such as in the frame of the central European flood in Germany (e.g. 
Khazai et al., 2013, 2014; Schröter et al., 2014). The objective was to quickly draw 
conclusions about a new and to a large extent unknown event, primarily by catego-
rizing the event and assessing possible damages in the frame of natural disasters 
(Möhrle & Raskob, 2014). Especially storm events of the past, which were in the 
same category or which have similar frame conditions like imminent or just occur-
ring storms, might give preliminary information (Möhrle & Mühr, 2015). For iden-
tifying useful historical events, particularly for estimating upper and lower limits 
for damaged buildings and direct loss, storm classes were defined taking the pre-
dicted affected area and wind speed into account. In particular, research on natural 
disasters was the starting point for developing the web interface, which was further 
enhanced when working in the nuclear field. As mentioned in the introduction, the 
central project in the nuclear field was PREPARE that aimed at closing gaps that 
have been identified in nuclear and radiological preparedness following the first 
evaluation of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident. In particular, 
existing operational procedures in dealing with long-lasting releases needed to be 
reviewed. Furthermore, monitoring and safety of goods transcending national bor-
ders, improved source term estimation, and dispersion modeling including hydro-
logical pathways for European water bodies were subjects of research. Communi-
cation issues were addressed as well, aiming at investigating the conditions and 
means for relevant, reliable, and trustworthy information to be made available to 
the public at the appropriate time and according to its needs. In particular, the ‘An-
alytical Platform’ was developed exploring the scientific and operational means to 
improve information collection, information exchange, and the evaluation of such 
types of disasters. The case-based decision support method presented in this thesis, 
was partly integrated in the Analytical Platform (Raskob & Möhrle, 2014; Raskob, 
Möhrle, Bai, & Müller, 2016; Raskob, Müller, Möhrle, & Bai, 2016). In this context, 
scenarios were elaborated due to few events of the past (Raskob, Möhrle, & Bai, 
2016).
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In the following, the main assumptions and overall solution are presented before 
discussing the single components in a more detailed way in Chapters 4-6. 
3.1 Assumptions and Chronology of a Nuclear Accident 
The development of the decision support method is based on two assumptions: 
Firstly, it is assumed that the whole problem can be divided into single sub-prob-
lems that if solved, result in solving the whole problem. 
The whole problem in the course of a (potential) nuclear accident is the condi-
tion of not knowing which strategy is appropriate to protect public and envi-
ronment from a possible radiation exposure.  
Second, in order to solve these sub-problems, experience from former, particularly 
similar, problem situations helps to determine appropriate solutions. Experience 
does not relate to past accidents only but also to scenarios defined in advance of an 
accident which benefit from experience as well. This assumption particularly paves 
the way for applying CBR. 
3.1.1 Dividing a Problem into Sub-Problems 
The division of the whole problem occurring when an area that can be a region, city, 
or whole country, is threatened by a (potential) release of radioactive material from 
a nuclear power plant, is conducted according to temporal as well as area specific 
aspects. The German Commission on Radiological Protection suggests to break 
down an accident into phases (Figure 3.1) that reflect the varying status of release, 
type and urgency of measures, type and availability of resources, and relevance of 
exposure pathways (German Commission on Radiological Protection, 2014). The 
required and also implementable measures at a certain point in time are linked to 
these varying conditions and hence fit into a specific schedule.  
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Figure 3.1:   Phases of a nuclear accident (German Commission on Radiological Protection, 2014, p. 12) 
Accident phases (German Commission on Radiological Protection, 2014, p. 11 ff.) 
In the first instance, the urgency phase and post-accident phase are distinguished, 
which can be broken down into several sub-phases. The urgency phase consists of a 
pre-release and, if applicable, a release phase.  
The pre-release phase starts if a possible major radionuclide release of radionuclides 
from a nuclear power plant is identified. The phase ends with the onset of such a 
release or the control of the incident. The pre-release phase may last for hours or 
days. During this phase, crisis management needs to be activated and the public has 
to be informed. If necessary and possible, precautionary measures, such as precau-
tionary evacuation, should be initiated. If ‘iodine thyroid blocking’ is necessary, the 
pre-release phase should be used to distribute or collect iodine tablets. Decisions on 
precautionary measures are based on dose  criteria and depend on the forecast qual-
ity of the type, amount, and timing of radioactive material potentially to be released, 
the source term, and the dispersion and deposition mechanisms. The plant condition 
                                                          
 The dose refers to the quantity of ionizing radiation. In general, the effective dose is meant, which is the 
sum of weighted equivalent doses in all tissues and organs and hence measuring the radiation exposure 
to human. Hereby, the relative biological effectiveness of different radiation types as well as variation 
in the susceptibility of organs and tissues to radiation damage are taken into account (Nisbet & 
Watson, 2015b). 
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is important for the assessment of the source term. A small release that does not 
demand the implementation of measures, is not considered in this accident phase. 
The release phase can last hours, days or a few weeks. If a precautionary evacuation 
was or could not (be) executed, measures considerably reducing the exposure on 
the propagation area are urgent, such as sheltering or the intake of iodine. More 
precautionary measures for civil protection, in particular evacuation, should be im-
plemented in areas, where the radioactive cloud possibly approaches swiftly. 
Whether evacuation is possible during the passaging of the radioactive cloud has to 
be reviewed for each individual case. The release phase ends when dispersion and 
deposition of radioactive material have finished and the plant is under control 
again. This phase is characterized by the transition of the initial projection of the 
radiological situation to measuring the actual level of contamination by stationary 
or mobile monitoring facilities. Particular attention must be paid to the exposure 
pathways (which are explained later in this chapter) that are associated with the 
passing radioactive cloud and radiation protection of the action forces, which are 
primarily not occupationally exposed to radiation. 
The post-accident phase consists of the transition phase and the long-term post- 
accident phase. 
In the transition phase the radiation of the cloud including the direct inhalation of 
radioactive material and the deposition has ended or is not relevant any more. This 
phase can last days to several weeks or months. The beginning of the transition 
phase is characterized by a detailed analysis of the radiological situation. Particu-
larly, the contamination values of food, drinking water, surfaces, soils, plants, and 
water bodies are determined with the help of a sufficient number of reliable meas-
urements. At the end of the transition phase, the required data, resources, and time 
should be available to decide upon incident-based justification and optimization of 
measures for civil protection and of radiation exposure to emergency and support 
personnel and special groups among the population. At this late stage, changes in 
measures already implemented or additional measures, such as relocation, can just 
avert a part of the dose (averted dose) accrued without implementing the measures. 
Finally, the stepwise revocation of measures needs to be decided upon. 
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The long-term post-accident phase can last up to several years or decades after the 
accident and is characterized by a prolonged contamination of areas and the risk of 
a chronic low but constant human exposure. Organizing and shaping individual, 
social, and economic life in the affected areas as well as the implementation of radi-
ation protection need to be discussed with the affected population and businesses. 
Decisions on strategies need to be realized in a societal consensus including aspects 
which are not radiologically significant. This particularly includes investigating 
people in more highly contaminated areas, conveying associated health risks, and 
a follow-up medical care to monitor the progress of their health. In general, multiple 
stakeholders such as politicians, experts, NGOs, or representatives of industry and 
consumers, are possibly involved in the decision process taking into account the 
many facets of a nuclear accident and aiming at deciding in a societal consensus. 
The different accident phases may occur at various times for different places. This 
means that the categorization is area-specific and, for example, a country that is split 
up into different areas, may undergo different accident phases at the same time 
(International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2018). 
As mentioned before, various pathways lead to human exposure where their  
importance vary in the course of a nuclear accident (German Commission on 
Radiological Protection, 2014, p. 13 f.). External radiation may be caused by the radi-
ation from the passing radioactive cloud, due to contamination of the ground, skin, 
clothing, objects and solid or liquid waste as well as direct radiation from the plant. 
Internal radiation may be caused by inhaling airborne radioactive substances from 
the radioactive cloud, ingestion of contaminated foodstuffs, inhalation of resus-
pended radionuclides previously deposited on the ground, objects, and clothing, 
unintentional ingestion of contaminated earth as well as oral ingestion of contami-
nation from the skin or clothing as well as contaminated drinking water. Contami-
nation of foodstuffs result from direct contamination of leafy vegetables, root  
uptake by plants on contaminated ground, fodder crops containing radioactivity 
from contamination and root uptake, contaminated livestock and wild animals, and 
subsequent contamination of milk and meat. If no measures are taken, ingestion of 
contaminated food may be the most important pathway when observed over a pro-
longed period whereas inhalation of airborne radioactive material and radiation 
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from contaminated ground pose the main pathways otherwise. In the case of wet 
deposition, radiation due to ground contamination have increased importance. 
 
Figure 3.2:   Exposure pathways that can lead to external and internal human radiation exposure 
(German Commission on Radiological Protection, 2014, p. 14) 
Possible measures in the Urgency Phase (German Commission on Radiological 
Protection, 2014, p. 21 f.) 
As introduced in the section before, a nuclear accident can be divided into phases 
during which specific measures may be implemented. The most important precau-
tionary measures are introduced shortly in the following (German Commission on 
Radiological Protection, 2014): 
Sheltering 
This measure means that the public is told to stay indoors in protective rooms for a 
recommended period of time (that is typically limited to 1-2 days) to reduce inhala-
tion of radionuclides and external radiation through shielding. The level of shield-
ing heavily depends on the type of building, the construction materials, and sur-
rounding buildings. During sheltering, windows and doors should be closed as 
well as ventilation systems shut off. 
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Evacuation 
Evacuation is the swiftly organized relocation of the public to a safe location where 
accommodation, food, and drink is provided, with an undefined time of return. In 
case contamination remains high, evacuation might turn into a temporary or long-
term relocation (see below). A well-organized evacuation provides the most effec-
tive protection against external and internal radiation exposure. 
Iodine thyroid blocking 
This measure helps to protect the thyroid gland against radioactive iodine  
entering the body and particularly concerns population groups that inhale radioac-
tive iodine.  
Interfering with the food supply 
In the urgency phase, actions concerning food refer to issuing the public with a pre-
cautionary recommendation to avoid recently harvested foodstuffs and animal feed 
as well as fresh milk to avoid ingestion of contaminated foodstuffs. 
Further actions refer to access restrictions and personal decontamination affecting 
external exposure and inhalation, particularly via skin, hair and clothing as well as 
radiation measurements for assessing the radiological situation and for medical 
screening purposes to affect external and internal exposure. 
Possible measures in the Post-Accident Phase (German Commission on 
Radiological Protection, 2014, p. 21 ff.) 
Relocation 
This measure means to transfer residents of an area to a different area during the 
post-accident phase to prevent external irradiation from the ground and inhalation 
of resuspended material. The implementation and duration may be temporary or 
long-term. In case of temporary relocation, people are permitted to return to their 
homes at a later stage. Meanwhile, decontamination measures reduce the time  
period of relocation and affect the external exposure due to deposited radionuclides 
and incorporation. In contrast to long-term relocation, the social and economic  
impact is smaller. If contamination involves long-lived radionuclides, long-term  
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relocation that means over an undefined period of time, might be necessary, imply-
ing organizational as well as social challenges. 
Interfering with the food supply 
In the later phases when radionuclide deposition has taken place, these actions refer 
to intervening in the supply of foodstuffs and animal feed as well as measures to 
reduce the presence of radionuclides in foodstuffs and animal feed and hence par-
ticularly affecting the exposure pathway ‘ingestion’. 
Decontamination 
Decontamination is “the complete or partial removal of contamination by a delib-
erate physical, chemical or biological process […]”(International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), 2007, p. 48) and is an umbrella term for various clean-up measures 
to reduce external doses and doses from resuspended material, possibly resulting 
in large volumes of waste (Nisbet et al., 2010). 
Summary of time-dependent objectives 
As already presented in the subsections before, each accident phase and strategy 
respectively, focus on specifics of the overarching objective to protect public and 
environment. Protecting the public is not always compatible with protecting the  
environment as some side effects of decontamination measures such as soil erosion 
risk or partial loss of soil fertility indicate (Nisbet et al., 2010). Figure 3.3 illustrates 
an objective hierarchy (German Commission on Radiological Protection, 2014; 
Nisbet & Watson, 2015b) where in the urgency phase the main focus lies on reduc-
ing the level of radiation exposure to human and in the post-accident phase, the 
objective is to return to normal living. Reducing the level of radiation exposure re-
fers to two effects: (i) Deterministic effects, which are health effects for which a 
threshold level of dose exists above which the severity of the effect grows with the 
dose (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2007); (ii) Stochastic effects, 
which are radiation-induced health effects (somatic or hereditary) where the prob-
ability of occurrence is greater for a higher dose but where the severity in case of 
occurrence is independent of dose (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
2007). For all objectives, commensurability of strategies needs to be taken into  
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account that means balancing health risks against gravity of intervening in people’s 
lives for the urgency phase and effectiveness against waste and societal aspects in 
the post-accident phase. 
 
Figure 3.3:   Objectives of strategies in the course of nuclear accidents 
Definition of a sub-problem 
Besides analyzing the problem concerning timely issues, the characteristics of the 
areas that are threatened by a nuclear accident are important for decision-making 
as well. Hence, an area-specific consideration is reasonable whereas areas can be 
regions or a whole country undergoing different accident phases. For example, a 
country can be divided into different affected areas that undergo different accident 
phases leading to different problems (due to different sub-objectives and area char-
acteristics) and the need to decide upon different measures. This work particularly 
started with analyzing historical accidents such as the Chernobyl nuclear power 
plant accident resulting in a decomposition according to the location (cities, coun-
tries, etc.) and accident phase. Examples are Pripyat (Ukraine) which have been 
evacuated, several districts in the Ukraine as well as United Kingdom as whole, 
where dietary advices during the release phase where given and measures such as 
selective grazing regime or manipulation of slaughter times were ordered during 
the long-term post-accident phase. Consequently,  
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a sub-problem in the course of a nuclear accident is the condition of not know-
ing which strategy is appropriate for a specific area and during a specific  
accident phase to protect public and environment from a possible radiation 
exposure. 
As stated in the introductory chapter, a decision is a choice of a measure or of sev-
eral measures including their combination to a strategy out of a set of possible 
measures, in consideration of the objectives defined for nuclear accidents. 
Problem-solving in the course of a nuclear accident hence describes the transi-
tion from a condition of being faced with a problem to a condition where the 
objectives are achieved by means of the decision taken. 
Figure 3.4 exemplarily illustrates the specification of an affected area undergoing 
different accident phases. If an area undergoes the pre-release or release phase, it is 
framed red. If an area undergoes the transition phase it is framed blue whereas for 
the long-term post-accident phase, the area is framed turquois. Assume a release of 
radioactive material is expected and hence, due to uncertain weather conditions, 
the whole area around the nuclear plant is potentially endangered. Here, the 
HERCA-WENRA approach (HERCA & WENRA, 2014) would be referred to and 
measures would be planned in a zone of 360 degrees around the installation and up 
to a specified distance. The accident proceeds, release has started and more infor-
mation on the radiological situation becomes available. The weather forecast limits 
sectors concerned and hence the implementation areas for protective measures. 
First measurements can be evaluated to prepare for long-term actions. Step by step, 
the urgency phase for the defined areas ends and the post-accident phase starts. 
 
Figure 3.4:   Several affected areas undergoing different accident phases 
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3.1.2 Constructing a Strategy 
The objectives for nuclear emergency management introduced in the chapter be-
fore, can be specified by means of two dose levels: the reference level for the residual 
dose, which is the effective dose people receive during the first year via inhalation, 
external irradiation and ingestion, and the intervention levels for individual measures 
that are projected doses that could be reached or exceeded among the affected pop-
ulation if a certain measure is not implemented (German Commission on 
Radiological Protection, 2014). These levels particularly take into account the com-
mensurability of measures within a social and economic frame.  
In emergency exposure situations, the International Commission on Radiological 
Protection (ICRP)  recommends to set reference levels within a band of 20-100 mSv 
effective dose (acute or per year). A dose above 100 mSv poses no tolerable health 
risk and almost always justify protective measures (ICRP, 2007, 2009). In Germany, 
for example, a reference level for the residual dose of 100 mSv in the first year is 
used to plan and initiate measures. Especially for the protective measures, interven-
tion levels that are compatible with the reference level for the residual dose, help in 
decision-making. They serve as radiological trigger levels for respective measures 
(German Commission on Radiological Protection, 2014) and are country-specific. In 
particular, the time span over which projected dose values are determined, may 
vary for different countries. For example, intervention levels in Germany for shel-
tering, iodine thyroid blocking, and evacuation refer to an early period of 7 days 
after release assuming that people are permanently staying outdoors. Table 3.1 
sums up the intervention levels for the protective measures. If the specific interven-
tion level is exceeded, the measure should be initiated. Especially decision support 
systems such as JRodos and dispersion, deposition, and dose models, respectively, 
help to determine areas for precautionary measures. Hereby, the source term, real-
time and prognostic weather data, and environmental data are necessary to deter-
mine environmental contamination and projected dose values. 
                                                          
 http://www.icrp.org/ 5
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Table 3.1:   Intervention levels for selected measures(German Commission on Radiological Protection, 
2014, p. 33) 
Measure Intervention level Explanation 
Sheltering 10 mSv 
Effective dose due to external exposure 
+ committed effective dose due to inha-
lation within a period of 7 days (perma-
nently staying outdoors) 
Iodine  
thyroid 
blocking 
50 mSv for children and 
young people under the age 
of 18 and pregnant women 
 
250 mSv for people aged 18 
to 45 
Thyroid dose (committed equivalent 
dose)  due to inhalation of radioactive 
iodine within a period of 7 days (per-
manently staying outdoors) 
Evacuation 100 mSv 
Effective dose due to external exposure 
+ committed effective dose due to inha-
lation within a period of 7 days (perma-
nently staying outdoors) 
 
Evacuation may lead to temporary or long-term relocation where the reference level 
of the residual effective dose provides a decisive criterion.  
In addition to dose criteria, further factors that are time- and location-dependent, 
influence decisions on an appropriate strategy (German Commission on 
Radiological Protection, 2014). These are the effectiveness and feasibility of 
measures, negative effects of measures, subjective influencing factors such as public 
acceptance, uncertainty parameters referring to inaccurate meteorological or radio-
logical estimations as well as planning requirements where the challenge is to map 
areas determined by the dose model to the emergency response planning areas. In 
particular, expert advisors may provide information on these influencing factors 
and judge their relevance in the actual context (German Commission on 
                                                          
 The equivalent dose is the absorbed dose delivered by a specific radiation type averaged over a tis-
sue or organ weighted with a specific radiation weight factor that considers the relative biological 
effectiveness of that radiation type (https://www.bfs.de, https://www.iaea.org). The committed dose 
particularly refers to the intake of radioactive material. 
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Radiological Protection, 2014) which supports the idea of this thesis to prepare and 
store information in a structured manner gained from experience and experts,  
respectively, in advance of an accident. 
If little information is available, particularly in the pre-release phase, the HERCA-
WENRA approach that was developed after the Fukushima Daiichi accident, may 
be used as first suggestion and which is integrated into this work. For the later 
phases, key steps in selecting and combining measures, as described in the Euro-
pean handbooks, are as follows (Nisbet et al., 2010, 2009): 
(1) Identify the targets that are likely to be/have been contaminated 
(2) Select the measures that are applicable to the specific targets 
(3) Check the applicability of measures with regard to radionuclides  
being considered 
(4) Check the key constraints for the measures with regard to the  
implementation 
(5) Check the effectiveness of the measures to decide which of them to keep 
(6) Check the type and quantities of waste produced by the measures as well 
as potential incremental dose  that may be received by individuals in con-
nection with the implementation of the measures 
(7) Check the relevant constraints of the remaining measures, particularly 
with regard to the site 
(8) Select and combine measures left to a strategy 
The handbooks provide recommendations or hints whether measures require fur-
ther analysis. Particularly, site-specific customization with the help of relevant 
stakeholders is necessary. In this respect, the purpose of this work is to support the 
selection and construction process by reusing already defined scenarios that resem-
ble the current problem situation to be solved and reuse already determined 
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measures. These measures can be used as a starting point for further discussions, 
save time, and indicate potential constraints for implementation. In particular, parts 
of the key steps referring to targets and radionuclides are integrated in the decision 
support method of this work in terms of attributes characterizing the problem (see 
Chapter 4). Furthermore, the constraints of implementing measures are implicitly 
taken into account when setting up the scenario. In particular, site-specific con-
straints are considered for specific location type categories. However, the categories 
are rough and when reusing a scenario and its measures, respectively, further dis-
cussions on the applicability of certain measures are possibly necessary. Further-
more, values on effectiveness and resources are adapted automatically (see  
Chapter 6). 
3.2 Overview of the Case-Based Decision Support 
Method 
The core of the decision support method is CBR. Here, 
the description of a (sub)-problem, corresponding strategies for problem-
solving, their effectiveness, and further decision supporting information 
build a case in the case base. The description of a case is oriented towards a 
case model. 
A case can be a historical accident as well as a scenario. Scenarios enhance the case 
base and result from simulations. Both are subject to a case model consisting of a 
problem and solution model (see Chapter 4.4). The solution model includes a strat-
egy model that is based on HLPNs. The main idea is to allow the integration of 
triggering events of measures as well as their targets. The latter captures the effects 
of measures as well. The approach is generic and not solely developed for the  
nuclear field. Figure 3.5 depicts the development of the case model, compiled 
sources, the integration of experts that actually work in the field of application, and 
building the case base. 
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Figure 3.5:   Process of case modeling and building the case base 
The retrieve step is realized in two steps: First, candidates for the subsequent simi-
larity calculation are selected whereas the filter attributes are the accident phase and 
further user-specified attributes. After delimiting the set of problem descriptions, 
similarities between the actual problem description and the problem  
descriptions of the remaining cases are calculated whereas the choice of attributes 
as well as weights are user-specified. The similarity function is defined according 
to the local-global principle. Finally, a fixed number of cases or cases whose simi-
larities of their problem descriptions to the description of the actual problem exceed 
a certain threshold, are retrieved. The reuse step consists of merging and adaptation 
to transform solutions of most similar cases into a solution that fits into new circum-
stances. Merging aims at covering a wide range of actual targets whereas adaptation 
refers to area sizes, number of affected people, costs, and waste. Figure 3.6 briefly 
displays the realized retrieve and reuse steps of the CBR application, which is  
explained more in detail in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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Figure 3.6:   Two-level retrieval and reuse step of the CBR application. The illustration is inspired by 
Leake, 1996a, Figure 1 
The reuse step comprises numerical adaptations, merging of several strategies, and 
a multi-criteria assessment. Merging is realized at equally labeled transitions aim-
ing at covering a larger part of the current problem description than the single strat-
egies retrieved do. If several strategies are available, a subsequent multi-criteria as-
sessment helps to identify an appropriate strategy for the current problem situation. 
MCDA provides means to complement the case-based approach taking into account 
users’ preferences as well as the exceptionality of nuclear accidents. The choice of 
suitable criteria is crucial. The approach pursued by this thesis (see Chapter 6.2) 
integrates different perspectives on the assessment of strategies: (i) The main idea 
is to reuse solutions of already experienced or at least considered problems and 
hence information on how the strategy works is integrated. (ii) Considerations with 
regard to future developments are integrated by evaluating the robustness of solu-
tions. (iii) System-specific parameters, which depend on the underlying decision 
supporting method, are included indicating to which degree the user can trust the 
solutions identified. (iv) Current constraints such as concerning resources are  
regarded by running simulations of possibly suitable strategies. 
Figure 3.7 sums up the components of the developed decision support method and 
illustrates the integration into the original CBR cycle (Aamodt & Plaza, 1994), which 
is marked in green. Particularly, several cases can be retrieved for further reuse. 
Note that cases comprise historical as well as fictitious accidents (scenarios) being 
simulated by JRodos. For decision support, the scenarios are of primary concern. 
The historical accidents provide additional information, especially experience 
gained with implementing measures. 
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Figure 3.7:   Overview of the case-based decision support method and integrations into the CBR cycle. 
The original CBR cycle is based on Aamodt & Plaza, 1994, Figure 1 
3.3 Discussion of the Novel Approach 
Decision-making in the course of a nuclear accident is complex due to the compli-
cated but also varying frame conditions and requirements in each accident phase. 
This is also reflected in the changing objectives and corresponding possible 
measures. Systems currently in use support the decision-making process by ad hoc 
projections of the radiological situation and analyses in respect of measure combi-
nations, for example with regard to their effectiveness – either computer-based or 
with the help of handbooks. In other words, they help in constructing a strategy by 
preparing or providing some decisive information. However, some issues are not 
sufficiently addressed: (i) Uncertainty, which is a crucial issue ranging from initial 
information on the accident to simulation results; (ii) Strategy building, which is 
very complex and would benefit from additional computerized support. Further-
more, non-radiological aspects need to be focused more. Also, there is lack of prac-
tical experience with regard to appropriate strategies and their implementation,  
especially with regard to long-term actions; (iii) Preparedness, which includes the 
preparation of scenarios in advance to save time, to avoid mistakes due to effects 
that have not been adequately thought through as well as to counter the complexity 
of decision-making due to various factors that need be considered. The structured 
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integration of existing knowledge and experience from the past in the decision pro-
cess would contribute to avoid pitfalls also. 
The method presented in this thesis provides solutions for these issues and partic-
ularly supports nuclear emergency management during all accident phases: In the 
early stages of an accident, precautionary measures, the size of implementation ar-
eas, a shelter factor  as well as experience on implementing these measures are pro-
vided. In the post-accident phase, the focus lies on decontamination and hence strat-
egies and effectiveness values such as a dose reduction factor  or waste produced, 
are presented to the user. Again, experience on the implementation of strategies are 
provided. In contrast to existing decision support, the novelty of the develop 
method is as follows: 
 Direct identification of strategies instead of providing information to the 
user to build a strategy. 
 Strategies based on scenarios prepared in advance of an accident are  
reused instead of developing strategies new in the course of an accident. 
 Aggregation and central storage of different knowledge sources such as 
handbooks, experts’ knowledge, and experience gained in former accidents 
as well as simulation results. 
 Knowledge sources are made available computerized and structured to  
recognize potential pitfalls. 
 Modeling of strategies with PNs allows to capture orders of implementa-
tion and effects of measures. Particularly with regard to the latter, the  
tokens in the nets are typed according to the target and the effect of a  
measure and degree of endangerment, respectively. This idea differs from 
                                                          
 The shelter factor is the ratio between the dose received with sheltering and the dose received with-
out sheltering. 
 The factor of dose reduction is the ratio between the dose received after implementing a specific 
strategy and the dose received without implementing this strategy. 
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existing approaches that mainly concentrate on process execution support  
or analysis according to performance parameters. 
 Multi-criteria assessment of strategies by adopting various perspectives 
such as considerations on possible future developments, effectiveness, re-
sources as well as confidence in the solutions retrieved. This approach par-
ticularly integrates different perspectives instead of pursuing a single one. 
In summary, computerized case-based decision support is new in nuclear emer-
gency management. Hence, this work pursues a completely new direction where 
each component of the solution is presented in the following chapters more in  
detail. The whole method is elaborated by means of nuclear accidents where some 
components such as the multi-criteria assessment and the strategy modeling are of 
generic nature. Furthermore, the case-based approach can be applied to other event 
types as well (Chapter 8). The reasons for focusing on nuclear accidents are the sci-
entific relevance but were also the good frame conditions for modeling and data 
acquisition in close collaboration with experts. They provided knowledge on past 
accidents but also approved the developed scenarios and results of assessments. In 
contrast to other projects that focused on natural disasters, research on disaster 
management according to strategy building could be conducted. Furthermore, sim-
ulation results of a decision support system that is operationally used worldwide, 
helped to further extend the case base, which is the core of the whole approach. 
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4 The Case Base 
The following chapter deals with the structure and content of the collection of cases 
and particularly addresses the questions what to store in a case, how to structure 
the case contents, and how the case base should be organized and indexed for re-
trieval and reuse. Especially with regard to the reuse step, the integration of general 
domain knowledge needs to be clarified (Aamodt & Plaza, 1994). Some parts of the 
case model have already been published (Moehrle & Raskob, 2015; Raskob & 
Möhrle, 2014). 
In this work, the commonly used attribute-value-based case representation is cen-
tral. Other representations such as pure texts or images are possible but were not 
pursued since decisive criteria could be directly discussed with experts. Further-
more, the attribute-value-based representation is flexible and hence suitable for the 
application domain and facilitates the later retrieve step. The choice of attributes 
results from gathering potentially relevant attributes from related documents, soft-
ware, and databases and evaluating the obtained attribute catalogue by experts. 
This includes the evaluation of attribute domains as well. The attribute catalogue 
aims at covering all accident characteristics that are relevant for decision-making on 
strategies. The importance of the attributes are assessed according to each accident 
phase revealing changes during an accident.  
This chapter outlines the sources that have been analyzed and the resulting attribute 
catalogue for evaluation. The catalogue covers radiological and non-radiological as-
pects which are, as stated in Chapter 3.1.2, important for decision-making as well. 
Chapter 4.2 presents the results of the expert survey. Chapter 4.3 addresses the issue 
of uncertainty and makes suggestions with respect to the case base. Afterwards, the 
case model is introduced (Chapter 4.4) as well as the modeling of strategies using 
High-level Petri Nets (Chapter 4.4.1). The last part of Chapter 4 is dedicated to  
data collection. 
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4.1 The Attribute Catalogue 
Various sources contribute to the list of attributes and in case of symbolic attributes, 
a set of allowed values. In the following, the notion of ‘event’ is used in a general 
sense and is not limited to nuclear accidents. As introduced in Chapter 1 an event is 
an occurrence of an incident that triggers the necessity of building and implement-
ing a strategy. The term comprises historical and fictitious nuclear accidents as well 
as further disaster types. 
In the following, a hazard is “a potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon 
and/or human activity, which may cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, 
social and economic disruption or environmental degradation […] and “describes 
the probability of occurrence of a potentially destructive natural phenomenon in a 
defined area and within a defined time period.” (Center for Disaster Management 
and Risk Reduction Technology, 2005, p. 13). The vulnerability describes the suscep-
tibility of a system towards adverse impacts of hazards and can be expressed by the 
degree of loss (Center for Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Technology, 
2005, p. 28). The term risk “[…] encompasses the probability and the amount of 
harmful consequences or expected losses […]” being result of hazards and vulner-
abilities (Center for Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Technology, 2005, p. 
24). These notions are introduced for clarifying the next sections but are not further 
used in this thesis. Hence, an extensive discussion is omitted. 
The first two sources are related to risk management and are primarily used for 
generally describing the affected area and covering different kinds of impact. Also, 
the approach for impact classification is used for the attribute catalogue. The third 
source provides means to describe an event in a general manner and particularly to 
be used in the event of a disaster. Especially, many symbolic attributes and their 
domains are made available. The last two sources are dedicated to the nuclear field 
and encompass results of current research. 
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Method of Risk Analysis for Civil Protection 
The Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK)1 in Germany, 
established in May 2004, acts as a federal service center for organizations and insti-
tutions working in civil protection and authorities at all levels of the administration. 
The BBK published a guideline ‘Method of Risk Analysis for Civil Protection’ 
(Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance, 2011) applicable to all 
administrative levels in Germany, with the aim to determine the extent of expected 
damage for different hazardous events, to compare a variety of risks related to dif-
ferent hazards, and consequently to implement measures to protect the population. 
In respect of expected damage assessment, attributes to describe the reference area 
and impact parameters are provided. The guideline lists information needed with 
regard to man, environment, economy, and supply as well as immaterial facts. Fur-
thermore, parameters and central questions for describing a scenario are provided. 
The guideline resulted from research on methods of risk analysis as well as ex-
change with international and federal authorities and academia and respects inter-
national standards. Due to the generic approach, the attribute catalogue includes 
the descriptions of the reference area, a scenario, and impact parameters (Table A.1, 
Table A.2, and Table A.3) and the templates for impact classification (Appendix C). 
Disaster Inventory System (DesInventar)2 
DesInventar (Network of Social Studies in the Prevention of Disasters in Latin 
America, 2009) is a methodology and software tool to build databases containing 
loss, damages, or effects of disasters and emergencies. DesInventar originated from 
the Network of Social Studies in the Prevention of Disasters in Latin America (LA 
RED). The purpose is to provide a capacity for risk management to analyze hazards, 
vulnerabilities, and risks by supporting the acquisition, analysis, and visualization 
of disaster related information. In the methodological guide various events and 
causes are defined. Here, events are phenomenon of natural and anthropological 
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4 The Case Base  
92 
origin having harmful effects on human lives, health, and economic or social infra-
structure. Furthermore, adverse effects are provided, grouped into people, homes, 
infrastructure, and economic loss (Table A.4) 
Tactical Situation Object (TSO) 
TSO (CEN3 Workshop Agreement Part 1 2009; CEN Workshop Agreement Part 2 
2009)  is a message structure for disaster and emergency management. The idea of 
TSO is to support the transfer of information between computer-based systems by 
encoding disaster/emergency relevant terms in an XML schema contributing to a 
shared situation awareness of various parties. TSO provides the relevant attributes 
to describe a disaster or emergency and defines a basic vocabulary for disaster man-
agement with unique expressions. The codes are arranged hierarchically providing 
a basic categorization of event features. TSO is used as an approach for a generic 
event description (Moehrle, 2012). Endangered objects, location type and environ-
mental description, scale, type of area, and weather conditions are further used for 
the nuclear case (Table A.5). 
Real-time On-line Decision Support System for Off-site Emergency Management in Europe 
(RODOS) 
The decision support system RODOS (Ehrhardt & Weis, 2000) resulted from the 
RODOS project launched in 1989 and increased in size through the European Com-
mission’s 3rd, 4th and 5th Framework Programs. Up to 40 institutes from 20 countries 
were actively involved in the project. RODOS provides support for all stages of a 
nuclear accident and can be used at local, regional, or national level. The system can 
predict the dispersion and disposition of material released, models the transfer of 
radioactive material to feed- and foodstuff and to man, and supports decisions on 
countermeasures. RODOS covers nuclear power plant accidents, explosions of  
radiological dispersal service (‘dirty bombs’), and radiological accidents with fire. 
The basis for calculations are the source term, real-time and prognostic weather 
data, and environmental data. The current version of RODOS is Java based and re-
named into JRodos (Ievdin et al., 2010). The input parameters of JRodos (Table A.6) 
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are added to the list of potential attributes, mainly to take the release phase  
into account. 
Handbooks for assisting in the management of contaminated inhabited areas, food produc-
tion systems, and drinking water in Europe following a radiological emergency 
The handbooks for assisting emergency management in Europe (J. Brown et al., 
2009; Nisbet et al., 2010, 2009) resulted from the 5-year project EURANOS: European 
approach to nuclear radiological emergency management and rehabilitation strate-
gies4 which started in 2004. The project was funded by the European Commission 
and 23 European Member States where 17 national emergency organizations and 
33 research institutes participated. The generic handbooks serve as a guideline for 
planning, response, and training purposes. They include scientific, technical, and 
societal aspects which are important to the management of contaminated inhabited 
areas, food productions systems, and drinking water. The handbooks help in un-
derstanding the radiological aspects that are important for constructing a strategy, 
as already introduced in Chapter 3.1.2.  
The first step in constructing a strategy is to identify the objects of concern (see 
Chapter 3.1.2), which are referred to as ‘targets’ in the attribute catalogue. Thereaf-
ter, appropriate measures can be determined depending on the radionuclides  
released. The period of exposure, the distance between people and contamination, 
and the presence of any shielding material are important for decision-making as 
well (Nisbet et al., 2010) and hence is integrated in the attribute catalogue. Further-
more, radionuclides differ in half-lives and type of radiation emitted (alpha, beta, 
or gamma radiation) penetrating human body in different ways. Consequently, 
these characteristics of radionuclides are integrated in the catalogue also. Further-
more, weather and particular the amount of precipitation at the time of deposition 
have a great influence on the radiation exposure and time people spend indoors 
and outdoors contributes to the doses in a different way (Nisbet et al., 2009) and 
hence need to be reflected in the catalogue of decisive criteria. 
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Furthermore, the characteristics of the measures listed in the handbooks are inte-
grated in the attribute catalogue. For example, the effectiveness and type and 
amount of waste restrict the set of possible measures.  
Appendix B shows the attribute catalogue presented to the experts for evaluation. 
These attributes are grouped according to event, nuclear power plant, involved  
radionuclides, location, consequences, and measures. For symbolic attributes, a set 
of allowed values, often arranged in a taxonomy, are provided. Table B.7 exempla-
rily illustrates the TSO codes for the attribute ‘location type’. 
4.2 Evaluation of the Attribute Catalogue 
The attribute catalogue was evaluated independently by nine experts according to 
its relevance for decision-making. The experts participated in the PREPARE project 
and work in research institutions as well as nuclear safety authorities. In particular, 
the importance of each attribute for an accident phase was assessed. The objective 
was to identify the smallest set of attributes that covers all important aspects of de-
cision-making. The advantages of a small set are as follows: 
 Time pressure may not allow to specify unnecessary accident 
characteristics that are possibly already covered by other attributes. 
 The retrieval results may not be clearly distinguishable if too many  
attributes are involved in the similarity calculation. The more attributes  
are involved, the more possibilities exist to cancel out major differences  
between attribute values. The similar cases might not be differentiated 
properly from each other. 
 In the later data acquisition step, values need to be provided for the attrib-
utes. If too many attribute values are missing, the retrieval step might be  
impaired also. 
For evaluation, a scale from zero to four was offered to the experts to give their 
votes (Table 4.1). The intention was to strike a balance between rough relevant/not 
relevant assessments and fine granular scales that would overreach the objective to 
identify relevant attributes for each accident phase. Hence, ‘medium relevance’ 
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serving as judgement between two extremes as well as intermediate values between 
two adjacent judgements were given. However, a less granular scale would have 
been preferred by the experts (see 4.2.1). 
Table 4.1:   Scales to assess the relevance of an attribute for an accident phase 
Scale Explanation 
0 No relevance 
1 Little relevance 
2 Medium relevance 
3  Great relevance 
4 Strictly necessary 
 
In total, 151 attributes were offered in the survey. Table 4.2 illustrates the number 
of possible values for the symbolic attributes ‘targets’, ‘location types’, ‘environ-
mental hazards’, ‘area types’, and ‘weather categories’. These domains were 
adopted from TSO. More symbolic attributes are included in the catalogue, such  
as ‘time of release’ where only ‘day’, ‘night’ or ‘day and night’ are available,  
for example. 
Table 4.2:   Number of possible values for symbolic attributes with large domains. 
Attribute Domain cardinality 
Targets 234 
Location types 53 
Environmental hazards 17 
Area types 79 
Weather categories 48 
 
The experts were asked to provide value ranges for specific impact categories  
such as the number of fatalities and injured in case of a disastrous event (see  
Appendix C). 
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4.2.1 Experts’ Feedback 
As part of the project, nine experts were addressed to rank the attributes and com-
plete the impact classification form where all of them provided feedback and shared 
their experience when fulfilling this task: 
 The attribute catalogue has been regarded as well-chosen and comprehen-
sive but mainly as too large. 
 The scores might have been reduced to three or even two scores: 
no relevance/some relevance/great relevance or relevant/not relevant. 
 The domains for some symbolic attributes have been regarded as too  
detailed. The domain for the targets have been shortened and re-organized 
as a hierarchy (see Appendix E).  
 In general, changes in some attribute names have been suggested in align-
ment with the radiological terminology, particularly those gained from TSO. 
Particularly, the INES scale has been added to the attribute catalogue. 
 The meaning of the accident phases was not clear for everyone due to differ-
ing country-specific terms. 
 It was not clear who in the end should provide values for the attributes 
defined. 
 The question arose how to integrate different operational guidelines and  
approaches in different European countries as well as the quantification of 
loss since monetary values may have different meanings in different Euro-
pean countries. 
 The impact classification form has generally been regarded as very difficult 
to fill. Only two experts provided numbers for some categories. This is owed 
to country-specific regulations but also to the range of interpretation possibil-
ities and hence subjectivity. One expert commented that an incident that 
causes no immediate fatalities or injuries might be still categorized as disas-
trous if it has serious impact on the area, environment, or economy or result 
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in other issues such as stigmatization or economic recession. Furthermore, the 
expert questioned the classification of an event concerning environment and 
particularly on the basis of impairment of protected area, water bodies, 
ground water, and agricultural land since i) the implications of impairment 
would probably depend more on available alternative resources than on the 
actual contaminated area and ii) isolated treatment might not be useful since 
even small contaminated land could lead to stigmatization and large econom-
ical loss for the entire region. To summarize, the complexity of the topic does 
not easily allow a categorization in such simple terms when it comes to econ-
omy, supply, and immaterial impacts. In the following, the two examples for 
impact classification are presented based on Belgian and Ukrainian regula-
tions. 
Impact classifications 
The approach of the experts was to translate their country-specific emergency clas-
sifications into the classification form provided. 
Belgium 
For the Belgian emergency levels, there is usually no sharp division between fatali-
ties or injuries. The main levels of emergency are divided into A, B, and C levels 
where C is the highest (Table 4.3). 
Table 4.3:   Belgian emergency levels 
Number of casualties  
(death & injuries) 
Emergency level declaration 
5 heavily injured 
Trigger level A emergency plan 10 moderately injured 
20 of an unknown situation 
21-40 wounded Trigger level B emergency plan 
40+  Trigger level C emergency plan 
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These levels were translated into the classification form. Here, a disastrous event 
starts with 40+ casualties where the lowest level of emergency is declared when 5 
people are heavily injured which is reflected by classifying an event as ‘moderate’ 
(Table 4.4). 
Table 4.4:   Belgian impact classification with regard to man based on the country-specific emergency 
levels 
MAN 
Classification Casualties (Fatalities & Injured) 
Disastrous   > 40 
Significant 10 - 20 
Moderate 5 - 9 
Minor 2 - 4 
Insignificant   ≤ 2 
 
In respect of impact classifications with regard to environment and supply, the 
specification approach is questioned again since impairments and disruptions can-
not be regarded isolated. With regard to water bodies not only the area contami-
nated but also the speed of stream and dilution of contamination respectively is 
important. Furthermore, with regard to drinking water, the number of people  
affected, alternative sources as well as the industry dependence on water plays an 
important role. Also, with regard to energy and gas supply, the season influences 
how damaging a disruption is. In general, disruptions may be measured not only 
with regard to time or affected area but in the dimension of how many persons may 
be affected. 
Ukraine 
In Ukrainian legislation there are no classes of emergencies as ‘disastrous’, ‘signifi-
cant’, ‘moderate’, ‘minor’, ‘insignificant’. Ukrainian classification of emergencies is 
based on the administrative status of territories involved, number of casualties and 
scope of economic losses, and emergencies are divided into emergencies of ‘national 
level’, ‘regional level’ and ‘local level’. Based on this logic, an event is classified as 
disastrous if more than 10 fatalities and more than 300 injured are involved. In case 
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of less than one fatality and less than 20 injured, the event would be classified as 
insignificant (Table 4.5). 
Table 4.5:   Ukrainian impact classification with regard to man 
MAN 
Classification Fatalities Injured 
Disastrous   > 10   > 300 
Significant 5 - 10 100 - 300 
Moderate 3 - 5 50 - 100 
Minor 1 - 2 20 - 50 
Insignificant   ≤ 1   ≤ 20 
 
Environmental classification could not be conducted since the territories involved 
are characterized as administrative units such as region, populated locality etc. and 
not expressed in ha or km. With regard to economy, the general term ‘losses’ is in 
use in Ukrainian legislation. Figures are provided for the cases when no casualties 
are involved and were calculated based on the minimum official salary valid for 
September 2013 and currency exchange rate at that time. Here, losses exceeding 16 
million Euro would refer to a disastrous event (Table 4.6) 
Table 4.6:   Ukrainian impact classification with regard to economy 
ECONOMY 
Classification Losses 
Disastrous 
 
> 16 million Euro 
Significant 1.6 million Euro - 16 million Euro 
Moderate 0.02 million Euro - 1.6 million Euro 
Minor   -   
Insignificant   ≤ 0.02 million Euro 
 
In Ukrainian legislation there is no classification on the type of living conditions (as 
‘disruption of water supply’, ‘disruption of energy supply’, ‘disruption of gas sup-
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ply’, and ‘disruption of telecommunication’). Ukrainian legislation provides gen-
eral definition – ‘disruption of living conditions’. Here, as disastrous event means 
that the living conditions of 50000 persons are disrupted for more than 3 days (Table 
4.7). The immaterial classification was not clearly understood. 
Table 4.7:   Ukrainian classification of disruption of living conditions 
SUPPLY 
Classification Disruption of living conditions 
Disastrous     > 50000 persons 
 
  for > 72/3 hours/days 
Significant   10000 - 50000 persons 
 
for   > 72/3 hours/days 
Moderate   1000 - 10000 persons 
 
for   > 72/3 hours/days 
Minor   100 - 1000 persons 
 
for   > 72/3 hours/days 
Insignificant   
 
≤ 100 persons 
 
  for ≤ 72/3 hours/days 
 
Interim conclusion 
The forms for the impact classifications were only partly filled of two experts. Due 
to the different country-dependent legislations, the classification of an event and its 
impacts is very individual. For example, classifying an event as disastrous by means 
of the number of fatalities and injured differs between the two countries regarded. 
This may be partly owed to the differing country and population size as well as 
population density. Exemplarily, the numbers are listed in Table 4.8. 
Table 4.8:   Country size, population size, and population density for Ukraine and Belgium. Date of  
information July 2017 
Country Country size Population size  Population density 
Ukraine 603.550 km² 44.033.874 73/km2  
Belgium 30.528 km² 11.491.346 376/km2 
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Another conclusion is that impacts on man, supply, economy, as well as immaterial 
implications cannot be regarded separately for categorization and a specific size for 
an affected area cannot be automatically assigned to the category ‘disastrous’. The 
categorization depends on, for example, how many people are affected and if strat-
egies can be developed to overcome the impairment. Consequently, the impacts 
need to be considered together with country-specific characteristics in order to clas-
sify the severity of an accident. Due to the reserved response to the impact classifi-
cation form, further attempts of clarification have not been undertaken. The experts 
rather recommended to work with the number of affected people and the interna-
tional nuclear and radiological event scale (INES) to classify nuclear power plant 
accidents (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2008). The scale has seven 
levels and events are considered according to their impact on people and environ-
ment, on radiological barriers and controls at facilities, and on defense in depth. The 
latter particularly takes into account events with no but potential consequences. Ac-
tually, the INES scale is applied after an accident. During an accident, the notion of 
‘iodine equivalent’ is used and reflects the amount of radioactive material released 
from a nuclear power plant accident. There are specific conversion factors for radi-
ological equivalence to Iodine 131 (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
2008, Table 2). However, only regarding an accident from a radiological point of 
view is insufficient and further attributes were taken into account as can be seen in 
the following. 
Importance of the attributes for decision-making during each accident phase 
The results of evaluating the attributes and particularly the median values for each 
accident phase can be found in Appendix D. If it is not mentioned that an attribute 
is deleted, the attribute is integrated in the final set. Attributes that are marked with 
the note ‘add’ are provided additionally by the experts. For being integrated in the 
final set, an attribute needs to be voted at least by a 3 (great relevance) for at least 
one accident phase. Attributes for describing a measure have all been regarded as 
decisive. In summary, 
 Most of the domains of symbolic attributes needed to be reduced since 
many values TSO offers have been regarded as not necessary. 
 Several attributes were adapted to the nuclear domain. 
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 Depending on the expertise of the evaluator, some very specific attributes 
were suggested to add to the catalogue. 
 The taxonomy of targets subsumed many attributes. 
 Several attributes could be merged. 
 Except of the attributes describing consequences, the degree of importance of 
attributes varied depending on the release status. Many attributes assigned 
high relevance during the pre-release and release phase were less important 
during the transition and long-term post-accident phase.  
 Consequences are not important for the pre-release phase. However, most of 
the offered attributes were regarded as having great relevance or were strictly 
necessary for decision-making during the other accident phases. 
After the evaluation, the original aggregation in ‘event’, ‘nuclear power plant’,  
‘location’, ‘radionuclide’, ‘consequences’, and ‘measures’ was almost completely re-
vised. The structure was particularly aligned with the problem division into  
affected areas and accident phases (see Chapter 3.1.1). The evaluation particularly 
revealed, which attributes are relevant to describe an affected area, which are phase-
specific, and which belong to a general description of the event. Figure 4.1 illustrates 
the basic structure of an accident, which is linked to a release or potential release 
(indicated by ‘pre-release’), to several affected areas, where each area can be as-
signed to one or several accident phases. A strategy is specified for an affected area 
during a specific phase. ‘Release’ and ‘pre-release’ indicate general characteristics 
whereas ‘accident phase’ includes phase-specific information. Hence, a case in the 
case base contains general information on the accident, such as the nuclear power plant 
involved, information on the affected area, such as the population distribution, infor-
mation on release such as the release duration, and phase-specific information. The lat-
ter refers to targets, for example, which change in the course of an accident. Roofs, 
for example, are objects of interest in the later phases in terms of decontamination 
whereas specific food needs to be regarded earlier. Furthermore, each case includes 
a strategy and further decisive information such as the effectiveness of this strategy. 
The latter can be specified by the dose reduction, for example. 
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Figure 4.1:   Basic structure of an accident 
4.3 Uncertainty Handling 
Thinking of a nuclear accident or potential accident scenario, there is likely to be 
uncertainty, for example in the source terms, weather conditions, observation  
errors in the monitoring data, in processing models like e.g. atmospheric dispersion, 
the public compliance with any measure, the demography of the population af-
fected and so on (French, 1997). From the earliest moments of an accident when a 
release threatens, through the release phase, to the long-term consequences  
arising from the resulting contamination, there are many uncertainties to be 
weighted in selecting strategies. Many of these uncertainties can be reduced 
through careful collection and analysis of a variety of data.  
In Chapter 2.1.5, several solutions are presented on how to handle uncertainty in 
the problem description. Within the scope of this thesis, the first step in handling 
uncertainty is to offer categories for description instead of demanding exact values 
for a specific attribute. As could be already seen in the attribute catalogue, several 
symbolic attributes can be used for problem description. The accident scenario type, 
for example, indicates a possible event development, such as a large leak in the con-
tainment which may lead to a steam blast. Furthermore, attributes such as weather 
which could have a very detailed description, can be categorized as well. For in-
stance, a first distinction into ‘no rain’ or ‘rain’ indicates the extent of contamination 
where precipitation may lead to a higher contamination of an area. Refinements are 
necessary as can be seen in Chapter 4.5 when the simulation results are analyzed. 
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Working with pre-defined domains of symbolic attributes and categorization of cer-
tain characteristics are the first steps to limit additional uncertainty generated in the 
model by uncertain input data. Furthermore, the assignment of important attributes 
for decision-making to accident phases, help to reduce uncertainty by focusing on 
relevant characteristics as well. Table 4.9 shows some examples of symbolic attrib-
utes and corresponding domains. 
Table 4.9:   Examples of symbolic attributes with corresponding domains 
Attribute Categories  
Accident type 
explosion of radiological dispersal service 
nuclear power plant accident 
radiological accident with fire 
spread of contamination following radiological poisoning 
Iodine  
equivalent 
1-7 
 
Comment: There is a significant difference in the measures between 
the top level 7 of the iodine equivalent and the other lower level no 
less than 5. For the cases of less than level 5, no recommended strat-
egies could be offered. 
Population  
distribution 
rural 
urban 
metropolitan 
Weather 
rain 
no rain 
no rain low wind 
no rain medium wind 
no rain stable wind 
 
Comment: When the iodine equivalent achieves the top level 7, the 
weather significantly changes the sizes of evacuation/sheltering 
area or the distribution area of iodine tablets for adults/children 
from the data analysis of the scenarios calculated by JRodos (see 
also Chapter 4.5). 
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4.4 The Case Model 
In the following, the structure of a case is introduced formally (Moehrle & Raskob, 
2015). Basically, a case consists of a problem and solution description which in turn 
encompasses a strategy, its effectiveness, and further decisive information. For de-
scription, attributes are used (based on Stahl, 2003, Definition 2.1): 
Definition 4.1 Attribute 
An attribute 𝐴 is a pair (𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒 , 𝑑𝑜𝑚(𝐴)) where 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒  is a unique label and 
𝑑𝑜𝑚(𝐴) is the domain. The value of an attribute 𝐴 is denoted by  
𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚(𝐴).  
Note that the domain of an attribute particularly contains NULL in case the attribute 
value is not known. One part of a case is the problem description being subject to a 
problem model (based on Stahl, 2003, Definition 2.2): 
Definition 4.2 Problem model 
A problem model D consists of finitely many attributes  
𝐷 = (𝐴1, 𝐴2, … , 𝐴𝑛), 𝑛 > 0. Denote ?̂? as the set of all problem models. 
The problem model comprises descriptions of the affected area, the accident phase 
and the related event that in turn refers to the description of release (if happened) 
and involved nuclear power plant. As mentioned before, the solution part of a case 
consists of a strategy: 
Definition 4.3 Strategy model 
A strategy model 𝑆 = (𝑀, 𝐸) where 𝑀 = {(𝑀1, … ,𝑀𝜈)|𝜈 ≥ 0} is a set of tuples 
of attributes where 𝐸 ⊆ 𝑀 ×𝑀 indicates the implementation order of the 
measures. Denote ?̂? as the set of strategy models. A strategy is a pair  
𝑠 = (𝑚, 𝑒) with 𝑚 = {(𝑚𝑖1, . . , 𝑚𝑖𝜈)|𝑚𝑖𝑟 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚(𝑀𝑟), 𝑟 = 1,… 𝜈, 𝑖 ∈ ℕ
+} and  
𝑒 ⊆ 𝑚 ×𝑚. Denote 𝑆 the set of all strategies that are subject to a strategy 
model S. 
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Note that each tuple of M represent the measure, the target of the measure, and 
further information on the measure. A case further consists of effectiveness values 
of a strategy: 
Definition 4.4 Solution model 
A solution model 𝐿 is a pair 𝐿 = ((𝐿1, . . , 𝐿𝑘), 𝑆) consisting of finitely many 
attributes (𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘), 𝑘 ≥ 0 and a strategy model S. Denote ?̂? the set of all so-
lution models. 
The attributes 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘 particularly specify the effectivenss of a strategy. Finally, the 
parts introduced so far can be joined to a case model (based on Stahl, 2003, 
Definition 2.4): 
Definition 4.5 Case Model 
A case model C is a pair 𝐶 = (𝐷, 𝐿) ∈ ?̂? × ?̂?. Denote ?̂? the set of all case  
models. 
A case is then defined as follows: 
Definition 4.6 Case 
A case according to a case model C is a pair 𝑐 = (𝑑𝑐 , 𝑙𝑐) =
((𝑎1
𝑐 , . . , 𝑎𝑛
𝑐 ), ((𝑙1
𝑐 , … , 𝑙𝑘
𝑐 , 𝑠𝑐)) with 𝑎𝑖
𝑐 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚(𝐴𝑖), 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛, 𝑙𝑗
𝑐 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚(𝐿𝑗), 𝑗 =
1,… , 𝑘 and 𝑠𝑐 ∈ 𝑆. Further, 𝑑𝑐 is called the problem description and 𝑙𝑐 the 
solution description of the case c. 
The core of a CBR system is the case base which is defined as follows: 
Definition 4.7 Case base 
The case base 𝐶𝐵 = {𝑐1, … , 𝑐𝐾} is a finite set of valid cases according to a given 
case model 𝐶 ∈ ?̂?. 
Note that the solution description part may be empty in contrast to the problem 
description part (based on Stahl, 2003, Definition 2.7): 
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Definition 4.8 Query 
Given a case model C, a query is a case 𝑞 = (𝑑𝑞 , 𝑙𝑞) with an empty solution 
description that means for 𝑙𝑞 = (𝑙1
𝑞 , … , 𝑙𝑘
𝑞 , 𝑠𝑞) it holds 𝑙𝑖
𝑞 = 𝑁𝑈𝐿𝐿, 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑘 
and 𝑠𝑞 = (∅, ∅). 
The strategy model introduced so far provides means to present measures and their 
characteristics as well as their implementation order by pairwise considerations. For 
example, for a strategy 𝑠 = (𝑚, 𝑒) with 𝑒 ⊆ 𝑚 ×𝑚, 𝑒1 = (?̃?1, ?̃?2) ∈ 𝑒 indicates that 
the measure specified in ?̃?1 is implemented before the measure specified in ?̃?2. This 
is a first approach to capture the order of implementation. The next chapter intro-
duces a more sophisticated modeling of strategies. 
4.4.1 Modeling of Strategies Using High-Level Petri Nets 
In the following, the strategy model (Moehrle, 2013b, 2013a; Moehrle & Raskob, 
2019) is presented. The requirements for strategy modeling resulted from analyses 
of related work, flood reports (Arbeitsgruppe Hochwasser (Sachsen-Anhalt), 2003; 
Unabhängige Kommision der Sächsischen Staatsregierung, 2002), and fire depart-
ment regulations (Feuerwehr-Dienstvorschriften FwDV) dealing with leadership 
and command in emergency operations command and control systems as well as 
research within the PREPARE project. The fire department regulations particularly 
guide situation assessment which is based on locality, time, weather, damage, dam-
aged objects, the extent of damage as well as resources determining the planning 
process and the resulting measures. In this work, location, context of event, or the 
initial situation are primarily covered by the retrieve step of CBR.  
 Independence of the type of event. This requirement originated from research in 
the field of natural disasters and analyses of different types of events allow-
ing now to transfer the model to nuclear emergencies as well. 
 Capturing the implementation order of measures. In general, measures cannot be 
executed in an arbitrary order, such as decontamination measures that may 
have timely or logical constraints with regard to the implementation order 
(Nisbet et al., 2010). 
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 Comprising short- and long-term decisions as well as possible event develop-
ments. Being part of the preparedness phase of disaster management, this 
work aims at providing support for response and recovery and hence 
short- and long-term decisions. 
 Capturing the effects of measures. This requirement is important for the 
comparability of strategies. 
 Capturing crucial factors influencing decisions on measures. This requirement 
particularly refers to the learning capability of CBR. The crucial factors are 
important for identifying similar cases from the case base. Some of them 
are important for the reuse step as well. 
 Allowing performance analysis, which is important for the assessment of 
strategies. Hence, simulation possibilities are of great value. 
 Supporting a graphical representation of strategies facilitating user under-
standing. A structured storage and possibilities for automatic processing 
are of first priority. A graphical presentation would mainly be useful for 
communication and manual adaptation of strategies, if desired. 
 Facilitating automatic processing which is important for the reuse step  
of CBR. 
 Allowing easy extensibility. The modeling capabilities should not be limited. 
This work does not claim to have integrated all decisive factors but rather 
focuses on a general model for strategies. 
The strategy model is based on ISO/IEC 15909 (International Organization for 
Standardization, 2000, 2004). Moreover, the labeling of transitions (Murata, 1989) is 
integrated. The strategies in the case base are instances of the strategy model. In 
consideration of the requirements listed before, the following assumptions are 
made: 
(i) The model contains two active components with different behaviors: 
measures and events. 
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(ii) Events cause the endangerment of targets, which may also be surfaces that 
have been contaminated. Here, ‘endangerment’ needs to be understood in 
a wider sense. 
(iii) Measures are decided upon and implemented because of an event and 
its resulting targets. 
(iv) Measures reduce the endangerment of the targets and do not create 
endangerment. 
(v) Measures consume resources. 
Definition 4.9 HLPN-based strategy model 
The strategy model S is a tuple 
𝑆 =  (𝑃, 𝑇, 𝐷𝑜𝑚, 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒, 𝑃𝑟𝑒, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑀0), 
where: 
 P is a finite set of places. 
 𝑇 =  𝑇𝑚 ∪ 𝑇𝑒 is a finite set of transitions where 𝑇𝑚 denotes the set of 
measures and 𝑇𝑒 denotes the set of events. It holds that 𝑃 ∩ 𝑇 =  ∅. 
Moreover, there are finite sets of labels for measures Σ𝑚 and events Σ𝑒  
and labeling functions 
𝐿𝑘: 𝑇𝑘 → Σ𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ {𝑚, 𝑒}, 
which assign labels to the transitions from a predefined domain. 
 𝐷𝑜𝑚 =  {𝐵, 𝐵 × [0,1], 𝑅, 𝐵 × [0,1] × 𝑅, {⋅}} is a set of domains where 
each element of Dom is called a type. The type B is a predefined set of 
targets. The interval [0,1] indicates the degree of endangerment  
expressed as real number between 0 and 1. With reference to a contam-
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inated surface, 1 indicates 100 % contamination and 0 indicates a suc-
cessful decontamination5. The type R is a predefined set of resources. 
The type {⋅} does not have any characteristics. 
 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒: 𝑃 ∪ 𝑇 → 𝐷𝑜𝑚 is a function used to assign types to places and to 
determine transition modes. A transition mode is a pair comprising the 
transition and a value taken from the transition’s type. 
 𝑃𝑟𝑒, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡: 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆 → 𝜇𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐶𝐸 are pre- and post-mappings with 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆 =  {(𝑡,𝑚)|𝑡 ∈ 𝑇,𝑚 ∈ 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒(𝑡)}, 
𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐶𝐸 =  {(𝑝, 𝑔)|𝑝 ∈ 𝑃, 𝑔 ∈ 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒(𝑝)}, 
𝜇𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐶𝐸 is the set of multisets over the set 𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐶𝐸. 
 𝑀0 ∈ 𝜇𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐶𝐸 is the initial marking of the net. 
For (𝑡,𝑚) ∈ 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆 the pre-and post-mappings of the transition 𝑡 and its mode 
(𝑡,𝑚) can be written as symbolic sums of elements of 𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐶𝐸 scaled by their multi-
plicities: 
𝑃𝑟𝑒(𝑡,𝑚) = 𝑃𝜇 = ∑ 𝑃𝜇(𝑥)
′𝑥, 𝑃𝜇 ∈ 𝜇𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐶𝐸
𝑥∈𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐶𝐸
 
and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑡,𝑚), respectively, where 𝑃𝜇(𝑥) is the multiplicity of 𝑥 ∈ 𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐶𝐸 in 𝑃𝜇. 
Let 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆|𝑇𝑚 = {(𝑡,𝑚)|𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑚, 𝑚 ∈ 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒(𝑡)} 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆|𝑇𝑒 = {(𝑡,𝑚)|𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑒 , 𝑚 ∈ 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒(𝑡)} 
Assumptions (ii) and (iv) can be formalized as follows:  
Let (𝑡,𝑚) ∈ 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆 with 𝑚 = (𝑏, 𝑦) ∈ 𝐵 × [0,1].  
                                                          
5 A successful decontamination does not necessarily correspond to a pre-release status but rather to 
the achievement of specific effectiveness values and the restoration of a worth-living environment. 
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For (𝑝1, (𝑏, 𝑦𝑝𝑟𝑒 )) ∈ 𝑃𝑟𝑒(𝑡,𝑚), (𝑝2, (𝑏, 𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡) ) ∈ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑡,𝑚) it holds 
𝑦𝑝𝑟𝑒 ≤ 𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡  𝑖𝑓 (𝑡,𝑚) ∈ 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆|𝑇𝑒 (4.1) 
y𝑝𝑟𝑒 ≥ 𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡  𝑖𝑓 (𝑡,𝑚) ∈ 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆|𝑇𝑚 (4.2) 
Note that {∙} is equivalent to (𝑝, (𝑏, 0)) for any 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃 and 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵. Inequality (4.1) for-
malizes assumption (ii): events may create endangerment. Inequality (4.2)  
refers to assumption (iv): measures may reduce endangerment. 
Assumption (iii) can be formalizes as follows: 
𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒(𝑡𝑚) = 𝐵 × [0,1] × 𝑅 for all 𝑡𝑚 ∈ 𝑇𝑚 (4.3) 
Assumption (v), which refers to the consumption of resources, can be formalized as 
follows: 
Let (𝑡,𝑚) ∈ 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆|𝑇𝑚, 𝑃𝜇  =  𝑃𝑟𝑒(𝑡,𝑚) and 𝑃?̃?  =  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑡,𝑚). There exists at least 
one 𝑥 =  (𝑝, 𝑟) ∈ 𝑃𝜇6 with 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅 for which it holds that 
𝑥 ∈ 𝑃?̃? and 𝑃𝜇(𝑥) ≥ 𝑃?̃?(𝑥) or 𝑥 ∉ 𝑃?̃? (4.4) 
where 𝑥 ∉ 𝑃?̃? indicates a complete consumption of resources. 
The tokens contain information on targets and their endangerment as well as on 
resources. A strategy is an instance of the strategy model. The implementation of 
this strategy corresponds to a run of this instance. 
4.4.2 Example 
For illustration purposes, CPN Tools7, a modeling and simulation tool for Colored 
Petri Nets (CPNs), is used. CPNs belong to the class of HLPNs and are characterized 
by the combination of PNs and programming languages (Jensen & Kristensen, 
                                                          
6 𝑥 is a member of the multiset 𝑃𝜇 denoted by 𝑥 ∈ 𝑃𝜇 if 𝑃𝜇(𝑥) > 0 
7 http://cpntools.org/ CPN Tools particularly denotes multisets as 𝑙`𝐴 + +𝑚`𝐵, 𝑙, 𝑚 ∈ ℕ, for example. 
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2009). The CPN modeling language particularly conforms to the ISO/IEC standard 
the definition of the strategy model is based on.  
The following example shows different implementation possibilities of measures 
excluding the consumption of resources. Figure 4.2 illustrates an event E1 triggering 
an endangerment on targets B1, B2, and B3. Measures directed towards B1 and B3 
as well as B2 are implemented concurrently. The endangerment of target B3 is re-
duced stepwise by the measures M1 and M3. An intermediate event E2 increases 
the endangerment of target B3 again. Measures M1 and M3 as well as M4 are par-
ticularly illustrating sequentially implemented measures directed towards different 
targets. Measures M5 and M6 are both directed towards target B2. They are imple-
mented concurrently. Measures M2 and M5 and M6, respectively, illustrate sequen-
tially implemented measures directed towards the same target. With regard to tar-
get B2, M2 as well as M7 and corresponding subsequent measures can be applied 
particularly anticipating the merging of several strategies that is discussed in  
Chapter 6. 
 
Figure 4.2:   Example strategy illustrating different orders of implementation 
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4.4.3 Discussion of the Model 
The strategy model developed in this thesis represents a solution to capture the or-
der of implementation, event developments, the targets involved as well as their 
endangerment and effects of measures on the endangerment. Strategies that are 
stored according to the strategy model can be further used in the reuse step of CBR. 
First, to merge several strategies if necessary, and second to further analyze possibly 
alternative strategies in the course of a multi-criteria assessment. The strategy 
model supports a structured storage, automatization of the reuse step, and analyses. 
However, the model serves as an integral part of the decision support method and 
does not intend to be utilized by the user directly. In respect of implementing the 
decision support method, a suitable interface is necessary. In the examples so far, 
tokens represent different targets. The degree of endangerment may be specified by 
the achievement of objectives. Furthermore, the HLPN-based strategy model ena-
bles to take performance indicators, such as the implementation duration of a strat-
egy, into account. 
This thesis particularly considers following implementation possibilities of 
measures: 
 Sequential implementation of measures directed towards a target. 
 Concurrent implementation of measures directed towards different 
targets. 
 Concurrent implementation of measures directed towards the same target. 
 Several strategy possibilities depending on the targets involved. 
 Sequential implementation of measures directed towards different targets. 
 Event happening during the implementation of a strategy. 
 Combinations of these.  
More possible constellations are conceivable, such as measures that are imple-
mented several times, but which are not investigated in this thesis. 
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As can be seen in the examples, it is implicitly assumed that  
(i) The net has exactly one initial and one final node of the type {∙} (or 𝐸 in 
the Figures).  
(ii) Endangerment generated is completely reduced in each net. 
These assumptions are particularly important for the merging of several strategies 
which is presented in Chapter 6. 
4.5 Data Collection 
For building the case base, the experts that voted on the attribute catalogue, were 
asked to provide knowledge on historical events, simulations were run by JRodos 
for the release and long-term post-accident phase, and the HERCA-WENRA  
approach was translated into 8 cases for the pre-release phase. In general, the prob-
lem descriptions of the historical events are more comprehensive than of the JRodos 
scenarios. In contrast to strategies that are received from the simulations, experts 
provided additional knowledge on the experience with implementation and their 
effectiveness. For a structured data collection, a data record form based on the struc-
ture illustrated in Figure 4.1 was built for the experts to fill in their knowledge. Four 
historical events have been analyzed to populate the case base: the Chernobyl  
nuclear power plant accident, the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident, 
the Windscale fire, and the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko. Each event is sub-
divided into accident phases and affected areas. Finally, 16 cases result from four 
historical events. For each affected area, a strategy is provided that are directed  
towards specific targets and exposure pathways. Furthermore, the experts shared 
their expertise in respect of implementation. Table 4.10 shows to which phases the 
cases belong to and which affected areas are regarded. 
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Table 4.10:   Number of cases gained of historical events for the different accident phases 
Phase/event Chernobyl nu-
clear power plant 
accident 
Fukushima 
Daiichi  
nuclear 
power plant 
accident 
Windscale 
fire 
Poisoning of  
Alexander 
Litvinenko 
Release 3 1 1 1 
Transition 1 - 1 1 
Long-term post-
accident 
4 1 1 1 
Affected areas Pripyat 
Narodichskiy  
district of Zhito-
mirskaya oblast 
Bryansk region 
Novo Bobovichi 
United Kingdom 
Fukushima 
Prefecture 
Milk ban 
area 
Population who 
were given urine 
tests  
(includes both 
United Kingdom 
and overseas 
testing) 
 
The simulations for the release phase are based on variations in the values of four 
symbolic attributes (Table 4.11). Since the approach to countering uncertainty is to 
work with rough classifications, symbolic attributes are regarded only. Although 
the INES scale range from 1-7, only INES 5-7 are regarded since INES 4 would result 
in ‘do nothing’. The four weather categories are a first approach to roughly classify 
different weather situations (Table 4.12) assuming three wind speed categories: low, 
medium, and stable. The categories define the wind speed at a grid point and the 
direction of the wind. ‘Low‘ refers to a wind speed of 1 m/s and a changing wind 
direction with time, ‘medium’ to a wind speed from 1 to 3 m/s and a changing wind 
direction with time, and ‘stable’ to a wind speed of 4 m/s with a more specific wind 
direction and less direction changes with time. 96 scenarios result from this  
approach. The results of the simulations are (i) The size of evacuation area and the 
number of affected people; (ii) The size of the sheltering area and the number of 
affected people; (iii) The size of the distribution area of iodine tablets for adults and 
the number of affected people; (iv) The size of the distribution area of iodine tablets 
for children and the number of affected people; (v) Costs; (vi) Average shelter factor. 
4 The Case Base  
116 
Table 4.11:   Attributes and domains for constructing scenarios 
Attribute Values 
INES 5 (FKI)8 
6 (FKF) 
7 (FKA) 
Season Spring 
Summer 
Autumn 
Winter 
Weather No rain low wind 
No rain medium wind 
No rain stable wind 
Rain 
Population distribution Urban (high population area) 
Rural (low population area) 
Table 4.12: Explanation of the weather categories 
Weather category Explanation 
No rain low wind Low wind speed and changing wind direction 
No rain medium wind Medium wind speed and changing wind direction 
No rain stable wind High wind speed and a specific wind direction 
Rain Rain, medium wind speed and changing wind direction 
 
Table 4.13 shows exemplarily calculated areas for evacuation, sheltering, and the 
distribution of iodine tablets for adults and children for the different INES values 
in an urban area averaged over all seasons. The values show that the largest areas 
result from INES 7 events. INES 6 events, for example, include less contaminants 
and with changing wind directions contaminants are dispersed. Hence, the areas 
resulting from the weather category ‘no rain stable wind’ are often larger since most 
contaminants are blown into one direction. Furthermore, the different weather con-
ditions result in variations in the area sizes. Rain leads to the largest areas for evac-
uation and sheltering. Since inhalation is the main exposure pathway for radioac-
tive iodine, rain may lead to smaller areas in contrast to other weather conditions. 
                                                          
8 The FKI, FKF, and FKA denote different release scenarios (Walter et al., 2016). 
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In summary, the variations in the results show that a refinement of weather catego-
ries is reasonable to get more precise results. 
Table 4.13:   Area sizes for measures resulting from simulations 
Weather  
category / 
INES 
No rain low 
wind 
No rain  
medium wind 
No rain  
stable wind 
Rain 
Evacuation areas in km2 
5 0 0 0 0 
6 0 0.2 0.65 1.1 
7 81.88 33.88 22.8 195.7 
Sheltering areas in km2 
5 0 0 0.4 0.3 
6 1.38 11.1 12.32 54.42 
7 1327 516.4 730.4 4127.0 
Areas for the distribution of stable iodine to adults in km2 
5 0 0 0 0 
6 0 3.9 5.4 3.1 
7 555 251.4 202.7 254.8 
Areas for the distribution of stable iodine to children in km2 
5 0 0 2.3 0 
6 78.2 99.9 99.7 96.2 
7 12516.4 6394.5 2641.4 2465.4 
 
The cases for the long-term post-accident phase are either gained from historical 
events or determined by JRodos. Again, values for symbolic attributes are varied 
(Table 4.14). 
Table 4.14:   Attribute values for constructing long-term scenarios 
Attribute Values 
INES 6 
Season Summer 
Weather Rain 
No rain 
Population distribution Urban 
Rural 
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Figure 4.3 depicts exemplarily a combination of measures and their order deter-
mined by JRodos for the long-term post-accident phase in an urban area under rainy 
weather conditions during release. This result includes the duration of each meas-
ure and needs to be developed by hand. JRodos calculates the costs, amount of 
waste, and factor of dose reduction. However, the composition of measures needs 
to be reviewed by an expert to identify possible pitfalls and side effects. An expert 
of the project, for example, stated that grass cutting would generally not be an  
option for wet deposition scenarios as most of the contamination would from the 
beginning be in the soil rather than on the grass. 
  
Figure 4.3:   Combination of measures for an urban area and rain during release 
As mentioned before, the cases for the pre-release phase are derived from the 
HERCA-WENRA approach. Table 4.15 exemplarily shows a value assignment of 
the four attributes regarded and the corresponding recommendation. 
 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Firehosing  walls (External walls)
Firehosing paved (Paved pavement)
Firehosing paved (Paved other)
Cover with clean soil (Small area of grass)
Grass cutting (Small area of grass)
Plant removal (Small area of plants)
Cover with clean soil (Small area of soil)
Firehosing paved (Paved road)
Turf harvesting and returf (Large area of grass)
Grass cutting (Large area of grass)
Firehosing roofs (Roof)
Plant removal (Large area of plants)
Cover with clean soil (Large area of soil)
Tree removal/pruning (Trees and shrubs)
Washing interior surfaces (Internal surfaces)
Time interval (in days)
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Table 4.15:   Example result of the HERCA-WENRA approach 
Attribute Value 
Risk of core melt? Yes or unknown 
Maintaining of containment integrity? Yes or unknown 
Wind direction Variable or unknown 
Estimated release time Unknown 
Recommended strategy 
Evacuation and iodine thyroid blocking up to 5 km in a zone of 360 degrees 
Sheltering and iodine thyroid blocking from 5 to 20 km in a zone of 360 degrees 
 
Figure 4.4 depicts an excerpt of the scheme developed for the storage of the cases in 
a database. The excerpt reflects the structure of an accident and shows some of the 
attributes describing, for example, a release or an affected area. 77 attributes are 
available for problem description and 34 for describing a strategy and its effective-
ness. However, some attribute values remained (predominantly) empty which was 
taken into account when determining the retrieval criteria (see Chapter 5.1). For 
reasons of clarity, mainly those attribute that are used in the retrieve and reuse step 
of CBR are illustrated in Figure 4.4. The database is structured in 43 tables including 
domains for symbolic attributes. For example, the table ‘release_characteristics’ has 
a many-to-one relationship to the table ‘weather_at_release’, which includes differ-
ent weather categories. Again, for reasons of clarity, tables that include the domains 
of symbolic attributes are not illustrated in Figure 4.4.  
Figure 4.5 illustrates the distribution of cases in the database according to historical 
events, scenarios, and rules as well as accident phases. The database so far mainly 
builds upon scenarios that are simulated by JRodos and are assigned to the release 
phase. As part of future work, the database needs to be enhanced in order to cover 
a wide range of different scenario types. An approach would be a finer granularity 
of specific symbolic attribute domains such as weather categories (see Chapter 8). 
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Figure 4.4:   Excerpt of the database scheme for the storage of nuclear events (Moehrle & Raskob, 2015, 
Figure 4) 
 
Figure 4.5:   Overview of cases in the database categorized in historical events, scenarios, rules, and  
accident phases 
4.6 Summary and Discussion 
The first step of developing the case base was to elicitate relevant problem- and 
solution characteristics for decision-making. The approach was to collect possibly 
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relevant attributes from the nuclear as well as general disaster management field to 
be evaluated by experts to identify the set of decisive criteria. Many symbolic attrib-
utes with predefined domains were integrated to be particularly used in times when 
little information is available to describe a problem in a detailed way. The evalua-
tion reduced the set of attributes partly being adapted to the nuclear domain. The 
current set of attributes does not claim to be complete. Since the whole approach is 
new in nuclear emergency management, adaptations and extensions are expected 
in the course of time. This refers also to the domains for symbolic attributes. The 
domains that already existed were evaluated by the experts resulting in reduction, 
rearrangement, or completely revision. For example, the weather categories that are 
mainly oriented towards precipitation, wind speed, and wind direction, are  
regarded as sufficient in the first instance. However, refinements in this regard are 
necessary. The evaluation also showed that the problem description characteristics 
relevant for decision-making vary in the course of an accident. Hence, the timely 
development of an accident plays an important role when defining cases. The  
attempt of an (European-wide) impact classification (as discussed in Chapter 4.2.1) 
was less successful due to country specific regulations and the complexity of the 
topic that does not easily allow a categorization in such simple terms when it comes 
to economy, supply, and immaterial impacts. 
The topic of uncertainty needs to be taken into account throughout the CBR cycle. 
With regard to the case base the focus is on vague descriptions and the use of sym-
bolic attributes and predefined domains as a first approach to handle this issue. The 
idea is to allow categorical descriptions under the assumption that these may be 
specified more easily and possibly faster than numerical values, especially in times 
when little information is available. Also with regard to the later phases the idea is 
to start with some rough categorizations to cover a wide range of different scenario 
types to be refined stepwise. The whole approach particularly contributes and pro-
motes to prepare for possible accident scenarios in advance. 
Data collection revealed the complexity of building a case base since not for all at-
tributes values could be assigned and hence information content varied from case 
to case. Hence, the actual set of attributes used for retrieval is a subset of the initial 
attributes describing problem and solution. Moreover, some attributes are for infor-
mation only, such as date or name. A more detailed discussion can be found in 
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Chapter 5.1. Retrieval is divided into two steps: First the set of problem descriptions 
is filtered, first according to the accident phase, and second according to further 
filter attributes selected by the user. Second, the actual similarity calculation is per-
formed. The general approach is to maintain flexibility that means to allow varia-
tions in the set of retrieval attributes. The actual choice of attributes is left to the 
user. Table 4.16 sums up the number of case describing attributes and the number 
of attributes that are used for retrieval. 
Table 4.16:   Number of attributes for case description and retrieval 
# Attributes available Usage 
77 Problem description 
34 Solution description 
9 Filtering 
26 Retrieval criteria 
 
Due to the also flexible implementation of the whole method (see Chapter 7) and 
the freedom of the user to configure the retrieve step, additional characteristics that 
might be relevant for decision-making can be included easily.  
In respect of scenario construction, only a small set of primarily symbolic attributes 
were chosen to set up the simulations. The first approach was to work with catego-
ries of release scenarios, weather situations, and affected areas with rather rough 
granularity. The resulting area sizes and number of affected people as well as effec-
tiveness values and experiences made during historical events support decision-
making in the early stage of an accident. The attributes chosen are particularly input 
parameters of the JRodos system. The next steps would be to specify further attrib-
utes and refine the strategies with the help of experts or refine the categories worked 
with for the simulations to improve the results. 
The case model is composed of a problem model and solution model which, in turn 
consists of a strategy model and attributes for, amongst others, specifying the effec-
tiveness. In particular, in respect of the HLPN-based strategy model, the regarded 
implementation orders are limited, at first. The generic model that integrates event 
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developments, measures, and increasing and decreasing endangerment of targets, 
allow enhancements according to time, for example. In general, this chapter pre-
sents the basic ideas for a case model being generic and expandable.  
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5 Similarity Assessment of 
Nuclear Accidents 
This chapter introduces the retrieve step of the case-based decision support method. 
Retrieval aims at identifying those cases from the case base whose solutions are 
useful for solving the current problem. Their usefulness is indicated by a similarity 
value and depends on how similar the problem descriptions are. In other words, 
the similarity value indicates to which degree the problem descriptions correspond 
to each other. The main assumption of CBR is that similar problems have similar 
solutions. Hence, the objective of the retrieval step is to identify problem descrip-
tions in the case base which are close to the current problem description and the 
query, respectively, in order to solve the current problem.  
Within the frame of this thesis, similarity is reflected by a similarity function which 
operates on problem descriptions. Another way is to express similarity via relations, 
which is independent of the case representation. However, stating quantitatively 
how similar two cases are, is preferred. A higher similarity value is understood as 
‘more useful’ and hence this approach is regarded as more expressive. Based on the 
notation introduced by (Stahl, 2003, Definition 2.6), DD denotes the set of all problem 
descriptions according to a problem model 𝐷 ∈ ?̂?. A problem model D (Definition 
4.2) is a tuple of attributes 𝐷 = (𝐴1, 𝐴2, … , 𝐴𝑛), 𝑛 > 0.  
A similarity function (Definition 2.3) for D is a function 
𝑓: 𝐷𝐷 × 𝐷𝐷 → [0,1]. 
Here, a value of 1 reflects a useful case for solving the current problem whereas a 
value of 0 indicates a useless case. For cases that contain negative experiences, the 
solely comparison of problem descriptions could lead to a similarity value of 1 as 
well. Hence, the similarity value needs to be enriched by additional information on 
the effectiveness of the solution. A similarity value smaller than 1 indicates that the 
case does not capture the current problem description completely and consequently 
the solution stored needs to be adapted. The similarity values enable to rank the 
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retrieved cases (Chapter 5.1). The higher the similarity value the more useful the 
case is. 
Case and query are compared to attribute-wise posing a flexible way for similarity 
assessment when cases are represented by attributes. With regard to the application 
domain, the individual view on the problem of each expert, missing information 
that might be excluded in the comparison as well as varying information available 
for different events and during different accident phases, favor the attribute-wise 
comparison of case and query. Hence, each attribute needs its own similarity func-
tion: 
A local similarity function (Definition 2.4) for attribute A is a function 
𝑓𝐴: 𝑑𝑜𝑚(𝐴) × 𝑑𝑜𝑚(𝐴) → [0,1]. 
Each attribute may have different relevance in the similarity assessment which can 
be reflected by weights assigned to the attributes: 
For attributes 𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛 characterizing the cases, 
?⃗⃗? = (𝑤𝐴1 , … , 𝑤𝐴𝑛  ) with 𝑤𝐴𝑖 ∈ [0,1] and  ∑ 𝑤𝐴𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 = 1 
denotes the attribute weight vector (Definition 2.5), where each 𝑤𝐴𝑖  is called the attrib-
ute weight for 𝐴𝑖. 
The overall similarity between a query and a case is determined by a global similarity 
function (Definition 2.6) 𝑓: 𝐷𝐷 × 𝐷𝐷 → [0,1] with  
𝑓(𝑑𝑞 , 𝑑𝑐) = 𝜎(𝑓𝐴1(𝑑𝐴1
𝑞 , 𝑑𝐴1
𝑐 ), … , 𝑓𝐴𝑛(𝑑𝐴𝑛
𝑞 , 𝑑𝐴𝑛
𝑐 ), ?⃗⃗? ), 
where 𝜎: [0,1]2𝑛 → [0,1] is called aggregation function and 𝑑𝐴𝑖
𝑞  denotes the value of 
the query 𝑑𝑞 for attribute 𝐴𝑖, 𝑓𝐴𝑖  the local similarity function for 𝐴𝑖, and ?⃗⃗?  the  
attribute weight vector. 𝑑𝑐 is defined accordingly. 
The local similarity function for an attribute takes its type as well as domain prop-
erties into account. The global similarity function controls the influences of the  
attributes on the overall similarity. Local and global similarity functions together 
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need to reflect the meaning of a useful solution in the application domain and for 
the user, respectively 
The retrieve step consists of two steps: First, candidates for solving the current prob-
lem are selected. This step is realized by filtering the set of problem descriptions. 
Second, the similarities between these candidates and the query are assessed (Fig-
ure 5.1). Chapter 5.1 introduces retrieval as a whole. In Chapter 5.2, local similarity 
functions for attributes possibly being part of the similarity assessment are pro-
posed. Table 5.1 lists (possible) retrieval attributes. Some of them are suitable for 
candidate selection (see Chapter 5.1). The configuration possibilities of retrieval are 
flexible and particularly left to the user (see Chapter 5.1). Note that in the course of 
specifying retrieval, attributes used for adaptation only are specified as well  
(Table 5.1).
Table 5.1:   Overview of retrieval attributes and attributes for adaptation 
Attributes for retrieval and similarity assessment 
Risk of core melt Maintaining of containment integrity 
Wind direction Estimated release time 
Accident type Event description 
Iodine equivalent Environmental hazard 
Nuclear power plant type Average thermal power 
Area size Number of people 
Population density Population distribution 
Waste storage possibility Contamination 
Target Time of release 
Season Weather at release 
Category of release duration Cause 
Accident scenario type Number of events 
Similarity threshold1  Accident phase 
Attributes for adaptation only 
Soil type Exposure pathway 
Attributes used for retrieval and adaptation 
Target Number of people 
Area size Accident phase 
                                                          
1 A similarity threshold is a value 𝑥 ∈ [0,1], which the similarity values of the cases retrieved should 
exceed. 
5 Similarity Assessment of Nuclear Accidents  
128 
 
Figure 5.1:   Illustration of the retrieve step 
5.1 Two-Level Retrieval of Similar Cases 
The retrieval step aims at identifying cases from the case base that are useful for 
solving the current problem. Similarity functions help to judge the usefulness 
whereas similarity values are used for ranking several retrieved cases. Based on the 
notation of Stahl, 2003, Definition 3.4, the retrieval task is defined as follows: 
Let 𝐶 = (𝐷, 𝐿) be the case model,  𝐶𝐵 = {𝑐1, … , 𝑐𝐾} the case base, f a similarity func-
tion, and 𝑞 = (𝑑𝑞 , 𝑙𝑞) a query. The retrieval task is to determine an ordered list of 
cases 𝑅 = (𝑐1, … , 𝑐𝜅) with 
𝑓(𝑑𝑞 , 𝑑𝑐𝑖) ≥ 𝑓(𝑑𝑞 , 𝑑𝑐𝑗), 0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝜅 
where one of the following conditions, which can be specified by the user, holds: 
1. |𝑅| = 𝑥 meaning that a fixed number 0 < 𝑥 ≤ 𝐾 of cases to be retrieved is  
demanded2. 
2. 𝑓(𝑑𝑞 , 𝑑𝑐𝑖) ≥ 𝜃, 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝜅 meaning that the similarity values need to exceed a 
threshold 0 < 𝜃 ≤ 1. 
                                                          
2 |𝑅| denotes the length of the list 𝑅. 
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3. |𝑅| ≤ 𝑥 and 𝑓(𝑑𝑞 , 𝑑𝑐𝑖) ≥ 𝜃 > 0, 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝜅 meaning that the number of  
retrieved cases should not exceed a specific number 0 < 𝑥 ≤ 𝐾 and within 
those cases, the similarity values should exceed a threshold 0 < 𝜃 ≤ 1. 
Retrieval may be realized in different ways (Lopez De Mantaras et al., 2006) and 
often depends on the specific application domain. Within the framework of this the-
sis, only a few of the problem describing attributes are used for retrieval. This is 
owed to the different number of attribute values that could be determined for his-
torical events and specified for generating the scenarios. In respect of historical 
events, experts provided many values for attributes. For generating the scenarios, 
only few attribute values have been specified. For specifying comprehensive sce-
narios with detailed problem descriptions, an extended expert involvement is  
necessary. However, these detailed descriptions are not necessary in respect of the 
objectives defined (Chapter 1.2), since some attributes (i) Refer to disruption of crit-
ical infrastructure, which is important with regard to the feasibility of a strategy. 
However, the focus of this thesis is identifying an appropriate strategy in the first 
instance. Feasibility studies are to be conducted afterwards; (ii) Are implicitly taken 
into account such as the dose, which is integrated in the simulation results; (iii) 
Have an informative and less decisive character, such as the name or date. 
Denote ?̃? = (𝐴𝑖|𝑖 ∈ 𝐽), 𝐽 ⊆ {1, … , 𝑛} the possible retrieval attributes. The specifica-
tion of the accident phase is mandatory and is particularly used as filter attribute. 
For the release, transition, and long-term post-accident phase, retrieval is realized 
as follows: 
(i) The user selects the retrieval attributes ?̃?𝑅 = (𝐴𝑖|𝑖 ∈ 𝐽𝑅), 𝐽𝑅 ⊆ 𝐽. 
(ii) The user specifies the query by assigning values to each 𝐴𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐽𝑅. 
(iii) The user selects the filter attributes 𝐹 = (𝐴𝑖|𝑖 ∈ 𝐽𝐹), 𝐽𝐹 ⊆ 𝐽𝑅.  
(iv) The user assigns weights to each 𝐴𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐽 ≔ 𝐽𝑅\𝐽𝐹 . Denote = (𝑤𝐴𝑖)𝑖∈𝐽
 the 
weight vector. 
(v) The case base is filtered according to the accident phase and the filter attrib-
utes specified by the user. Denote 𝐶𝐵𝐹  the filtered case base  
𝐶𝐵𝐹 = {𝑐 = (𝑑
𝑐 , 𝑙𝑐)|𝑑𝐴𝑖
𝑐 = 𝑑𝐴𝑖
𝑞 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐽𝐹}. 
(vi) The retrieval task is applied to 𝐶𝐵𝐹 , with 𝑞 = ((𝑑𝑖
𝑞|𝑖 ∈ 𝐽), 𝑙𝑞) and 
𝑓(𝑑𝑞 , 𝑑𝑐) = 𝜎 (𝑓𝐴𝑖(𝑑𝐴𝑖
𝑞 , 𝑑𝐴𝑖
𝑐 ), ?⃗⃗? |𝑖 ∈ 𝐽) , 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝐵𝐹  
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  and ?⃗⃗? = (𝑤𝐴𝑖)𝑖∈𝐽
. 
For the aggregation function 𝜎, which aggregates the local similarities, the weighted 
sum can be applied 
𝜎 (𝑓𝐴𝑖(𝑑𝐴𝑖
𝑞 , 𝑑𝐴𝑖
𝑐 ), ?⃗⃗? |𝑖 ∈ 𝐽) =∑ 𝑤𝐴𝑖 ⋅ 𝑓𝐴𝑖(𝑑𝐴𝑖
𝑞 , 𝑑𝐴𝑖
𝑐 )
𝑖∈𝐽
 
In the framework of this thesis, the weighted sum particularly is preferred due to 
its widespread use and common understanding. 
As introduced above, a two-level retrieval is realized: First, candidates for the sim-
ilarity assessment are selected by means of filter attributes. Second, similar cases are 
determined within the filtered set of cases. The choice of filter attributes and attrib-
utes for similarity assessment are made by the user providing the flexibility to state 
mandatory equality for certain attribute values as well as to configure the similarity 
assessment individually. The attributes appropriate for filtering have the following 
names: ‘accident type’, ‘iodine equivalent’, ‘population distribution’, ‘time of  
release’, ‘season’, ‘weather at release’, ‘category of release duration’, ‘cause’, and 
‘accident scenario type’. Filtering according to the ‘accident phase’ is mandatory. 
This approach takes into account the exceptionality and temporary uncertainty of 
these events as well as users’ individual view on the problem. In respect of uncer-
tainty, attributes might be excluded in the retrieval for which values are not availa-
ble yet. In addition, users may assign weights to the attributes to control their influ-
ence on the overall similarity. The majority of retrieval attributes are symbolic. The 
aim is to offer categories instead of demanding numeric values, particularly in times 
information is sparse and may be rather stated qualitatively than quantitatively. 
For the pre-release phase, retrieval corresponds to a rule-based approach that is 
based on the attributes (risk of core melt, {yes or unknown, no}), (maintaining of con-
tainment integrity, {yes or unknown, no}), (wind direction, {variable or unknown, sta-
ble}), and (estimated release time, {unknown, before evacuation within 5 (or 20) km 
distance, after evacuation within 5 (or 20) km distance}). Table 5.2 shows the corre-
sponding measures. 
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Table 5.2:   HERCA-WENRA approach (HERCA & WENRA, 2014) 
Risk of 
core melt 
Maintaining of 
containment 
integrity 
Wind  
direction 
Estimated  
release time 
Measures 
Yes or 
unknown 
Yes or  
unknown 
Variable or 
unknown 
Before evacu-
ation within 5 
km distance 
Sheltering + Iodine  
Thyroid Blocking up to 
20 km in a zone of 360  
degrees 
Yes or 
unknown 
Yes or  
unknown 
Variable or 
unknown 
After evacua-
tion within 5 
km distance/ 
Unknown 
Evacuation + Iodine 
Thyroid Blocking up to 
5 km in a zone of 360 
degrees 
Sheltering + Iodine Thy-
roid Blocking from 5 to 
20 km a zone of 360  
degrees 
Yes or 
unknown 
Yes or  
unknown 
Steady Before evacu-
ation within 5 
km distance 
Sheltering + Iodine  
Thyroid Blocking up to 
20 km in selected 30  
degrees sectors 
Yes or 
unknown 
Yes or  
unknown 
Steady After evacua-
tion within 5 
km distance/ 
Unknown 
Evacuation + Iodine 
Thyroid Blocking up to 
5 km in selected 30 de-
grees sectors 
Sheltering + Iodine Thy-
roid Blocking from 5 to 
20 km in selected 30  
degrees sectors 
Yes or 
unknown 
No Steady Before evacu-
ation within 
20 km dis-
tance 
Sheltering + Iodine Thy-
roid Blocking up to 100 
km in selected 30  
degrees sectors 
Additional Iodine Thy-
roid Blocking actions 
specific to children 
Yes or 
unknown 
No Steady After evacua-
tion within 20 
km distance/ 
Unknown 
Evacuation + Iodine 
Thyroid Blocking up to 
20 km in selected 30 de-
grees sectors 
Sheltering + Iodine Thy-
roid Blocking from 20 to 
100 km in selected 30 
degrees sectors 
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Risk of 
core melt 
Maintaining of 
containment 
integrity 
Wind  
direction 
Estimated  
release time 
Measures 
Additional Iodine Thy-
roid Blocking actions 
specific to children 
Yes or 
unknown 
No  Variable or 
unknown 
After evacua-
tion within 20 
km distance/ 
Unknown 
Evacuation + Iodine 
Thyroid Blocking up to 
20 km in a zone of 360 
degrees 
Sheltering + Iodine Thy-
roid Blocking from 20 to 
100 km in a zone of 360 
degrees 
Additional Iodine Thy-
roid Blocking actions 
specific to children 
Yes or 
unknown 
No Variable or 
unknown 
Before evacu-
ation within 
20 km dis-
tance 
Sheltering + Iodine Thy-
roid Blocking up to 100 
km in a zone of 360  
degrees 
Additional Iodine Thy-
roid Blocking actions 
specific to children 
5.2 Assessing Local Similarities 
Let 𝑞𝐴 ≔ 𝑑𝐴
𝑞 the attribute value of attribute 𝐴 of the query description 𝑑𝑞 and  
𝑐𝐴 ≔ 𝑑𝐴
𝑐  the attribute value of attribute 𝐴 of the case description 𝑑𝑐. The local simi-
larity functions are sorted according to attribute types. 
Symbolic attributes 
Accident type, Population distribution, Nuclear power plant type, Cause, Accident scenario 
type, Release duration category 
The accident type roughly categorizes the type of emergency. Let B1 = {explosion of 
radiological dispersal service, nuclear power plant accident, radiological accident 
with fire, spread of contamination following radiological poisoning}. 
5.2 Assessing Local Similarities 
133 
The population distribution describes the population density of the affected area 
quantitatively and hence reflects the number of people affected. Let B2 = {metropol-
itan, urban, rural}. 
The nuclear power plant type may state something about the controllability of an 
event. Let B3 = {advanced boiling water reactor, boiling water reactor, fast breeder 
reactor, gas cooled reactor, graphite reactor, heavy water moderated reactor, high 
temperature gas cooled reactor, light water cooled reactor, light water graphite  
reactor, pressurized heavy water reactor, pressurized water reactor}.  
The specification of the cause of the accident may have psychological implications. 
Let B4 = {accidental, deliberate, natural} 
The accident scenario type provide means to implicitly describe the accident, what is 
potentially released, and hence the source term. Let B5 = {burst pipe, large leak in 
containment, loss-of-coolant accident, medium leak in containment, overpressure 
failure, small leak in containment, station blackout with core melt, steam blast}. 
Before the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident, there was no experi-
ence with long-lasting releases and the operational procedures in dealing with long-
lasting releases needed to be reviewed. As an example, decisions on early measures 
need to take the release duration into account. Let B6 = {short, long}.  
Let 
 A1 = (accident type, B1) 
 A2 = (nuclear power plant type, B2) 
 A3 = (population distribution, B3) 
 A4 = (cause, B4) 
 A5 = (accident scenario type, B5) 
 A6 = (release duration category, B6) 
For these attributes the overlap measure (e.g. Boriah et al., 2008) 
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𝑓𝐴𝑖(𝑞𝐴𝑖 , 𝑐𝐴𝑖) = {
1, 𝑞𝐴𝑖 = 𝑐𝐴𝑖
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
with 𝑖 ∈ {1,2,3, 4, 5, 6} is chosen as local similarity function. This function only 
checks for an exact match. For example, with regard to the accident type, the num-
ber of radionuclides involved varies for the different categories. Also the nuclear 
power plant types differ and, as stated before, the population distribution reflects 
the number of affected people. The different causes for an accident can be also 
clearly distinguished and the different accident scenario types lead to different 
source terms (Löffler, Mildenberger, Sogalla, & Stahl, 2012). Furthermore, the  
release duration category only distinguishes two different durations. As a first  
approach, the overlap measure is regarded as sufficient for these attributes. 
Time of day of release 
For A = (time of day of release, (day, night, day and night)) a similarity table (Stahl, 
2003, Definition 3.14) is proposed as local similarity function: 
Given a symbolic attribute A with 𝑑𝑜𝑚(𝐴) = (𝜇1, … , 𝜇𝑛), the matrix (𝑠𝑖𝑗)𝑖=1;…,𝑛;𝑗=1…,𝑛 
with 𝑠𝑖𝑗 ∈ [0,1] and 
𝑓𝐴(𝑞𝐴, 𝑐𝐴) = 𝑓𝐴(𝜇𝑖 , 𝜇𝑗) = 𝑠𝑖𝑗  
is called a similarity table for 𝑑𝑜𝑚(𝐴). 
A similarity explicitly states the interrelations between attribute values (Table 5.3). 
Table 5.3:   Similarity values of different release times 
𝑞𝐴/𝑐𝐴 Day Night Day and night 
Day 1 0 0.5 
Night 0 1 0.5 
Day and night 0.5 0.5 1 
 
During night, there is less mixture in the lower atmosphere which leads to a higher 
concentration of contaminants. Hence, release during day or night needs to be 
treated differently. If release lasts longer and for day and night, depending on the 
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release time of the query, the local similarity is reduced by 50 %. Note that this  
attribute does not refer to the release duration but the concentration of the contam-
inants. It may be discussed further if the symmetrical reduction of 50 % is reasona-
ble. However, the similarity table serves as first idea to compare between different 
release times. 
Iodine equivalent 
The iodine equivalent corresponds to the International Nuclear and Radiological 
Event Scale (INES) that ranges from 0 to 7 for particularly classifying nuclear acci-
dents. In the frame of this work, only INES 5 to INES 7 events are regarded since 
events below INES 5 would result in the strategy ‘do nothing’. The local similarity 
function for A = (iodine equivalent, (5, 6, 7)) is 
𝑓𝐴(𝑞𝐴, 𝑐𝐴) = {
1, 𝑞𝐴 = 𝑐𝐴 = 7
0, 𝑞𝐴 < 7, 𝑐𝐴 = 7
1 − 0.5|𝑞𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴|, 𝑞𝐴 < 7, 𝑐𝐴 < 7
 
This function resulted from analyses of the JRodos results of the evacuation and 
sheltering areas as well as areas for the distribution of iodine tablets (Table 4.13). 
The calculations provide a representative spectrum of possible simulation results 
without being complete. The differences of the areas between INES 7 events and 
events of a smaller scale are considerable. Hence, if the query corresponds to an 
INES 7 event only cases from the same scale are useful. If the query is of smaller 
scale, a possibly useful case does not have to be of the same scale. Since INES 7 
events reflect a large amount of released material, the scale of event plays an  
important role for the long-term phases as well.  
Season of release 
For A = (season, (spring, summer, autumn, winter)) a similarity table is proposed as 
well (Table 5.4).  
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Table 5.4:   Similarity values of different seasons 
𝑞𝐴/𝑐𝐴 Spring Summer Autumn Winter 
Spring 1 0.75 0.5 0 
Summer 0.75 1 0.5 0 
Autumn 0.5 0.5 1 0.75 
Winter 0 0 0.75 1 
 
The season of release not only affects deposition mechanisms but may also have in-
fluence on strategy implementation due to climatic conditions. However, depend-
ing on the position on earth, season does not necessarily imply the same climatic 
conditions. In the course of the JRodos scenarios, German climatic conditions are 
used. In future, seasons in different countries need to be translated accordingly. The 
values that can be found in Table 5.4 serve as a first approach to define similarity 
values between seasons but may be refined if necessary. Especially with regard to 
the long-term phase, season is an important criteria for decisions in respect of agri-
cultural production areas. 
Weather 
Weather at release is a decisive factor strongly influencing, for example, the area 
sizes for the early measures (Table 4.13) and in general the deposition mechanisms. 
For A = (weather, (rain, no rain, no rain low wind, no rain medium wind, no rain 
stable wind)) a similarity table as local similarity function is proposed (Table 5.5). 
Table 5.5:   Similarity values of different weather categories 
𝑞𝐴/𝑐𝐴 Rain No rain No rain  
low wind 
No rain  
medium wind 
No rain  
stable wind 
Rain 1 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 
No rain 0 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 
No rain  
low wind 
0 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 
No rain  
medium wind 
0 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 
No rain  
stable wind 
0 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 
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Since the wind conditions have a great influence, the additional information on 
wind reduce the similarity value by 50%, if on the other hand, only the condition 
‘no rain’ is available. The area sizes vary for the weather categories depending on 
the scale of event and the corresponding measure. Here, the refinement of the 
weather categories and hence adaption of the similarity values poses another  
research direction for the future. 
Target 
Let B = {adults, airplane, cars buses motorbikes, cereals, children, crop growing, 
dairy cows milk, detached external surfaces, detached external surfaces gutters and 
downpipes, detached external surfaces roofs, detached external surfaces walls, de-
tached internal surfaces, detached precious objects, football stadium, fruit, game, 
horticulture, hospital patients, hospitals, hotel, hotel bar, inhabited areas, kinder-
garten, large area of grass, large area of plants, large area of soil, mobile homes and 
tents, mobile homes and tents external surfaces, mobile homes and tents internal 
surfaces, mobile homes and tents precious objects, multi-storey external surfaces, 
multi-storey external surfaces gutters and downpipes, multi-storey external sur-
faces roofs, multi-storey external surfaces walls, multi-storey internal surfaces, 
multi-storey precious objects, offices, paved pavement, paved other, paved road, 
people, recreational, residential, restaurant, roads, schools, semi-detached external 
surfaces, semi-detached external surfaces gutters and downpipes, semi-detached 
external surfaces roofs, semi-detached external surfaces walls, semi-detached inter-
nal surfaces, semi-detached precious objects, sewage and water treatment, sheep 
meat, sheep milk, small area of grass, small area of plants, small area of soil, soil 
grass and plants, trees and shrubs, vegetables, water environment, woods and for-
est} and A = (target, B). The local similarity function for A is defined as follows: 
𝑓𝐴(𝑞𝐴, 𝑐𝐴) = {
1, 𝑞𝐴 ⊆ 𝑐𝐴
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
Here, A is a multi-valued attribute and hence 𝑞𝐴 and 𝑐𝐴 are sets. The idea of the 
similarity function is that the contribution to the overall similarity is highest, when 
the targets stated in the query are completely included in the set of targets consid-
ered by the case. In the reuse step, the targets play an important role as well since 
measures are directed specific targets. 
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Contamination 
Let B = {Ba140, Ce141, Ce144, Cm242, Cs134, Cs136, Cs137, I131, I132, I133, Kr85, 
La140, Mo99, Nb95, noble gases, Np239, Po210, Pu238, Pu239, Pu240, Pu241, Pu242, 
Ru103, Ru106, Sr89, Sr90, Te129, Te132, U, Xe133, Xe33, Y90, Zr95} and A = (contam-
ination, B). For this attribute, a local similarity function for many-valued attributes 
(Richter & Weber, 2013, p.159) is applied: 
𝑓𝐴(𝑞𝐴, 𝑐𝐴) =
1
|𝑞𝐴|
∑ max {𝑠𝑖𝑚(𝑥, 𝑦)|𝑦 ∈ 𝑐𝐴}
𝑥∈𝑞𝐴
 
with |𝑞𝐴| > 0 and 
𝑠𝑖𝑚(𝑥, 𝑦) = {
1, 𝑥 = 𝑦
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
Basically, the function determines if the radionuclides specified in the query appear 
in the regarded case as well. A possible enhancement of the function would be to 
include the similarities between the radionuclides. Furthermore, since measures are 
applicable to specific radionuclides, a more sophisticated approach for calculating 
local similarities is conceivable (Möhrle, Schoknecht, Raskob, & Oberweis, 2015). 
Also, the amount of contamination is excluded so far. 
Textual attributes 
Event description 
This attribute is a textual attribute and intends to capture general information on 
the case that may not be provided by a predefined set of allowed values. Hence, the 
domain is the set of all sequences of characters. The Jaccard coefficient (Jaccard, 
1901) is proposed to handle comparisons between texts. The texts are split, stop 
words are removed, and words are stemmed. Afterwards, the remaining sets of 
words are compared to each other: For A = (event description, dom(A)) let 𝐽𝑞 the set of 
resulting words after splitting and processing 𝑞𝐴 and 𝐽𝑐 the corresponding set for 
𝑐𝐴. The Jaccard coefficient for A is defined as3 
                                                          
3 |𝑋| denotes the cardinality of the set 𝑋. 
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𝑓𝐴(𝑞𝐴, 𝑐𝐴) =
|𝐽𝑞 ∩ 𝐽𝑐|
|𝐽𝑞 ∪ 𝐽𝑐|
. 
The Jaccard coefficient is useful for identifying duplicates of text and does not take 
into account synonyms and the semantic of event descriptions. An underlying  
ontology would contribute to a more in-depth similarity assessment. However, this 
work prefers to structure nuclear accidents and hence textual descriptions play a 
minor role. The attribute ‘event description’ allows the user to add further infor-
mation. Important aspects are assumed to be covered by the other attributes. 
Numeric attributes 
Number of people, Population density, Average thermal power, Release height 
Let A1 = (average thermal power, ℝ+), A2 = (number of people, ℕ), A3 = (population density, 
ℝ+) and A4 = (release height, ℝ+). For these attributes following local similarity function 
is proposed: 
𝑓𝐴𝑖(𝑞𝐴𝑖 , 𝑐𝐴𝑖) =
min {𝑞𝐴𝑖 , 𝑐𝐴𝑖}
max {𝑞𝐴𝑖 , 𝑐𝐴𝑖}
 
with 𝑖 ∈ {1,2,3,4}. 
The average thermal power indicates the amount of radioactive material that can  
potentially be released. Besides the iodine equivalent, the number of people is another 
important criterion for classifying the scale of an event. This information is particu-
larly important to judge the feasibility of a strategy. The population density can be 
specified if more information is available. Otherwise, the attribute ‘population dis-
tribution’ is used. Hence, ‘population distribution’ and ‘population density’ are not 
used simultaneously. The release height indicates the possible transport distances 
of the radioactive particles. The release height in the Chernobyl accident (2000m) 
was much larger than in the Fukushima accident (mostly 0-300 m, but some up to 
1000 m) contributing to a much larger affected area. The local similarity functions 
for these attributes are ratios between the values of the query and the case. With 
regard to the number of affected people, a difference-based similarity function was 
applied first. However, it is difficult to judge, from which size difference on the local 
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similarity in- or decreases the global similarity. In general, difference-based ap-
proaches require a subsequent mapping to the interval [0,1]. A general approach 
for defining local similarity functions for numeric attributes is (Stahl, 2003) 
𝑓𝐴(𝑞𝐴, 𝑐𝐴) = {
𝑓1(𝛿(𝑞𝐴, 𝑐𝐴)), 𝑐𝐴 < 𝑞𝐴
1,                               𝑐𝐴 = 𝑞𝐴
𝑓2(𝛿(𝑞𝐴, 𝑐𝐴)), 𝑐𝐴 > 𝑞𝐴
 
where 𝛿 is a difference function 𝛿: 𝑑𝑜𝑚(𝐴) × 𝑑𝑜𝑚(𝐴) → ℝ. Working with difference-
based similarity functions assumes that a decreasing distance results in an increas-
ing similarity value. Usually, 𝑓1 is monotonic increasing and 𝑓2 monotonic decreas-
ing (Stahl, 2003).  
Examples for 𝑓1 and 𝑓2 are threshold, linear, exponential, and sigmoid functions: 
𝑓𝑖(𝛿(𝑞𝐴, 𝑐𝐴)) = {
1, 𝛿(𝑞𝐴, 𝑐𝐴) < 𝜃
0, 𝛿(𝑞𝐴, 𝑐𝐴) ≥ 𝜃
 
𝑓𝑖(𝛿(𝑞𝐴, 𝑐𝐴)) = {
1, 𝛿(𝑞𝐴, 𝑐𝐴) < 𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝛿(𝑞𝐴, 𝑐𝐴)
𝑚𝑎𝑥 −𝑚𝑖𝑛
, min ≥ 𝛿(𝑞𝐴, 𝑐𝐴) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥
0, 𝛿(𝑞𝐴, 𝑐𝐴) > 𝑚𝑎𝑥
 
𝑓𝑖(𝛿(𝑞𝐴, 𝑐𝐴)) = 𝑒
𝛿(𝑞𝐴,𝑐𝐴)⋅𝛼 
𝑓𝑖(𝛿(𝑞𝐴, 𝑐𝐴)) =
1
𝑒
𝛿(𝑞𝐴,𝑐𝐴)−𝜃
𝛼 + 1
 
With 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. The challenge is to define the difference function, base functions and 
corresponding parameters.  
Area size 
The area size is an important criterion for classifying the event as well. Furthermore, 
when discussing decontamination strategies, an expert of the PREPARE project par-
ticularly emphasized the dependency on the possibility to store waste. Hence, when 
comparing two areas concerning size, their similarity would decrease if one area 
has possibilities to store waste and the other area not. For the early phases, waste 
storage is not relevant. The exact area sizes are important in the reuse phase of CBR. 
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Hence, for A1 = (area size, ℝ+) the attribute A2 = (waste storage possibility, {TRUE, 
FALSE, NULL}) is introduced. The local similarity function for A1 is as follows: 
𝑓𝐴1(𝑞𝐴, 𝑐𝐴) =
{
  
 
  
 
min {𝑞𝐴1 , 𝑐𝐴1}
max {𝑞𝐴1, 𝑐𝐴1}
, 𝑞𝐴2 = 𝑁𝑈𝐿𝐿 ∨ 𝑐𝐴2 = 𝑁𝑈𝐿𝐿
0, 𝑞𝐴2 = 𝐹𝐴𝐿𝑆𝐸 ∧ 𝑐𝐴2 = 𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸
1, 𝑞𝐴2 = 𝐹𝐴𝐿𝑆𝐸 ∧ 𝑐𝐴2 = 𝐹𝐴𝐿𝑆𝐸
min {𝑞𝐴1 , 𝑐𝐴1}
max {𝑞𝐴1, 𝑐𝐴1}
, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
If the user does not make any specifications in respect of waste storage, the ratio 
between the area sizes is regarded. If in a current event, waste storage is not possi-
ble, the area size of a case that has taken waste storage into account, does not con-
tribute to the overall similarity. Inversely, a case that has not included any waste 
storage possibilities is regarded as highly valuable for the current problem situa-
tion. Hence, a situation in which it is known that waste cannot be stored in the  
affected area is regarded as more crucial for decision-making than the other way 
round. 
5.3 Summary and Discussion 
The retrieve step and similarity assessment of nuclear accidents are implemented 
in a flexible manner. The user may choose criteria to be included in the similarity 
assessment. Two events are compared attribute-wise and the user determines for 
which attribute values equality is required. Furthermore, the influence of each  
attribute can be controlled by assigning weights to each non-filtering attribute.  
Finally, the similarity threshold or number of cases envisaged to be retrieved is set 
individually.   
The local similarity functions proposed so far depend on the attribute type as well 
as its domain properties. The functions result from discussions on the role of the 
attributes in decision-making as well as analyses of their domains. The latter refers 
to the influence of specific attribute values on the results. For example, as stated 
before, INES 7 events result in larger area sizes for measures than other events, 
which is reflected in the similarity function defined. Furthermore, similarity tables 
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provide good opportunities to state similarity values between specific attribute val-
ues. As with all local similarity functions and attribute domains, further refinements 
are possible and envisaged. The local similarity function for the attribute ‘affected 
area’ for example, is rather general since only the ratio between area sizes is  
regarded. A possible improvement is to work with difference-based similarity func-
tions where the shape of the function reflects how the area sizes of query and  
case associate.  
Especially in the early phases of an accident, uncertainty complicates decision-mak-
ing. Symbolic attributes allow to describe a problem qualitatively and indirectly 
such as the accident scenario type indicating potentially released material. The local 
similarity functions proposed reflect the demanded differentiation between attrib-
ute values. For example, weather categories might be closer to each other than dif-
ferent accident types. Furthermore, in terms of attribute selection, filtering, and 
weights, retrieval can be defined individually for each new query. Unavailable  
information, for example, may be implemented by omitting the corresponding at-
tribute. Furthermore, uncertainty on attribute values may be reflected in low attrib-
ute weights. Hence not only users’ preferences but also uncertainty are taken into 
account in the retrieve step. To improve this approach, stating value ranges for  
numeric attributes as well as estimating missing values from the case base or other 
sources are conceivable. The flexibility of the retrieval step proposed open up  
improvements in various directions. Furthermore, more attributes that are part of 
the problem description, can be included in the retrieval as well. Once uncertainty 
decreases and strategies for the long-term post-accident phase are of interest, the 
characterization of release and the affected area is particularly important for decid-
ing on agricultural and decontamination strategies. Here, new challenges appear 
such as the problem description of a case only covers parts of the query description 
in respect of targets as well as users’ individual preferences concerning effective-
ness parameters that now increasingly reveal. Chapter 6 particularly deals with 
these issues. 
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6 Reusing and Merging Strategies 
This chapter presents the reuse step of the case-based decision support method 
comprising numerical adaptation, merging of strategies, and strategy assessment. 
Numerical adaptation concerns the number of affected people, the area size, the 
amount of waste, and costs. Merging aims at combining several strategies where 
each of them covers a subset of the set of targets currently specified. Strategy assess-
ment deals, inter alia, with several effectiveness parameters to compare strategies. 
The reuse step considers the identification of suitable strategies in diverse ways by 
(i) adapting numerical quantities to current circumstances, (ii) by taking into  
account several solutions to cover the entire problem, and (iii) by offering the user 
a wide decision basis. The numerical adaptation for the number of affected people 
and the area size is realized by computing the proportion of query and case values 
for the corresponding attributes. For decontamination strategies, the amount of 
waste, and costs are adapted according to the area size. For the release phase, costs 
are oriented towards the number of affected people. Merging (Moehrle, 2013b, 
2013a; Moehrle & Raskob, 2019) and strategy assessment (Moehrle, 2014) are pre-
sented in the following. 
6.1 Merging Strategies of Similar Cases 
A strategy corresponds to an instance of the strategy model introduced in Chapter 
4.4.1. The strategy model takes into account the targets a measure is directed  
towards. If a strategy of a retrieved case does not cover all targets currently endan-
gered, another strategy directed towards the missing targets possibly provides  
additional decision support. The question is how to combine these strategies to 
cover all targets? 
Assume that 𝑘 similar cases are retrieved from the case base to solve a current prob-
lem. Hence, 𝑘 strategies are available to be reused. 
For the sake of clarity, the following assumptions are made: 
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(i) Each net has exactly one initial node and one final node. The initial and 
final nodes are places of type {⋅}. 
(ii) Endangerment is produced and reduced completely in each net. 
(iii) Resources are completely consumed in each net. 
In the course of merging, the focus is on following situations starting with two strat-
egies to be merged. The strategies have a joint event resulting in targets. 
(i) Both strategies cover disjoint subsets of targets. 
a. They do not have any measures in common resulting in concur-
rently implemented measures. 
b. They share the same measure, which enhances the set of transition 
modes and essentially refers to the situation when a measure is  
directed towards different targets. The demanded resources rise  
accordingly. 
(ii) Both strategies are directed towards the same targets. The strategies do 
not have any measure in common resulting in a choice of measures for 
specific targets. 
These situations may be combined and generalized arbitrarily. The purpose of 
merging is to identify possible strategies if a single strategy only covers part of the 
problem. The latter primarily refers to the targets currently endangered. Further-
more, if the addressed targets are the same but different strategies are available, the 
choice of measures should be identified. Hence,  
merging of two strategies and hence two Petri nets is conducted at their com-
mon equally labeled transitions including corresponding pre- and post-map-
pings and may result in an extension of place types and transition modes. 
Merging focuses on (i) combining several strategies that cover subsets of targets 
currently endangered; (ii) providing runs taking into account newly combined tar-
gets (iii) preserving the original runs of the nets. 
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Let 𝑆1 and 𝑆2 be two strategies 
𝑆𝑖 = (𝑃𝑖 , 𝑇𝑖 , 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑖 , 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖 , 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑖 , 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 , 𝑀0,𝑖) 
with 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑖 , 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖: 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑖 → 𝜇𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐶𝐸𝑖 
and 𝐿𝑚,𝑖, 𝐿𝑒,𝑖 the labeling functions of 𝑆𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. In the following, transitions are 
referred to by their labels 
𝑇𝑖 ≔ {𝐿𝑘,𝑖(𝑡)|𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑖 , 𝑘 ∈ {𝑚, 𝑒}}, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. 
Denote 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 ∈ 𝑃𝑖 and 𝑒𝑛𝑑 ∈ 𝑃𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ {1,2} the start and end nodes of the nets. 
The merging of the two nets is based on merging the transitions with the same  
labels, the nodes start and end, and places that are involved in the pre-and post-
mappings of the merged transitions. In the following, the merging of two transitions 
is investigated further, especially the merged places involved. 
Let 𝑡1 ∈ 𝑇1 and 𝑡2 ∈ 𝑇2 with 𝑡1 = 𝑡2. Denote 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆|𝑡𝑖 = {(𝑡𝑖, 𝑚)|𝑚 ∈ 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒(𝑡𝑖)}, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2} 
?̃?𝑖
𝑝𝑟𝑒 = {𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑖|(𝑝, 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒(𝑝)) ∈ 𝑃𝑟𝑒(𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆|𝑡𝑖)} 
and 
?̃?𝑖
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 = {𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑖|(𝑝, 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒(𝑝)) ∈ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆|𝑡𝑖)}, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2} 
the places involved in the pre- and post-mappings of 𝑡1 and 𝑡2. Two places 𝑝1 ∈ ?̃?1
𝑝𝑟𝑒 
and 𝑝2 ∈ ?̃?2
𝑝𝑟𝑒 are merged if 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒(𝑝1) and 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒(𝑝2) both belong either to the targets 
and their endangerment, resources or do not have any characteristics. The merging 
generates a new place 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑀  which denotes the set of all new places originating 
from merging a place of 𝑃1 with a place of 𝑃2. The same applies to places that belong 
to ?̃?𝑖
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 , 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. Start and end nodes are always merged.  
Let 
𝐼: 𝑃1 × 𝑃2 → 𝑃
𝑀 
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a bijective function assigning places 𝑝1 ∈ 𝑃1 and 𝑝2 ∈ 𝑃2 to a place 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃
𝑀 . Denote  
𝜋𝑖: 𝑃1 × 𝑃2 → 𝑃𝑖  
the 𝑖-th projection mapping, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}, and 
?̃?𝑖 = {𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑖|∃?̅? ∈ 𝑃
𝑀: 𝜋𝑖(𝐼
−1(?̅?)) = 𝑝}, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2} 
the places of 𝑆1 and 𝑆2 that are merged. 
Definition 6.1 Merged nets 
Let 𝑆1 and 𝑆2 be two strategies with 
𝑆𝑖 = (𝑃𝑖 , 𝑇𝑖 , 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑖 , 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖 , 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑖 , 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 , 𝑀0,𝑖), 𝑖 ∈ {1,2} 
The merged nets result in 
𝑆 = (𝑃, 𝑇, 𝐷𝑜𝑚, 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒, 𝑃𝑟𝑒, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑀0) 
where 
(i) 𝑃 = (𝑃1 ∪ 𝑃2 ∪ 𝑃
𝑀)\(?̃?1 ∪ ?̃?2) 
(ii) 𝑇 = 𝑇1 ∪ 𝑇2 
(iii) 𝐷𝑜𝑚 = 𝐷𝑜𝑚1 ∪ 𝐷𝑜𝑚2 
(iv) 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒(𝑝) = {
𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖(𝑝), 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑖\?̃?𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}
𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒1(𝜋1(𝐼
−1(𝑝))) ∪ 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒2(𝜋2(𝐼
−1(𝑝))), 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑀
 
(v) 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒(𝑡) = {
𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖(𝑡), 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑖 , 𝑡 ∉ 𝑇1 ∩ 𝑇2, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}
𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒1(𝑡) ∪ 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒2(𝑡), 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇1 ∩ 𝑇2
 
(vi) 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆 = 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆1 ∪ 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆2 
(vii) 𝑃𝑟𝑒, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡: 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆 → 𝜇𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐶𝐸 with 
𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐶𝐸 = {(𝑝, 𝑔)|𝑝 ∈ 𝑃, 𝑔 ∈ 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒(𝑝)} 
and for (𝑡,𝑚) ∈ 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆\𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑗 
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𝑃𝑟𝑒(𝑡,𝑚) = 𝑃𝑟?̃?𝑖(𝑡,𝑚) (6.1) 
𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1,2} with  
𝑃𝑟?̃?𝑖(𝑡,𝑚) = ∑ 𝑃𝜇
𝑖(𝑝, 𝑔)′(𝑝, 𝑔)
(𝑝,𝑔)∈𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐶𝐸
𝑝∉𝑃𝑀
+ ∑ 𝑃𝜇
𝑖(𝜋𝑖(𝐼
−1(𝑝)), 𝑔)′(𝑝, 𝑔)
(𝑝,𝑔)∈𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐶𝐸
𝑝∈𝑃𝑀
 
 
with 𝑃𝜇
𝑖 = 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑖(𝑡,𝑚) 
and for (𝑡,𝑚) ∈ 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆1 ∩ 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆2 
𝑃𝑟𝑒(𝑡,𝑚) =  𝑃𝑟?̃?1(𝑡,𝑚) 𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝑟?̃?2(𝑡,𝑚) (6.2) 
The same applies to Post, respectively. 
(viii) M0 = M0,1 +M0,2 
6.1.1  Example 
Assume three similar cases retrieved from the case base and hence three strategies 
available for solving the current problem situation. The first strategy (Figure 6.1) is 
targeted towards ‘playground’ and ‘dairy cow’, suggesting ‘topsoil removal’ and 
‘cover with clean soil’ as well as ‘clean feeding’. The first two measures can be im-
plemented concurrently to the last measure.  
 
Figure 6.1:   Strategy directed towards ‘playground’ and ‘dairy cow’ 
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The second strategy (Figure 6.2) suggests ‘topsoil removal’ and ‘plant and shrub 
removal’ to decontaminate the playground. Both measures are implemented  
sequentially.  
 
Figure 6.2:   Strategy directed towards ‘playground’ 
The third strategy (Figure 6.3) is directed towards ‘park’ and suggests ‘ploughing’ 
and ‘cover with clean soil’, both implemented sequentially. 
 
Figure 6.3:   Strategy directed towards 'park' 
To begin with, the first two strategies are merged (Figure 6.4). The common transi-
tions are ‘release’ and M1 = topsoil removal. Hence the places involved in the pre- 
and post-mapping are merged accordingly. The resulting strategy offers a choice of 
measures with regard to the target ‘playground’. After topsoil removal (M1), either 
‘cover with clean soil’ or ‘plant and shrub removal’ can be implemented. The set of 
targets is not extended in the course of merging and hence there is no new combi-
nation of targets. The functions g and f with B1 = playground and B2 = dairy cow 
reflect the possible runs: 
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𝑔(𝑖) = {
1`𝐵1 + 1`𝐵2, 𝑖 = 1
1`𝐵1, 𝑖 = 2
 
𝑓(𝑖) = {
1`(𝐵1,1.0) + 1`(𝐵2,1.0), 𝑖 = 1
1`(𝐵1,1.0), 𝑖 = 2
 
 
Figure 6.4:   Petri net resulting from merging Petri nets of Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 
Figure 6.5 illustrates the final merged net and merging the net of Figure 6.4 and 
Figure 6.3, respectively. The merging is based on the common transitions ‘release’, 
M1 and M3. The set of targets is enhanced by B3 = park where new combinations of 
targets are possible now:  
𝑔(𝑖) =
{
 
 
 
 
1`𝐵1 + 1`𝐵2, 𝑖 = 1
1`𝐵1, 𝑖 = 2
1`𝐵3, 𝑖 = 3
1`𝐵1 + 1`𝐵2 + 1`𝐵3, 𝑖 = 4
1`𝐵1 + 1`𝐵3, 𝑖 = 5
 
𝑓(𝑖) =
{
 
 
 
 
1`(𝐵1,1.0) + 1`(𝐵2,1.0), 𝑖 = 1
1`(𝐵1,1.0), 𝑖 = 2
1`(𝐵3,1.0), 𝑖 = 3
1`(𝐵1,1.0) + 1`(𝐵2,1.0) + 1`(𝐵3,1.0), 𝑖 = 4
1`(𝐵1,1.0) + 1`(𝐵3,1.0), 𝑖 = 5
 
The measure M3 is directed towards ‘playground’ and ‘park’ and hence the user 
may choose between M3 and M4 with regard to ‘playground’:  
ℎ(𝑥, 0.5) = 1`(𝑥, 0.5), 𝑥 ∈ {𝐵1, 𝐵3}. 
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Figure 6.5:   Petri net resulting from merging Petri nets of Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 
6.1.2 Discussion of the Merging Approach 
Several strategies are merged in case each strategy retrieved only covers a part of 
the problem description of the query and a subset of the current targets, respec-
tively. Merging aims at identifying strategies that cover all targets specified in the 
query. The basic ideas are to merge the common transitions and their pre- and post-
mappings where a predefined set of transition labels is assumed. The pre- and post-
mappings for common transition modes can be chosen from the pre-and post-map-
pings of the respective Petri nets that are merged. The pre- and post-mappings of 
transitions that are not merged remain unchanged. The merging preserves the orig-
inal runs of the Petri nets and identifies possible new runs for newly combined  
targets. 
The merging approach is generic and neither linked to a specific event nor measure 
type. So far, the strategy model integrates two decisive factors for measure selection 
i.e., the targets and the resources needed for implementation. With reference to the 
key steps in constructing a strategy (see Chapter 3.1.2), a missing factor would be 
the radionuclides involved. However, the model can be extended according to more 
decisive factors by including more types. The key steps in selecting and combining 
measures (see Chapter 3.1.2) include the consideration of the effectiveness and the 
reduction of contamination as well, which is covered by the strategy model by the 
degree of endangerment. The notion of effectiveness is discussed in Chapter 6.2. 
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The consequences of implementing measures e.g., the waste produced or the result-
ing costs, which are important for the strategy assessment (Chapter 6.2), could be 
modeled through the post-mappings of the transitions. A subsequent strategy  
assessment is necessary if several strategies are available for selection. In general, 
Petri nets offer various possibilities for enhancement such as the duration of imple-
menting a measure or the probability of the occurrence of an event. The duration of 
implementing a measure might be uncertain and be endowed with a probability 
distribution as well. Performance analyses related to the duration of a strategy and 
resource utilization may be used in the assessment providing the user a wide deci-
sion basis. 
The assumptions stated at the beginning of this chapter reflect to which strategies 
the decision support method refers to, namely strategies that are endorsed by  
experts. Constructing scenarios means identifying possible accidents and useful 
strategies to counter them. The latter refers to, inter alia, eliminating the endanger-
ment. The assumption that a strategy has a fixed start and end node is for reasons 
of clarity. The start node is a place of type {⋅} that is part of the pre-mapping of the 
event that triggers the endangerment of certain targets and hence serves as model-
ing element to enable the initial event transition. The end node is a place of type {⋅} 
as well, determining the achievement of eliminating the endangerment. Resource 
modeling can be extended e.g., by modeling alternative resources or resources that 
are set free after implementing a measure. However, a Petri net in the case base 
models a strategy with defined type and amount of resources. Hence, within the 
scope of this work, modeling a complete consumption of resources is sufficient but 
does not entail any restrictions. 
The chapter primarily focuses on strategies underlying a joint event that cause the 
endangerment of objects, e.g. in the example of Chapter 6.1.1, the release of radio-
active material. However, a specialization of the event is possible, resulting in dif-
ferent events that cause the endangerment of targets but which does not limit the 
merging approach. It is also possible to model an event between two measures, 
which has effects on the endangerment of the targets. If two strategies have the same 
intermediate event, the pre- and post-mappings of the merged Petri net is deter-
mined according to Equations (6.1) and (6.2) and hence the mappings of the transi-
tion modes originally defined. 
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A transition mode comprises the transition, the target, its degree of endangerment, 
and possibly resources. The pre- and post-mappings define how transitions change 
the endangerment of a target. Hence, more special strategies including, for example, 
a repeated implementation of the same measure until the endangerment is elimi-
nated, is covered by the strategy model as well. Furthermore, assume a strategy that 
suggests a reversed implementation order of measures than another strategy. The 
merging of these two strategies would result in a Petri net that reflects the arbitrary 
implementation order. The merging particularly does not interpret this situation as 
a contradiction. 
As mentioned above, the merging may result in several strategies available for  
selection. In this case, a subsequent strategy assessment helps the user to decide. 
The method proposed in the next chapter, mainly integrates different perspectives 
on assessing a strategy, namely the experience with implementation, robustness  
towards future uncertainties, quantifiable ratios which can be deduced from simu-
lations, and system-specific parameters, which depend on the underlying decision 
supporting method. The following chapter discusses an integrative approach bring-
ing different perspectives on a sub-problem together, however, without in-depth 
investigation but indicating possible research directions. 
6.2 Multi-Criteria Assessment of Strategies 
For assessing strategies, multi-attribute value theory (MAVT) is proposed support-
ing participatory decision-making taking into account multiple objectives (decision 
criteria) in a transparent and structured manner and facilitating consensus finding 
in groups (Bertsch, 2007; Geldermann et al., 2009). The decision problem is struc-
tured hierarchically comprising an overall objective, multiple criteria, attributes, 
and decision alternatives. Here, attributes make the criteria measurable. After prob-
lem structuring, a preference model is constructed that includes elicitating the rela-
tive importance of the criteria and hence attribute weights and defining value func-
tions that map the scores of the alternatives with respect to a specific attribute to a 
common scale. The latter particularly makes the alternatives comparable. Thereaf-
ter, the scores of a specific alternative are aggregated in consideration of the value 
functions and weights, resulting in a ranking of the decision alternatives. If desired, 
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sensitivity analyses may be conducted. These steps are interactive and may be  
repeated, if necessary (Bertsch, 2007). The focus is on MAVT, since (i) the attribute 
values are assumed to be deterministic, (ii) the set of alternatives (strategies) is dis-
crete, and (iii) MAVT is successfully applied in related research field (Papamichail 
& French, 2005) as well as in combination with CBR (see Chapter 2.5). 
The strategy assessment aims at (i) ranking different strategies in a transparent 
manner, (ii) providing a broad discussion basis, and (iii) preserving flexibility to 
account for the variability of disasters and users’ preferences. In particular, the con-
tributions of the different criteria to the overall assessment should be revealed. This 
can be supported visually, e.g. by stacked-bar charts.  
As discussed in Chapter 2.5, various approaches exist to evaluate measures, mainly 
in terms of performance, through costs, response time, loss, required resources etc. 
as well as public acceptance. Another approach is to evaluate the robustness and 
especially to select a strategy that performs sufficiently well for many different sce-
narios and hence event developments and a changing environment (T. Comes et al., 
2010). In addition, strategies that are determined by a decision support system are 
based on certain methods. Therefore, quantities that help to judge the usefulness of 
the solution identified, provide decision support as well. In respect of CBR, a confi-
dence value, for example, reflects the accuracy of a solution and besides the simi-
larity values of the retrieved cases, the number of similar cases, the deviation in the 
solutions of the retrieved cases, the percentage of cases retrieved suggesting a spe-
cific solution or the span of the solutions could be taken into account (Cheetham, 
2000). Evaluation measures are particularly introduced in Chapter 2.1.4. 
The contribution of this chapter is to integrate different perspectives on strategy 
assessment. Existing assessment approaches either focus on system-specific param-
eters solely, or the robustness of strategies by elaborating scenarios, or focus on 
costs, efficacy, or public acceptance and hence current conditions. MAVT enables to 
integrate these different approaches taking into account users’ preferences. The 
strategy assessment proposed in this chapter is independent of the event but de-
pends on CBR and related parameters such as the similarity value. A previous pub-
lication (Moehrle, 2014) discusses this topic independently of the event and assumes 
a case base of historical events. In the framework of nuclear emergencies, the  
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majority of cases are scenarios where the strategies are based on reference levels for 
the residual dose and are judged according to costs, the amount of waste produced, 
public acceptance, or feasibility in general. Hence, one branch of the proposed  
attribute tree (Moehrle, 2014) is adapted to nuclear emergencies and particularly 
quantities that are actually computable. The paper treats strategy assessment from 
a more general point of view by regarding fatalities, injured, damage to economy, 
and environment. Furthermore, the terminology is adapted and the former notion 
‘old assessments’ that reflects historical values on damages is changed into ‘effec-
tiveness’. The effectiveness of a strategy measures how well the strategy achieves 
the objectives (Rongier et al., 2012) and i.e., reducing the level of radiation exposure 
to human and returning to normal living conditions. Depending on the type of 
measure, there are concrete definitions of effectiveness (J. Brown, Watson, Nisbet, 
2015; Nisbet & Watson, 2015b, 2015a) that mainly express the reduction of contam-
ination in or on the target after implementing a measure1. In particular, the effec-
tiveness refers to radiological aspects solely. In the frame of this thesis, societal as-
pects as well as produced waste are subsumed under the branch ‘effectiveness’ 
since they contribute to the objective of returning to normal living conditions as 
well. Their importance may vary during an accident such as the amount of waste, 
which is relevant in respect of decontamination. Hence the notion of effectiveness 
actually changes in the course of an accident but which can be taken into account in 
MAVT. The effectiveness of a strategy is one branch of the hierarchy for assessment 
and reflects a current status in contrast to discussions on robustness by investigat-
ing possible future developments. The other branches of the hierarchy utilize that 
strategies are derived by JRodos and are based on a Petri net model and that the 
core method, CBR, has its own ranking induced by the retrieval task as defined in 
Chapter 5.1. The strategy assessment is mainly formulated for the long-term acci-
dent phase when more time is available and particularly the merging of several 
strategies is applied and the set of targets is more diverse. This chapter intends to 
round off the identification of a suitable strategy for decision support, mainly by 
integrating the approaches elaborated so far as well as in consideration of the  
application field. The following hierarchy of criteria (Figure 6.6) proposes how the 
                                                          
1 Owed to the type of measure, the effectiveness of fixing measures is defined differently and refers to 
the reduction of the inhalation dose after implementing a measure (Nisbet & Watson, 2015b). 
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integration could be realized. Especially, the choice of attributes may be refined but 
which goes beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
Figure 6.6:   Hierarchy of criteria and attributes for strategy assessment 
The overall objective is to protect public and environment (Figure 3.3) being decom-
posed into ‘effectiveness’, ‘resources, ‘robustness’, and ‘confidence’. The effective-
ness can be measured according to (i) the factor of dose reduction, which is the ratio 
between the dose received after implementing a specific strategy and the dose  
received without implementing this strategy (see chapter 3.3), (ii) the amount of 
waste, and (iii) public acceptance. Introducing the factor of dose reduction intends 
to generalize the definitions of effectiveness mentioned above. Public acceptance 
may be measured qualitatively, such as in the categories ‘high’ and ‘low’ (L. Lin et 
al., 2014). 
The criterion ‘resources’ states through which means the objectives are achieved 
and e.g., which resources and to what extent they are utilized. Resources are partic-
ularly covered in the strategy model, as introduced in chapter 4.4.1., which allows 
the refinement according to time for implementing a measure or the entire strategy. 
Uncertainties in respect of duration can be expressed through probability distribu-
tions. These uncertainties may originate from an uncertain amount of available 
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equipment, personnel, or relief units, for example, or targets of the measures. In 
particularly, concurrently implemented measures may lead to delays during the 
implementation of a strategy, since, for example, concurrently implemented 
measures need to be finished before further measures can be implemented. Besides 
the duration of implementing a measure, the number of equipment, personnel, or 
relief units that potentially ‘wait’ because of delays during the implementation, is 
an interesting quantity as well, which can be expressed in the notion ‘utilization’. 
Both, utilization and duration are quantities that result from simulations of strate-
gies emphasizing the advantage of the strategy model that is based on Petri nets. 
Given an initial marking, simulations of Petri nets produce a sequence of markings 
aiming at, amongst others, analyses of quantitative aspects such as throughput 
times and costs (Oberweis, 1996). In the frame of this work, the costs of a strategy 
can be determined by JRodos. 
The criterion ‘robustness’ considers uncertainties with regard to the extent of a dis-
aster, changing environmental conditions, or insufficient information. One  
approach is to investigate different scenarios, to assess the different strategies and 
particularly the effectiveness under these varying conditions, and aggregate the 
scores for the different strategies over all scenarios (T. Comes et al., 2010). One may 
also demand a minimum score a strategy should achieve and count the frequency 
of achievement. The latter approach can be found in the industrial field in the course 
of assessing the robustness of a plan (Scholl, 2000). Evaluating the robustness of 
strategies is time-consuming and requires the cooperation of experts of different 
fields (M. Comes, 2011). Hence, an in-depth investigation is mainly possible in the 
later phases of a nuclear accident. For the early phases, a light version is conceivable 
by fixing decision-relevant factors that may be subject to variations, such as the 
source term or the weather category, and assessing different strategies under a pre-
defined set of possible values of these factors. This step can particularly be auto-
mated.  
The criterion ‘confidence’ refers to CBR and specifically the similarity values of the 
cases retrieved. In addition, a strategy that consists of measures that are part of other 
solutions retrieved may appear more trustworthy to the user than a complete new 
strategy. Hence, the deviation in the solution from other solutions is integrated in 
determining the confidence as well. Of course, further approaches exist to evaluate 
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a CBR solution as introduced in chapter 2.1.4. For demonstration purposes, values 
associated to retrieval and reuse, respectively, are chosen to measure the criterion 
‘confidence’. 
6.2.1 Example 
Assume a release where 300 inhabitants are endangered and two strategies are pro-
vided by the decision support method after merging (Figure 6.7). 
 
Figure 6.7:   Strategies entering the assessment provided with delay functions to model uncertainty 
The first strategy (A) suggests, after giving alarm, to ask the inhabitants in the sur-
rounding area to close their doors and windows. Meanwhile, a water curtain should 
be established. The second strategy (B) suggests an evacuation instead of closing 
doors and windows. For the durations of the measures a normal distribution 
𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎2) is assumed with the following means (𝜇) and variances (𝜎2): ‘alarm’  
N(2, 0.2), ‘close doors and windows’ N(4, 0.4), ‘water curtain’ N(8, 3), ‘evacuation’ 
N(13, 9). Values for the mean and variance are understood as relative time used for 
comparison. Strategy A needs 30 relief units, which are divided into two groups. 
Strategy B needs 50 relief units where 35 relief units are needed for alarm and evac-
uation and 15 relief units establish the water curtain. The strategies include few 
measures and hence there are no real waiting relief units. Exemplarily, the different 
durations of the concurrently implemented measures ‘alarm’ and ‘close doors and 
windows’ and ‘water curtain’ as well as ‘alarm’ and ‘evacuation’ and ‘water curtain’ 
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are regarded as source for a potential delay. In particular, the ratio between the av-
erage time differences between the completion of ‘water curtain’ and ‘close doors & 
windows’ and ‘water curtain’ and ‘evacuation’, multiplied with the number of wait-
ing relief units and the average duration of the entire strategy, multiplied with the 
number of all relief units, is determined. Table 6.1 shows the average values re-
ceived by simulating each strategy 1000 times with CPN Tools. Assume the strate-
gies are based on long releases causing medium contamination. For assessing the 
robustness of the strategies, two scenarios are considered: long release with first 
high and second low contamination. For each scenario, the effectiveness and costs 
of each strategy is estimated (Table 6.2) to get an average score for each strategy 
over both scenarios where the probability value for the first scenario is set 0.7 and 
for the second scenario 0.3. The attribute values are aggregated according to the 
weighted sum. The weights can be chosen between 0 and 10 where 0 is interpreted 
as ‘unimportant’ and 10 as ‘most important’. Furthermore, a minimal value is  
demanded each strategy should achieve and is set exemplarily to 0.4. To make the 
alternatives comparable, the attribute values are mapped lineally to the interval 
[0,1] where the upper and lower bounds as shown in Table 6.3 are worst and best 
attribute values, respectively. Values of dose reduction, utilization, similarity, and 
deviation in solution are already in the interval [0,1]. Public acceptance is mapped 
to 1 and 0 for the values ‘high’ and ‘low’, respectively. In order to maintain the cor-
rect interpretability, inverse value functions such as for dose reduction, waste, costs, 
average duration, and deviation in solution are applied to maintain the interpreta-
tion: the higher the value, the better. It is assumed that Strategy A results from a 
retrieved case with similarity 0.6 whereas the case Strategy B results from has sim-
ilarity 0.9. Since there are only two strategies to choose from, the deviation in solu-
tion only reflects the differences between them, which is set to 0.33 to show that 
only one measure differs.  
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Table 6.1:   Attribute values included in the assessment 
 Strategy A Strategy B Unit Weight 
Factor of dose reduction 0.8 0.1 - 9 
Waste 1000 1000 Liter 1 
Public acceptance high low - 5 
Average utilization 0.823 0.812 - 1 
Average duration 7.59 19.833 - 2  
Costs 100000 300000 Euro 1 
Average assessment 0.492 0.552 - 3 
Achievement of minimum  
assessment 
1 1 - 3 
Similarity 0.6 0.9 - 8 
Deviation in solution 0.33 0.33 - 6 
Table 6.2:   Attribute values for assessing the robustness of the strategies 
  Factor of 
dose  
reduction 
Waste Public  
acceptance 
Costs Strategy  
assessment 
Scenario 1 Strategy A 0.9 2000 High 300000 0.45 
 Strategy B 0.2 2000 Low 500000 0.52 
Scenario 2 Strategy A 0.7 800 High 100000 0.59 
 Strategy B 0.05 800 Low 300000 0.63 
Unit  - Liter - Euro  - 
Weight  9 1 5 1  
Table 6.3:   Upper and lower bounds for determining the value functions 
Attribute Upper bound Lower bound 
Waste 5000 0 
Costs 1000000 0 
Average duration 24 6 
 
Strategy A and B are assessed with the MCDA Tool developed at KIT2. Figure 6.8 
depicts the result of the strategy assessment where strategy B is identified as more 
appropriate for achieving the overall objective. The stacked-bar chart illustrates the 
                                                          
2 https://portal.iket.kit.edu/projects/MCDA/ 
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contributions of each attribute to the final result. Sensitivity analyses show the so-
lutions’ stability with regard to changes in the attribute weights, which may result 
in a change in ranking. For example, change in the attribute weight of ‘costs’ would 
not alter the ranking (Figure 6.9) whereas a decrease of the attribute weight for ‘fac-
tor of dose reduction’ leads to an increase of the assessment value for strategy A up 
to a ranking change of strategy A and B (Figure 6.10). 
 
Figure 6.8:   Assessment of strategies illustrated as stacked-bar chart 
 
Figure 6.9:   Stability of result according to changes in the weight of ‘costs’ 
 
Figure 6.10:   Stability of result according to changes in the weight of ‘factor of dose reduction’ 
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6.3 Summary and Discussion 
The reuse step of the case-based decision support method includes (i) numerical 
adaptations for the number of affected people, area size as well as amount of waste 
and costs, (ii) merging of several strategies to cover a large set of currently targets, 
and (iii) strategy assessment, in case several strategies are available. Numerical ad-
aptations utilize the relations between the number of affected people and costs for 
the release phase, and the area size and the amount of waste and costs for the later 
phases. Missing values can be determined with the help of the population distribu-
tion category or the population density.  
The idea of merging is to merge the common active components of the Petri nets, 
which are common events leading to endangerment and measures reducing the  
endangerment as well as their pre- and post-mappings. The latter are enhanced to 
both preserve the original runs and identify possible new runs for newly combined 
targets, which essentially results from preserving all possibilities each net is offer-
ing. In particular, the sets of transition modes are unified, the pre- and post-map-
pings of common transition modes can be chosen from the original mappings, and 
for non-common transition modes, the original mappings are maintained. The  
objectives are to identify strategies that cover all targets specified in the query and 
clearly reveal where a choice of measures is available. Besides the type that specifies 
the targets with its degree of endangerment, the examples introduce a further type, 
which is the target solely. This way of modeling enables to specifically analyze new 
combinations of targets and the proposed combination of measures. 
The basic idea of strategy assessment is to integrate commonly discussed  
approaches in the literature that refer to performance measures and investigating 
robustness. A new approach is to integrate CBR related values that reflect the trust-
worthiness of the solutions proposed. MAVT is suggested to bring together the dif-
ferent views on strategy assessment providing a wide discussion basis for the user 
where each contribution of the attributes values to the overall result becomes visi-
ble. MAVT not only provides a way to rank different strategies but also offers a 
structured and transparent procedure of strategy assessment taking into account 
users’ preferences and uncertainties. With a suitable tool, the users can discuss and 
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analyze the results according to their sensitivity in respect of the weights or attrib-
ute values set. The multi-criteria assessment proposed particularly considers cur-
rent conditions, possible future developments, utilizes simulations to account for 
current constraints and uncertainties with regard to time, for example, and facili-
tates users’ trust and understanding in the mechanism of the decision support 
method by integrating confidence values. 
The reuse of prepared strategies aims at offering an appropriate strategy to counter 
the current problem situation. Besides numerical adaptations to match current 
measurable or assessable quantities, a challenge is to determine a strategy that takes 
into account all targets currently endangered. Constructing scenarios intends to 
cover a wide range of possible problem descriptions. However, working with sim-
ilarities allows deviations that may demand several strategies from different cases 
to be combined. This chapter proposes how the combination can be realized and 
emphasizes the added value the Petri net approach offers. The subsequent multi-
criteria assessment integrates different approaches ranging from evaluating the ef-
fectiveness and robustness, parameters deduced from simulations to method-spe-
cific quantities. Hence, reuse includes discussing possible strategies with the help 
of different criteria as well, preferably in a structured way with visual support as 
the proposed approach and tool enables. This chapter finalizes the methodical back-
ground of the case-based decision support. The following chapter is dedicated to 
implementation and evaluation by means of a specific example. 
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7 Implementation and Evaluation 
This chapter presents the prototypical implementation of the case-based decision 
support method as well as its evaluation. The ‘Case-based reasoning application 
software’ (CBR application in the following)1 resulted from joint work within the 
working group ‘Accident Management Systems’ at the Institute for Thermal Energy 
Technology and Safety of the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) and was pre-
sented at the NERIS workshop2 in Dublin in 2018 (Moehrle et al., 2018, 2019). The 
implementation focuses on the core method CBR with its case base and the graph-
ical user interface and can be improved in following directions: (i) Modeling of strat-
egies as Petri nets and integrating them in the case base; (ii) Extending the merging 
step to process Petri nets; (iii) Building the connections between CPN Tools, CBR 
Application, and the MCDA Tool developed at KIT. With regard to the latter, infor-
mation exchange is realized via XML files and hence the CBR Application can be 
enhanced accordingly. Since the method CBR is not restricted to nuclear emergen-
cies only, research has been conducted in various directions as well. The application 
is set up in a flexible way to be expandable to other event types. In the following, 
the current state of the application is presented that goes beyond nuclear emergen-
cies. The integration of different event types in a decision support application is 
especially interesting in disaster management (Moehrle et al., 2019). 
7.1 Architecture Overview 
The CBR application is embedded in a web-based client server architecture. Over 
the last decades, web technologies have entered the development of decision sup-
port systems resulting in many successful application examples (Bhargava, Power, 
& Sun, 2007). Besides the access to decision supporting tools via a web browser, web 
technologies particularly facilitate communication and decision-making in distrib-
                                                          
1 http://portal.iket.kit.edu/CBR/ 
2 https://www.eu-neris.net/activities/workshops/dublin-2018.html 
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uted teams (Power, 2000). Moreover, analysis and computation are platform-inde-
pendent, remote, and distributed which facilitates information exchange. Also, sys-
tem maintenance is simplified and centralized (Bhargava et al., 2007). 
The management process of nuclear emergencies is complex involving various  
activities and corresponding responsibilities (Carter & French, 2005). Particularly, 
the institutions providing support and advice to the decision-makers may be  
located at different places. Therefore, a system that is accessible from different loca-
tions where the input and results can be synchronized and shared between the per-
sons in charge is of great value. A web-based application is well suited to fulfill this 
task, greatly simplifying the requirements of software and hardware as only a  
mobile device with a web browser is needed. Furthermore, besides the general use-
fulness of CBR in the frame of disaster management, a web-based access particu-
larly facilitates knowledge sharing (Otim, 2006). As some of the scientific discus-
sions revolve around emergency management handling multiple disaster types at 
the same time new challenges in the system’s architecture arise. In particular, after 
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident, one discussion topic was 
emergency preparedness with a special focus on severe accidents possibly linked to 
natural disasters (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2015b). This chapter 
proposes a generic system design allowing easy expandability of existing structures 
as well as integration of new event types.  
Figure 7.1 illustrates the web-based client server architecture and the information 
exchange of the single components: the frontend GUI, the backend CBR application, 
and the knowledge database (KDB) where the scenarios and historical accidents as 
well as general information for decision support are stored. 
 
Figure 7.1:   Overview of the architecture 
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7.1.1 Knowledge Database 
So far, natural events such as earthquakes and storms and nuclear accidents are 
stored in different schemes in the KDB. An excerpt of the scheme for storing the 
cases reported in this thesis has already been illustrated (Chapter 4.5, Figure 4.4). 
The KDB was enhanced within the subsequent project HARMONE (Bai, Staudt, 
Kaiser, & Raskob, 2018) focusing on remediation strategies for inhabited areas and 
food production systems for long-term management according to another scheme. 
In the following, ‘HARMONE event’ particularly refers to scenarios developed dur-
ing this project. Furthermore, research on natural disasters was conducted in the 
frame of CEDIM’s (Center for Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Technol-
ogy) Forensic Disaster Analysis (FDA) that was concerned with near-real time anal-
yses of disasters and their impacts (Möhrle & Raskob, 2014). In the course of this 
project, earthquake events from the CATDAT damaging earthquake database 
(Daniell, Khazai, Wenzel, & Vervaeck, 2011) were integrated into the KDB which 
primarily focus on resulting damages. Multiple disaster types may occur at the 
same time promoting the development of a system capable of analyzing different 
event types. So far, the database is populated with 512 cases of which 178 are  
nuclear events and 334 are natural events, mainly earthquakes. 
7.1.2 CBR Application 
The CBR application of this thesis is developed on the basis of jCOLIBRI2 (Recio-
García, González-Calero, & Díaz-Agudo, 2014) that is further enhanced in several 
application-specific directions, such as the structure of the solution description and 
the reuse step allowing combinations of measures. Each event type has its own con-
figuration directory storing information on database access and classes building a 
case. 
The CBR application is started when a new event is specified and a corresponding 
XML document with information about the event type and its characteristics is 
loaded. Accordingly, the application is configured. With regard to nuclear acci-
dents, the application distinguishes project-dependent events and PREPARE and 
HARMONE, respectively. The latter particularly does not regard accident phases 
and covers always the long-term post-accident phase. The cases are loaded and  
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accessed subsequently for the similarity calculation. In case of a nuclear accident 
(PREPARE), similar cases are retrieved for each phase involving a configuration of 
the similarity function, respectively. Depending on the accident phase again, cases 
are either adapted only or adapted and merged, if necessary. For the pre-release 
phase, no adaptation steps are conducted since the strategies consist of rule-based 
measures without any quantities. After calculating suggested solutions, the results 
are written in an XML document. If there is a triggering event such as an earthquake 
event, similar triggering events and their damages are determined to be added to 
the final result XML document. Figure 7.2 gives a brief overview of the main pro-
gram flow. 
 
Figure 7.2:   Flow chart of the main class of the CBR application 
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Interaction of CBR Application and GUI Engine 
The information exchange between the CBR application and the GUI engine as well 
as generation of the event type dependent input mask is realized in a generic and 
flexible manner. When accessing the start page of the user interface, one may select 
the event type for which a query is to be formulated. The GUI engine generates the 
corresponding input mask based on a pre-defined XML document that contains  
information on the attributes, their domains, and their domain formats such as mul-
tiple lists or text fields. The user may then specify the query and send a request with 
the current event description as well as configurations on retrieval and the similar-
ity function. In case of earthquakes and storms, the user may select the desired  
information on damages of past events as well.  
With the user requests, an XML document is created and passed on to the CBR ap-
plication by the GUI engine. The CBR application has now information on the event 
type, attributes selected, their specified values, attribute weights, and realization of 
the two-step retrieval and, in case of earthquakes and storms, information of past 
events the user is interested in. The two-step retrieval particularly enables to first 
filter the set of problem descriptions and calculate the similarities between the 
query and the remaining cases afterwards. The user may select the corresponding 
filter attributes and may state a similarity threshold or the number of desired cases, 
respectively. In case of nuclear events, the accident phase is specified as well, for 
which possible solutions are needed. According to the event type, the CBR applica-
tion connects to the corresponding database schemes and determines solutions, 
which are damages or measures. The results are stored in an XML document and 
passed on to the GUI engine for displaying the results to the user. 
In addition to the exchange of XML documents between the CBR application and 
the GUI engine, the latter can import and export XML documents from and to other 
sources as well. Furthermore, each query is stored with a time stamp and can be 
opened again later. 
Figure 7.3 sums up the basic information exchange. The grey boxes depict the dif-
ferent steps from selecting an event type to illustrating the results. The dotted  
arrows show the processing of information specified via the GUI by the GUI engine. 
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The solid arrows indicate the exchange of XML documents. CBR application and 
KDB connect via XML documents as well. 
 
Figure 7.3:   Interaction between CBR application and GUI engine 
Enhancing Existing Structures and Integrating New Event Types 
Since knowledge is stored in a database, current tables and structures may be  
enhanced easily and if necessary, new schemes can be created, particularly if a new 
event type should be integrated into the decision supporting software. On the CBR 
application side, corresponding classes and configuration files need to be updated. 
Since the GUI is generated by the GUI engine on the basis of an XML document, 
further attributes can be easily integrated. Here, the name of the attribute, the type 
and domain as well as default local similarity function characteristics can be speci-
fied (Figure 7.4). 
7.1 Architecture Overview 
169 
Figure 7.4:   Excerpt of the GUI generating XML document 
Regarding the CBR application, assigning local similarity functions to attributes is 
configured in an event-type independent document. Possibly, as new event types 
imply new attributes, new local and global similarity functions need to be imple-
mented and assigned. Depending on the type of event to be included, the package 
structure of the CBR application needs to extended, accordingly. Currently, natural 
and nuclear events are distinguished whereas structures for problem and solution 
describing classes are defined. Possibly, new adaptation mechanisms need to be  
included. The configuration directory of the CBR application is structured to differ-
ent event types and needs to be enhanced accordingly. Figure 7.5 depicts the data-
base configuration document. The main class of the CBR application realizes the 
CBR cycle whereas different actions are triggered by the event type. Further  
enhancements concern the event type dependent presentation of the final results 
being prepared by the GUI engine.  
Figure 7.5:   Database configuration of the CBR application 
<attribute> 
 <name> population distribution</name> 
 <type>List</type> 
 <value>metropolitan,rural,urban</value> 
 <localSim>true</localSim> 
 <weight>5.</weight> 
 <active>true</active> 
 <outName>populationDistribution</outName> 
</attribute> 
<DataBaseConfiguration> 
<HibernateConfigFile>nuclearEvent/hibernate.cfg.xml</HibernateConfigFile> 
<DescriptionMappingFile>nuclearEvent/eventDescription.hbm.xml</DescriptionMappingFile> 
<DescriptionClassName>dss.eventDescription.nuclear.NuclearEvent</DescriptionClassName> 
<SolutionMappingFile>nuclearEvent/strategy.hbm.xml</SolutionMappingFile> 
<SolutionClassName>dss.solutionDescription.nuclear.Solution</SolutionClassName> 
<JustificationOfSolutionClassName>dss.justificationDescription.nuclear.GeneralJustification 
</JustificationOfSolutionClassName> 
<JustificationOfSolutionMappingFile>nuclearEvent/justification.hbm.xml 
</JustificationOfSolutionMappingFile> 
</DataBaseConfiguration> 
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7.1.3 Graphical User Interface 
The web-based user interface is a comfortable way to access the CBR application, in 
particular to obtain first suggestions on reasonable strategies in an emergency, with-
out any pre-required software installations except of a web browser. Users can spec-
ify and configure the similarity calculation individually and hence integrate their 
preferences and expertise.  
Different event types and their corresponding input masks are prepared and can be 
chosen from a drop-down list. Moreover, besides default interfaces for each event 
type, already calculated events can be retrieved and selected or imported from  
another location. 
In case of nuclear events, different tabs are prepared to structure the event specifi-
cation, particularly according to different accident phases. The attributes types 
range from numerical values to symbols, whereas for the latter combo boxes with 
single or multiple selection options are provided. Weights from 1 (almost not  
important) to 10 (highly important) can be entered in a text field and checkboxes 
activate filter attributes, if desired. Figure 7.6 shows the input mask. The user can 
choose different event types for which different input masks are prepared. 
 
Figure 7.6:   Input mask of the CBR application 
After specifying query and similarity functions, the calculation can be launched. 
The user can set a similarity threshold or fixed number of cases considered for the 
final result. The results are shown in a newly generated tab assigned with a 
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timestamp. For the nuclear cases, a condensed strategy, combining measures, tar-
gets, and further information is provided. Moreover, information on the chosen 
cases as well as effectiveness values or results from simulated strategies in inhabited 
areas or food production systems are displayed. The retrieved cases can also be  
analyzed more in detail and can be expanded and collapsed for better clarity. Figure 
7.7 depicts some example results for nuclear events. 
 
Figure 7.7:   Result tab exemplarily on the basis of a nuclear query 
7.1.4 Open Points 
As stated before and as can be seen in the screenshots of the results (Figure 7.7), the 
strategies are not yet modeled as Petri nets but the measures are stored in a list with 
a defined course of action. The merging class rather focuses on (i) sorting the 
measures from the cases according to different exposure pathways, (ii) keeping 
measures that are directed towards current targets, and (iii) filtering measures  
according to the soil type. The latter is particularly an attribute that may be specified 
by the user in the input mask and which is for adaptation only. The implementation 
of the merging approach presented in this thesis can be realized by processing XML 
or PNML documents, the formats CPN Tools provides for storing the strategies. 
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Furthermore, the scenarios are subject of reuse only and the historical events are 
provided as additional information to learn from since they rather demonstrate  
issues in emergency management than being positive examples. As stated before, 
the connections between the CBR application, CPN Tools, and the MCDA Tool have 
to be closely established. To be more precise, the CBR application needs to be  
enhanced in several ways, in particular to better process the simulation results from 
CPN Tools, and consider the analysis results according to robustness, CBR related 
quantities as well as effectiveness values from the retrieved cases. Thereby the user 
is offered a broader decision basis. Figure 7.8 illustrates how the application can be 
extended accordingly. The solid arrows indicate exchanges of documents. Basically, 
further classes that are concerned with the strategy evaluation need to be integrated 
where separate classes for each criterion are suggested.  
 
Figure 7.8:   Overview of necessary connections between the MCDA Tool, CBR Application, and CPN 
Tools 
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7.2 Evaluation of the Developed Method 
This chapter presents the evaluation of the decision support method by means of a 
case study that is derived from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant acci-
dent. The evaluation aims at examining the achievement of the objectives formu-
lated in Chapter 1.2. The approach is to analyze the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
power plant accident, to identify points in time the developed method could be ap-
plied, to compare the results with the strategies that were implemented in reality, 
and discuss the provided decision support. The evaluation particularly should 
demonstrate the added value of applying the elaborated method in emergency 
management. Hence, the objectives pursued are to evaluate if the developed 
method 
(i) provides decision support for all phases of a nuclear accident and 
in particular identifies coherent strategies as discussion basis, 
(ii) suggests how to handle with the crucial issue of uncertainty in nuclear 
emergency management 
(iii) integrates experience and expert knowledge for decision support, 
(iv) takes into account different stakeholders with partially conflicting  
objectives, 
(v) supports the harmonization work in Europe, also by supporting the 
interaction with other tools for emergency management, and 
(vi) is applicable, especially by means of the prototypical implementation. 
The case study for evaluating the method is oriented towards the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear power plant accident (Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz, 2012; 
Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS), 2016; International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), 2015a, 2015b) that was triggered by the Tohoku earthquake 
occurred at 14:46 local time on 11 March 2011 and the subsequent tsunami at the 
northeast coast of Japan. The tsunami reached the Japanese coast approximately 40 
minutes after the earthquake. The main wave reaching the nuclear power plant ar-
rived about 50 minutes after the earthquake with a height of more than 14 meters, 
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exceeding the tsunami barrier seawalls that were designed to protect against a max-
imum tsunami height of 5.5 m.  
At the time of the earthquake, units 1-3 were in operation and units 4-6 were shut 
down due to revisions. The earthquake led to the loss of off-site power and all op-
erating reactors to be shut down. The units at the power plant responded as in-
tended by the designers and as stipulated in the operating procedures. However, 
the tsunami flooded emergency diesel generators and batteries resulting in a station 
blackout3. Hence water injection and cooling of the fuel rods and monitoring of the 
reactors were not possible anymore. Amongst others, destroyed infrastructure com-
plicated the injection with fresh water and the missing cooling of the fuel rods led 
to core meltdowns in units 1, 2, and 3 resulting in damages in the containment. 
Consequently, radioactive fission products were released. Oxidizing cladding tube 
material produced additional heat and hydrogen gas and units 1, 3, and 4 were  
severely damaged due to hydrogen explosions. In total, several 100 Petabequerel 
iodine equivalent were released, mainly iodine 131 and cesium 137. The amount of 
discharged radioactive materials to the environment is approximately 10 percent of 
the Chernobyl accident where an explosion of the reactor threw material such as 
strontium and plutonium in the environment. Moreover, fire carried radioactive 
material in great heights and distances. However, the oceanic release from the Fu-
kushima Daiichi nuclear power plant was the largest release of radionuclides from 
a nuclear accident into an ocean, mainly due to direct release of radioactive liquid 
effluents and atmospheric deposition. During the first days of the accident, most of 
the particles were blown out over the pacific. On the 15 and 16 March 2011, wind 
from southeast in combination with precipitation carried the particles to northwest 
in range of several dozen kilometers. Contrasting to the Chernobyl accident, the 
contaminated area around the Fukushima Daiichi power plant is smaller, even if 
the highest measured doses are similar in both accidents.. 
Table 7.1 highlights some events and implemented measures and particularly 
points in time when the developed decision support method (which is referred to 
                                                          
3 A station blackout occurred if there is no power supply via electricity network nor emergency diesel 
generators. In this case, selected components are supplied by batteries which last 10 h for Unit 1, for 
example. 
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as ‘CBR method’ in the following) could be applied. The complex accident sequence 
is therefore reduced for the purpose of this evaluation. Furthermore, published 
INES classifications are depicted. With regard to the long-term post-accident phase, 
the focus is on the remediation of contaminated areas excluding the stabilization of 
the reactors and preparation for eventual decommissioning, waste management, 
and rehabilitation of the communities, which are tasks of recovery as well 
(International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2015c). Remediation is defined as 
“any measures that may be carried out to reduce the radiation exposure from exist-
ing contamination of land areas through actions applied to the contamination itself 
(the source) or to the exposure pathways to humans […]” (International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), 2007, p. 166). Due to the limited scenarios for the long-term 
post-accident phase, the focus is especially on decontamination measures. The  
division of the accident phases and particularly the beginning of the transition 
phase cannot be declared globally but needs to be defined area-wise. In particular, 
areas where first decontamination measures were planned and implemented might 
be assigned to the transition phase. In general, defining the start and end points of 
the various phases clearly can be difficult and different accident phases may coexist 
in different areas (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2018). The division 
in Table 7.1 is based on the definition in Chapter 3.1 as well as the divisions pro-
vided by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2015c, 2018). 
Table 7.1:   Timeline of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident. Selected points in time 
are illustrated. CBR x indicates points in time to apply the CBR method. 
Date Event Ordered measures Official 
accident 
classification 
Accident 
phase 
20
11
 
11 
Mar 
Tsunami  Nuclear 
emergency 
(Japanese Gov-
ernment) 
Pre-release 
CBR 1  
Starting to 
plan venting 
Evacuation in a 2 km 
radius around the plant 
  
Core of unit 
2 predicted 
to become 
uncovered 
 Evacuation in a 3 km 
radius around the 
plant 
 Sheltering within 3-
10 km radius 
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Date Event Ordered measures Official 
accident 
classification 
Accident 
phase 
without cool-
ing 
12 
Mar 
Primary con-
tainment 
vessel of unit 
1 exceeds 
max. design 
pressure; 
Venting was 
delayed 
Evacuation in a 10 km  
radius 
 CBR 2 
Venting at 
unit 1 
 INES 4  
(Unit 1; NISA)4 
Release 
CBR 3 
CBR 4 
 
Explosion at 
unit 1 
   
 Extension of the evacua-
tion area to a 20 km 
radius 
  
13 
Mar 
Venting at 
units 2 and 3 
   
Explosion at 
unit 3 
   
15 
Mar 
Explosion at 
unit 4 
 INES 6 (ISIS)5  
Wind from 
southeast to 
northwest 
with precipi-
tation;  
Increased 
radioactive 
releases 
Sheltering within a 20-30 
km zone around the 
power plant 
 CBR 5 
CBR 6 
15-22 
Mar 
  Permission of flights 
in a radius of 30 km 
around the plant  
  
                                                          
4 Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), 2011a -  Japan 
5 Institute for Science and International Security, 2011 - USA 
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Date Event Ordered measures Official 
accident 
classification 
Accident 
phase 
 Evacuation of ships 
in 10 km radius in 
costal water  
17 
Mar 
 Publication of contamina-
tion limits for food to  
restrict the consumption 
of food 
  
18 
Mar 
  INES 5 (Units 
1-3; NISA)6  
 
20 
Mar 
Power sup-
ply of units 1 
and 2 estab-
lished again 
   
21 
Mar 
 Prevention of disseminat-
ing and selling of contam-
inated food 
  
22 
Mar 
Power sup-
ply of block 3 
established 
again 
   
23 
Mar 
  INES 7 
(H. Hirsch)7  
 
25 
Mar 
 Recommendation to leave 
the 30 km zone  
  
Apr Publication 
of dose 
measure-
ments 
 
 Extension of the 20 
km zone in the north-
west direction (=’De-
liberated evacuation 
area’); People were 
asked to leave the 
zone until the end of 
May 2011. 
 20 km zone 
announced as 
restricted zone 
INES 7 
(Units 1-3; 
NISA)8  
Transition 
phase and 
subse-
quent 
long-term 
post-acci-
dent phase 
for areas 
where peo-
ple should 
live further 
                                                          
6 Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), 2011b 
7 Classification is based on first assessments of Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire 
(IRSN) and Zentralanstalt für Meteorologie und Geodynamik (ZAMG) (Hirsch, 2011) 
8 Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), 2011a 
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Date Event Ordered measures Official 
accident 
classification 
Accident 
phase 
 Outside the 20 km 
zone: ‘Evacuation 
prepared area’ (cor-
responds to 30 km 
zone): lifestyle habits 
were restricted and 
pregnant women, 
children, and sick 
people should not 
stay in the area. Kin-
dergartens and 
schools were closed 
and it was recom-
mended to deliber-
ately leave the zone. 
 Decontamination 
measures outside the 
evacuation zone at 
schools and kinder-
gartens 
CBR 7 
CBR 8 
May  Topsoil removal from 
playgrounds 
  
June  ‘Specific spots recom-
mended for evacuation’ 
were announced exceed-
ing the effective dose of 
20 mSv in the first year. 
Precautionary measures 
as well as evacuation was 
recommended. Until end 
of 2012 260 spots that 
means 282 households 
were affected. 
  
‘Health Management for 
the Residents in 
Fukushima Prefecture’ 
started to observe possi-
ble long-term effects. 
  
July    Transition 
(Restricted 
zone and 
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Date Event Ordered measures Official 
accident 
classification 
Accident 
phase 
Deliberate 
Evacuation 
Area) 
Sept  Lifting of ‘Evacuation 
prepared area’ 
  
16 
Dec 
Cold Shut-
down9 for 
units 1-3 
Restructuring of evacua-
tion and restriction zones 
due to predicted doses 
per year. 
 Doses < 20mSv/a: lift-
ing evacuation for-
bidding overnight 
stay; decontamina-
tion (cleaning roofs 
and gutters, remov-
ing surfaces) with the 
aim of 1 mSv/a. 
 Doses  > 20mSv/a: en-
tering with re-
striction of deliberate 
evacuation area  
 Long-term 
post-acci-
dent 
20
12
 
Jan  Enacting of decontamina-
tion law 
Decontamination 
measures: See Table 7.2 
  
20
14
 
Apr  Some evacuation orders 
were lifted after decon-
tamination. 
  
  
                                                          
9 The end of the accident state is defined by the Government of Japan as ‘cold shutdown’: achieve-
ment of significant suppression of radiological release and steady decline of radiation dose rates. 
7 Implementation and Evaluation  
180 
Table 7.2:   Commonly implemented remediation measures in Japan since the accident (International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2015c, Table 5.2-3) 
Target Remediation measures 
Houses, buildings Removal of deposits from the roof, gutters and any 
decking 
 Wiping roofs and walls 
 Vacuum sanding 
 High pressure washing 
Schoolyards, gardens and parks Topsoil removal 
 Weed/grass/pasture removal 
Roads Removal of deposits in ditches 
 High pressure washing 
Gardens and trees Mowing 
 Removal of fallen leaves  
 Removal of topsoil 
 High pressure washing 
 Paring of fruit trees 
Farmlands Tillage reversal 
 Topsoil removal 
 Soil treatment (e.g. enhanced application of ferti-
lizer) 
 Soil hardening and removal 
 Weed/grass/pasture removal 
Animal production Control of radiocaesium levels in animal feed 
Forests and woodland Removal of fallen leaves and lower twigs  
 Pruning 
 
For each point in time that is identified for applying the CBR method, the problem 
description is provided (see Table 7.3-Table 7.10). The attributes are organized the-
matically belonging either to a general event description, the description of the  
nuclear power plant, the area affected, release characteristics, or for characterizing 
an accident phase. In the course of time, more information becomes available.  
Attribute values that are defined and do not change are not repeated throughout 
the tables. However, these values are included in the similarity calculations. After 
each description, the results gained from the CBR method are discussed and partic-
ularly compared to the implemented measures in Fukushima. If not further speci-
fied, the measures are assumed to be implemented concurrently such as evacuation 
and sheltering. The application of the Petri net based strategy model as well as the 
multi-criteria strategy assessment is particularly used in the transition and long-
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term post-accident phase when time pressure is not as dominant as in the emer-
gency phase. 
CBR 1 
Table 7.3:   Query at ‘CBR 1’ 
CBR 1 Solution 
General description Strategy 
 Evacuation and Iodine Thyroid 
Blocking within a 5 km distance 
in a zone of 360 
degrees around the installation. 
 Sheltering and Iodine Thyroid 
Blocking from 5 to 20 km dis-
tance in a zone of 360 degrees 
around the installation. 
Name Fukushima Demonstration 
Begin 11 March 2011 15:42 local 
time 
Accident type Nuclear power plant acci-
dent 
Event  
description 
Earthquake and Tsunami 
on the east coast of Japan. 
Four power plants are 
threatened. Severe accident 
might happen. Venting 
might be necessary. 
Nuclear power plant 
Name Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Power 
Plant type 
Boiling water reactor 
Average thermal 
power 
2812 
Affected area 
Name Fukushima 
Area type Prefecture 
Population distri-
bution 
Urban 
Pre-release characteristics 
Risk of core melt Yes or unknown 
Maintaining of 
containment  
integrity 
Yes or unknown 
Wind direction Variable or unknown 
Estimated  
release time 
Unknown 
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Discussion of the solution 
The result obtained by the CBR method is based on the ‘HERCA-WENRA ap-
proach’ (HERCA & WENRA, 2014) supporting rapid decisions on measures in the 
early phase when very little is known about the situation. The method suggests 
evacuation and iodine thyroid blocking in a 5 km radius as well as sheltering and 
iodine thyroid blocking up to 20 km. Since the weather conditions are uncertain, the 
implementation is suggested in a zone of 360 degrees around the nuclear power 
plant. In Japan, measures were implemented around the plant as well, successively 
increasing the radius from 2 to 3 and then to 10 km. The successive extension of the 
evacuation zones led, amongst others, to distrust in the public and multiple evacu-
ations. Furthermore, at this time, iodine thyroid blocking agents were not pre-dis-
tributed in Japan, although stockpiles were available within the 10 km emergency 
zone (Callen & Homma, 2017). The national government provided advice on imple-
menting iodine thyroid blocking on 16 March (Callen & Homma, 2017), which re-
duced the effectiveness of this measure. The intake of stable iodine should be  
implemented shortly before and maximum 24 h after the intake of radioactive io-
dine (Strahlenschutzkommission, 2011).  
Decision support provided 
The CBR method indicates the intake of stable iodine as well as a larger evacuation 
zone from the early beginning when a severe accident is suspected. Even though 
the HERCA-WENRA approach was developed after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
power plant accident, there was awareness on the risk of a total outage of electricity 
at the power plant in case a tsunami exceeds the barrier seawalls (The Fukushima 
Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, 2012). Hence, the generic 
HERCA-WENRA approach might have been developed earlier before the accident 
if the small probability of occurrence would have been earlier carefully considered.  
In summary, the larger evacuation radius the CBR method suggests, helps to avoid 
repeated evacuation. Furthermore, iodine thyroid blocking is suggested before the 
release of radioactive substances. 
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The advisories of different countries expressed a great uncertainty and varied  
according to the area that should be left and the point in time when to leave (Inves-
tigation Committee on the Accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo 
Electric Power Company, 2012b). The recommendations on the distribution and in-
take of stable iodine tablets were not harmonized as well. The CBR method supports 
a harmonized response by referring to transnational recommendations. 
CBR 2 
Table 7.4:   Query at ‘CBR 2’ 
CBR 2 Solution 
General description Strategy 
 Evacuation and Iodine Thyroid 
Blocking up to 20 km distance 
in a zone of 360 
degrees around the installation. 
 Sheltering and Iodine Thyroid 
Blocking up to 100 km distance 
in a zone of 360 degrees around 
the installation. 
Event  
description 
… Primary containment 
vessel of unit 1 exceeds 
max. design pressure; 
Venting was delayed 
Pre-release characteristics 
Maintaining of 
containment  
integrity 
No 
 
Discussion of the solution 
The exceedance of the maximum design pressure in unit 1 may indicate a loss of the 
containment integrity suggesting a second application of the CBR method at this 
point in time. The suggested evacuation zone corresponds to the restricted area 
around the nuclear power plant in Japan. In particular, on 12 March, the evacuation 
radius was extended again from 10 to 20 km. The CBR method suggests iodine thy-
roid blocking up to 100 km around the plant, earlier than the official recommenda-
tion from the national government. 
Decision support provided 
The method indicates the larger 20 km evacuation zone earlier than ordered in  
Japan. Furthermore, sheltering and iodine thyroid blocking is suggested in a large 
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area, which is owed to the instable conditions of the nuclear power plant. Further-
more, the method points out again iodine thyroid blocking in a timely manner. Alt-
hough the CBR method initially suggest evacuation in radius of 5 km (CBR 1) and 
now a radius of 20 km, the extension is suggested within a few hours. In Japan, the 
radius was extended three times over 2 days. The last extension to 20 km was  
ordered after radioactive substances were released. However, evacuation is most 
effective, before the radioactive plume reaches the affected area.  
In summary, the CBR method identifies an effective strategy and particularly indi-
cates a larger evacuation zone and iodine thyroid blocking before any radioactive 
material is released. Again, the suggestion is based on transnational recommenda-
tions and helps foreign governments to provide harmonized advices to their  
nationals. 
CBR 3 
Table 7.5:   Query at ‘CBR 3’ 
CBR 3 Solution 
General description Do nothing. 
Iodine equivalent 4 
Event  
description 
…Venting at unit 1 initi-
ated. 
Release characteristics 
Begin 12 March 2011 14:00 local 
time 
Target People 
Time of day of re-
lease 
Day 
Season Spring 
Weather at  
release 
No rain 
Release duration 
category 
Short 
Cause Deliberate 
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Discussion of the solution 
With the deliberate venting of unit 1 the release phase starts. At this time, the  
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency in Japan classified the event as INES 4. Based 
on this classification and further outline data, the CBR method would suggest to do 
nothing, which clearly contradicts to the results before. Here, the user is obliged to 
review the classification as the condition of the plant indicates a severe accident. 
The CBR method could then be applied again with a new classification. 
Decision support provided 
The method reveals the contradictions between the official classification of the acci-
dent and the results retrieved before. The user is now demanded to reclassify the 
accident and reapply the CBR method with the same problem description so far and 
a new classification. 
CBR 4 
Table 7.6:   Query at ‘CBR 4’ 
CBR 4 Solution 
General description Strategy 
 Evacuation of an area of 22.4 
km2 where about 6713 people 
would be affected. 
 Sheltering in an area of 709.5 
km2 where 212850 people would 
be affected.  
 Iodine thyroid blocking for 
adults in an area of 202.7 km2 
where 54665 adults would be af-
fected. 
 Iodine thyroid blocking for chil-
dren in an area of 2641.4 km2 
where 80034 children would be 
affected. 
 
Other similar scenarios with similar 
weather condition and season. 
 
Iodine equivalent 7 
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CBR 4 Solution 
Chernobyl accident: Experiences 
with measures applied in Prypyat 
 
Discussion of the solution 
The result is based on an INES 7 scenario in spring in an urban10 area, where the 
weather condition is ‘no rain stable wind’. The similarity between the current prob-
lem description and the description of the scenario retrieved is 0.639, which is owed 
to an imbalance between scenario describing attributes and the general availability 
of different attributes for describing a problem. Throughout data collection and 
building of the database, the used attributes for describing the problems differ,  
depending on whether scenarios were generated or information on historical events 
were elicitated. Especially for describing historical events, many attributes were 
used, where for scenario generation the first approach was to roughly categorize 
the possible accidents with few attributes. The scenarios are mainly used for sug-
gesting strategies where the historical events provide general hints on the imple-
mentation. Hence, the imbalance of the number of describing attributes and result-
ing low similarity values are not regarded as crucial. 
JRodos determines specific sectors for implementing measures, depending on the 
predicted wind direction and precipitation. Hence, instead of suggesting an imple-
mentation in a circular area, a more concrete and also smaller area (in contrast to 
the result of CBR 3) size is displayed now.  
Decision support provided 
The CBR method may initiate discussions on a partly revocation of the order ‘shel-
tering and iodine thyroid blocking up to 100 km distance in a zone of 360 degrees 
around the installation’. In general, prolonged sheltering can lead to serious disrup-
tions in people’s lives, as could be observed in Japan (International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), 2015b). Furthermore, the user may now run a simulation system 
such as JRodos to get a clearer picture concerning the areas affected. Especially in 
                                                          
10 Assumes a population density of 300 people per km2. For comparison: Germany: 232 people/km2 
(state: 2018), Fukushima: 376 people/km2 (state: 2018). 
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the early phase, the CBR method complements the existing decision support sys-
tems such as JRodos. However, simulation-based systems need the source term and 
predicted weather data for their calculations and the CBR method, amongst others, 
gives first hints when the source term is not yet estimated such as in Japan on 12 
March. However, at this point in time, the user may simulate the dispersion and 
deposition of radionuclides based on an INES 7 source term and a loss-of-coolant 
accident from a source term library (Löffler et al., 2012). 
Again, the method helps foreign governments to decide on measure advices to their 
nationals in the country where the accident occurred. The CBR method helps to 
roughly classify the accident, also according to the feasibility of measure implemen-
tation. 
As additional decision support, experiences made in Prypyat during the Chernobyl 
accident are retrieved. The similarity is 0.573. Some problems with regard to evac-
uation are pointed out such as the choice of the evacuation route. People were taken 
off in a preplanned direction that increased the already accumulated dose. In Japan, 
the evacuation route posed a problem as well. 
In summary, the method provides a strategy and an estimation of the extent of the 
accident according to the people affected by measures. Past experiences help to 
avoid potential pitfalls. The results retrieved support the review and possibly rev-
ocation of measures retrieved before and helps to give advices to the nationals stay-
ing in the country affected. As mentioned before, during the accident, the advisories 
of the foreign government diverged. 
For completion, simulation systems that determine potential affected areas in a 
more detailed way are expected to run.  
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CBR 5 
Table 7.7:   Query at ‘CBR 5’ 
CBR 5 Solution 
General description Strategy 
 Evacuation of an area of 1.1 km2 
where about 338 people would 
be affected  
 Sheltering in an area of 53.5 km2 
where 16050 people would be 
affected.  
 Iodine thyroid blocking for 
adults in an area of 3.1 km2 
where 826 adults would be  
affected. 
 Iodine thyroid blocking for chil-
dren in an area of 96.2 km2 
where 2915 children would be 
affected. 
 
Further similar scenario with varied 
season. 
 
Further similar scenario with INES 7 
classification. 
Iodine equivalent 6 
Event description … Wind from southeast to 
northwest with precipita-
tion; Increased 
radioactive releases. 
Affected area 
Size 3900 km2 (half circle with 
radius 50 km2) 
Target People 
Release characteristics 
Weather at release Rain 
Release duration 
category 
Long 
Cause Accidental 
Accident scenario 
type 
Loss-of-coolant accident 
 
Discussion of the solution 
Three days later, the Institute for Science and International Security re-classified the 
event as INES 6, which triggers a re-application of the CBR method due to a changed 
prognosed weather situation and particularly a change of wind direction and pre-
cipitation.  
The strategy and implementation areas of the measures are based on a JRodos sce-
nario that is classified as INES 6 and simulates a long release in spring with rainy 
weather conditions where an urban area is affected. The similarity between the 
problem description and the scenario description is 0.638. 
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The smaller areas in comparison to the areas retrieved at ‘CBR 4’ is owed to the 
INES classification. Although being classified as serious accident (INES 6), the areas 
are, for example, much smaller than for accidents classified as INES 7. As indicated 
before, the accident might have been classified as INES 7 before, promoting a  
re-application of the method with current weather prognosis and a classification of 
INES 7. Note that an INES 7 scenario is also listed in the similar cases. 
Decision support provided 
The result of the method shows the changed area sizes due to modified weather 
prognosis. These results may be used to compare them with results gained in the 
following and particularly calculations with an iodine equivalent of INES 7, which 
is already listed in the results here.  
CBR 6 
Table 7.8:   Query at ‘CBR 6’ 
CBR 6 Solution 
General description Strategy 
 Evacuation of an area of 192.8 
km2 where about 57844 people 
would be affected. 
 Sheltering in an area of 4123.7 
km2 where 1237106 people 
would be affected.  
 Iodine thyroid blocking for 
adults in an area of 254.8 km2 
where 68706 adults would be  
affected. 
 Iodine thyroid blocking for chil-
dren in an area of 2465.4 km2 
where 74701 children would be 
affected. 
 
Further similar scenarios with varied 
season. 
Iodine equivalent 7 
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Discussion of the solution 
The results of CBR 6 are based on a scenario describing an INES 7 accident with 
long release in spring and rainy weather conditions where the affected area is  
urban. The similarity between the scenario retrieved and the problem description 
of CBR 6 is 0.678.  
The area size for evacuation is smaller than the real evacuation area in Japan. The 
areas determined by JRodos are sectors where measures should be implemented. 
The weather forecast assumes specific wind directions, which makes sector-wise 
considerations possible. In Japan, the restricted zone is about a semicircle with 20 
km radius and the deliberate evacuation area corresponds to a 45° sector when re-
garding a circle with 40-50 km radius. The sheltering area is larger when comparing 
INES 6 and INES 7 results under the same rainy weather conditions. This is primar-
ily owed to the accident classification. Again, the user may run a simulation system 
taking into account the changed weather forecast. 
In contrast to INES 7 calculations in CBR 4, the area size for iodine thyroid blocking 
for children is smaller, which is owed to the rain that wash out contaminants from 
the plume and particularly transport them to the ground. However, the main expo-
sure pathway for iodine is inhalation. 
Decision support provided 
The extent of the accident is updated according to changed weather conditions and 
expressed by the area sizes for measures and the number of affected people. One 
may map the area sizes for evacuation and sheltering to a 6th of a circular area and 
calculate the corresponding radii. For evacuation the radius is 20 km and for shel-
tering 100 km. Hence, the suggestions in the pre-release phase are confirmed  
according to the distance from the nuclear power plant. The difference is that a 
weather prognosis is available, which limits the affected area. At this point in time, 
the method would suggest to maintain the strategy suggested before. From now on, 
discussions on relocation, particularly with the help of measurements begin. In 
April 2011, the criterion of 20mSv dose projected to be received within one year 
from the date to the accident is announced from the national government to deter-
mine areas beyond the 20 km zone from which people might need to be relocated 
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(International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2015b). In contrast to evacuation,  
relocation is “the non-urgent removal or extended exclusion of people from a con-
taminated area to avoid chronic exposure […]” (International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), 2007, p. 166). Scenarios concerning relocation are not yet integrated 
in the case base and hence no suggestions can be made accordingly. 
CBR 7 
Table 7.9:   Query at ‘CBR 7’ 
CBR 7 Solution 
Specific characteristics of the transition phase Strategy 
 Milk: Clean feeding to 90 days 
followed by the use of sorbents11 
from 90 days up to 540 days 
 Meat: Use sorbents for 90 days, 
after which apply clean feed 
(also for about 90 days) up to 
the time of slaughter to bring 
the activity concentration levels 
in meat below the MPL. The 
timing of the strategy depends 
on the slaughter time of the cat-
tle. Use live monitoring to en-
sure the target concentration is 
achieved before slaughter. 
 Green vegetables: Disposal of 
plants that were subject to direct 
deposition. No strategy required 
for plants sown after deposition. 
 
Further similar scenarios. 
Begin April 2011 
Contamination Cs 134; Cs 137 
Target Dairy cows milk; Meat; 
Vegetables 
 
Exposure pathway Ingestion 
 
 
                                                          
11 The official name is ‚addition of AFCF to concentrate ration‘ and refers to a radiocaesium binder, 
added to the diet of, for example, dairy cows or meat producing animals, to reduce the activity con-
centrations in meat or milk below maximum permitted levels (MLPs). 
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Discussion of the solution 
At this point in time, the transition phase might start for specific areas where people 
should live further. With regard to the exposure pathway ‘ingestion’, strategies in 
the early phase concentrate mainly on food restriction and disposal or removal of 
certain targets such as milk or cereals. In the course of time, further strategies aim-
ing at preventing the intake of contaminants through the food chain, are required. 
Exemplarily, three targets, namely milk, meat, and vegetables are regarded. The 
results are based on a deposition in spring of the amount of 105 Bq/m2 of Cs134 and 
Cs137. The similarity value is 0.661. The regarded scenario and especially the  
developed strategies resulted from the European project HARMONE (Harmonising 
Modelling Strategies of European Decision Support Systems for Nuclear Emergen-
cies) (Bai et al., 2018). In particular, strategies were recommended for continuing the 
production of milk, meat, and green vegetables by decreasing the activity concen-
trations below the Maximum Permitted Levels (MLP) specified in Council Regula-
tions (Euratom, 2016). 
Decision support provided 
During release, the mainly applied measures to avoid the intake of contaminants is 
the restriction of specific food entering the food chain. With the beginning of the 
transition phase, additional measures and especially intermediate- and long-term 
strategies that are oriented towards the exposure pathway ‘ingestion’, are important 
to reduce the radiation exposure in areas where people live further. The CBR 
method suggests studied strategies and shows experiences with the implementa-
tion of specific measures. 
The suggested strategy is exemplarily modeled with CPN Tools (Figure 7.9) offer-
ing further analysis possibilities. In particular, the following points could be inves-
tigated: (i) Implementation duration of the measures. A generic approach for the 
target milk would be clean feeding for 90 days and the use of sorbents from 90 days 
up to 540 days. If clean feed is not available in spring and alternative uncontami-
nated feed cannot be brought to the area, an earlier use of sorbents is recommended. 
The implementation duration as well as uncertainties concerning this matter, can 
be integrated in the Petri net model. (ii) Available resources. The amount of affected 
cows and area size of affected vegetables as well as required resources can be 
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adapted in the Petri net model too, for example, to discuss the feasibility of the strat-
egy. (iii) General time schedule. With regard to milk, the strategy must ensure that 
activity concentrations are consistently below the MPL, since milk enters the food 
chain on a continuous basis. With regard to meat, the strategy needs to focus on the 
period before slaughter. Sorbents should be used for 90 days and for about 90 days, 
clean feed should be applied to bring the activity concentrations below the MPL. If 
no clean feeding is possible, extended use of sorbents should be implemented for 
an extended period. Hence, the time shift up to the period before slaughter as well 
as uncertainties with regard to clean feed, can be integrated in the Petri net model 
as well. 
In summary, the CBR method suggests a strategy that is based on a similar vali-
dated scenario supporting decisions on appropriate strategies when there is little 
experience. Modeled as Petri nets, further analysis possibilities beyond dose reduc-
tion and waste are offered. The latter is particularly covered by simulation systems 
such as JRodos. However, in the later phases of an accident, more criteria enter de-
cision-making. The CBR method particularly supports decision-making from iden-
tifying appropriate strategies to assessing them. 
 
Figure 7.9:   Suggested strategy of 'CBR 7’. The strategy addresses the ingestion of contaminated food 
by humans. 
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CBR 8 
Table 7.10:   Query at ‘CBR 8’ 
CBR 8 Solution 
Specific characteristics of the long-term post-acci-
dent phase 
Strategy 
 Roofs: Roof brushing or roof 
cleaning with pressurized hot 
water 
 Internal Surfaces: Vacuum 
cleaning 
 Paved other: Turning paving 
slabs 
 Small area of grass: Grass cut-
ting and removal and  
rotovating or triple digging 
 Large area of grass: Grass cut-
ting and removal and rotovat-
ing or deep ploughing 
 Small area of plants: Plant and 
shrub removal and rotovating 
or triple digging 
 Trees and shrubs: Tree and 
shrub pruning/removal 
 
Similar cases the solution is based 
on. 
Begin April 2011 
Contamination Cs 134; Cs 137 
Target Multi-storey external sur-
faces roofs; Multi-storey in-
ternal surfaces; Paved 
other; Small area of grass; 
Large area of grass; Small 
area of plants; Trees and 
shrubs; 
Exposure pathway External radiation ground 
 
Discussion of the solution 
The strategy obtained results from two similar scenarios in the case base that sug-
gest strategies for dry depositions in summer in an urban area. They differ with 
respect to the targets and propose different measures for some of them. The simi-
larity value of the first scenario is 0.571 with a factor of dose reduction of 0.227 
whereas the second case has a similarity value of 0.464 and a factor of dose reduc-
tion of 0.214. Hence, their effectiveness with regard to dose reduction is similar. The 
small similarity values are again owed to the different number of attributes used for 
describing the problems. The scenarios assigned to the long-term accident phase are 
particularly described with few attributes.  
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The choice of placing the 8th run of the CBR application at this point in time has 
following reason: The transition phase has, amongst others, the task to prepare for 
the long-term accident phase and particularly develop appropriate strategies. Here, 
areas where people should live further and which are less contaminated are re-
garded, justifying the reuse of the strategies that are based on (i) an INES 6 event 
and a scenario assuming a contamination of 1‧ 106 Bq/m2 of Cs137 and Cs134 and 
1‧ 107 Bq/m2 I131, which corresponds to effective doses to adults in a range of 10-
20mSv/y, respectively and (ii) the reuse of dry deposition scenarios, since the areas 
in Japan with wet deposition, were more contaminated. Regarding deposition in 
summer is less crucial, since major differences in the measure selection and imple-
mentation would arise when regarding deposition during winter months. For  
example, due to missing leaves, the dose from trees is smaller during winter 
months. Hence, for a winter scenario, trees are unlikely to be taken into account in 
the measure selection. Furthermore, the strategies retrieved are expected to be  
implemented as early as possible being consistent with the point in time chosen for 
re-applying the CBR method. For example, some measures are less effective the 
later they are applied, such as grass cutting that should be implemented before rain 
occurs, since after rain more activity would be at the base of the grass and in  
the soil.  
The IAEA considers the months from around July to December 2011 as the transi-
tion phase, in which policies and arrangement for recovery were established 
(International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2018). However, in April, first decon-
tamination activities started in Japan. Furthermore, for identifying remediation 
measures, experimental and field based demonstration projects were carried out in 
2011 in Japan (Hardie & McKinley, 2014; International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), 2015c). The reasons were amongst others the need to identify effective and 
applicable measures suitable for the site specific conditions in Japan, the lack of  
experience in dealing with remediation of large areas and inhabited areas or to train 
work force on the use of different equipment (International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), 2015c). Besides the demonstration projects, information on past nuclear and 
radiological accidents formed the basis on decisions on remediation measures. Con-
sequently, the CBR application might be run earlier than the ‘official’ beginning of 
the transition phase for identifying early decontamination strategies. July 2011 
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could be a further point in time for identifying long-term recovery strategies. How-
ever, due to a lack of scenarios addressing long-term recovery, a further run is not 
pursued in the framework of this evaluation. 
Figure 7.10 illustrates the strategy of the first similar case retrieved. The function f 
reflects that the measure ‘grass cutting and removal’ is directed towards the targets 
‘small area of grass’ and ‘large area of grass’. The function h reflects that rotovating 
can be applied to ‘small area of grass’, ‘large area of grass’, and ‘small area of plants’.  
 
Figure 7.10:   First decontamination strategy for a dry deposition in summer 
Figure 7.11 illustrates the strategy of the second similar case retrieved. Here, one 
measure is directed towards one target. The function k reflects that ‘vacuum sweep-
ing paved’ can be applied to ‘paved road’ and ‘paved pavement’. The function g 
reflects that ‘triple digging’ can be applied to ‘small area of grass’, ‘small area of 
plants’, and ‘small area of soil’. The function l reflects that ‘deep ploughing’ can be 
applied to ‘large area of plants’, ‘large area of soil’, and ‘large area of plants’. Both 
decontamination strategies are merged to cover all targets specified in ‘CBR 8’ (Fig-
ure 7.12). The function f reflects that ‘grass cutting and removal’ can be applied to 
‘small/large area of grass’, g reflects that ‘triple digging’ can be applied to ‘small 
area of grass/plants’, and h reflects that ‘rotovating’ can be applied to ‘large/small 
area of grass’ and ‘small area of plants’. 
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Figure 7.11:   Second decontamination strategy for a dry deposition in summer 
 
Figure 7.12:   Strategy based on merging strategies of Figure 7.10 and Figure 7.11 
7 Implementation and Evaluation  
198 
For example, the suggested strategy (Figure 7.12), which results from merging two 
strategies, includes alternative measures for the targets ‘small area of grass’ and 
‘large area of grass’. For ‘small area of grass’ either ‘triple digging’ or ‘grass cutting 
and removal’ and ‘rotovating’ is possible whereas for ‘large area of grass’ the 
measures ‘deep ploughing’ or ‘grass cutting and removal’ and ‘rotovating’ are  
offered. This is surely not satisfactory for decision-making and hence, a multi-crite-
ria assessment can now help to investigate the four possibilities in a structured man-
ner. For illustration purposes, a sub-set of used criteria is sufficient. Furthermore, it 
is assumed that the targets can be investigated independently from each other and 
that the choice of one measure has no direct effect on the effectiveness of another 
measure that is directed towards a different target. Table 7.11 displays the different 
possible strategies excluding the other targets. 
Table 7.11:   Different possible strategies with regard to small and large area of grass 
Strategy A Small area of grass: Triple digging 
Large area of grass: Grass cutting and  
removal and rotovating 
Strategy B Small area of grass: Grass cutting and  
removal and rotovating 
Large area of grass: Grass cutting and  
removal and rotovating 
Strategy C Small area of grass: Grass cutting and  
removal and rotovating 
Large area of grass: Deep ploughing 
Strategy D Small area of grass: Triple digging 
Large area of grass: Deep ploughing 
 
Table 7.12 displays effectiveness values of the measures with regard to dose reduc-
tion. These values are determined in the course of the HARMONE project (Bai et 
al., 2018) and are the basis of the factors of dose reduction in Table 7.13. The amount 
of waste and costs of each measure are gained with the help of JRodos. Public ac-
ceptance is estimated according to a perceived effectiveness of the measures. The 
removal of contamination instead of dilution by, for example, rotovating, is  
assumed to have higher public acceptance.  
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Table 7.12:   Dose reduction values for grass areas. These values are determined during the  
HARMONE project. 
Target Average external 
gamma effective 
dose with no option 
applied (Sv) 
Measure 
applied 
Average external 
gamma effective 
dose with option 
applied (Sv) 
Dose 
reduction (Sv) 
Small 
area of 
grass 
4.0 10-3 Grass cutting 
and removal 2.0 10-3 2.0 10-3 
Rotovating 2.1 10-3 1.9 10-3 
Large 
area of 
grass 
9.9 10-4 Grass cutting 
and removal 5.0 10-4 4.9 10-4 
Rotovating 5.1 10-4 4.8 10-4 
 
Table 7.13:   Attribute values of the strategies to be assessed. These values are per m2 assuming 50 % 
small area of grass and 50% large area of grass. 
 Strategy A Strategy B Strategy C Strategy D Weight 
Factor of dose 
reduction 
0.24 0.2 0.2 0.1 9 
Waste12 0.05 0.1 0.05 0 6 
Costs13 20.012 0.212 0.206 20.006 5 
Public 
acceptance 
low high low low 8 
Similarity 0.5175 0.571 0.5175 0.464 5 
 
For the strategy assessment, the weights as displayed in Table 7.13 assume higher 
preferences in generating highly effective strategies producing a small amount of 
waste and having high public acceptance. Table 7.14 lists the used normalization 
functions enabling to compare the different attribute values with each other. 
                                                          
12 Waste: Grass cutting: 0.1 kg/m2.  
13 Cost: Triple digging 20 EUR/m2, Deep ploughing 0.006 EUR/m2, Grass cutting and removal/ 
Rotovating 0.2 EUR/m2 (small area), 0.012 EUR/m2 (large area). 
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Table 7.14:   Normalization functions of the different attributes 
Attribute Normalization function f Comment 
Factor of dose reduction 𝑓(𝑥) = 1 − 𝑥 It is assumed that a factor 
of dose reduction 1 is the 
worst case meaning that 
no dose reduction is 
achieved. 
Waste 𝑓(𝑥) = (60 − 𝑥)/60 Mechanical top soil and 
turf or plant removal and 
soil replacement is taken 
for comparison  
(60 kg/m2) 
Cost 𝑓(𝑥) = (22 − 𝑥)/22 The measure ‘roof clean-
ing with pressurized hot 
water’ costs 22 EUR/m2 
and is used as reference 
for a measure with high 
costs. 
Public acceptance 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑥 High acceptance = 1,  
low acceptance = 0 
Similarity 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑥  
 
Figure 7.13 illustrates the result of strategy assessment recommending strategy B 
for decontamination.  
 
Figure 7.13:   Stacked-bar chart of the result of strategy assessment 
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Decision support provided 
As mentioned before, decision on measures in Japan were based on experimental 
and field based demonstration projects as well as investigations on former nuclear 
and radiological accidents. Table 7.2 shows the commonly implemented measures 
that do not rely on a specific order. Furthermore, as an expert reported during the 
PREPARE project, implementation was not done consistently over large areas and 
a further review of strategies might have reduced the waste problem. The CBR 
method (i) identifies a strategy that is based on similar problem descriptions and 
their developed effective strategies, (ii) shows the original strategies and alternative 
measures with side effects (such as more waste), (iii) provide means to analyze dif-
ferent available strategies in a structured manner according to different criteria. Fur-
thermore, modeled as Petri nets, the strategies can be subject to further investiga-
tions according to resources. The CBR method includes historical knowledge and 
particularly experience with implementing measures as well. At this point in time, 
the method indicates the large amount of waste as well as a timely implementation 
of specific measures. For example, the measure ‘grass cutting and removal’ that is 
also suggested by the CBR method, should be implemented as early as possible to 
be effective. 
7.2.1 Achievement of the Evaluation Objectives 
The example in the section before is derived from a real accident and demonstrates 
the basic capabilities of the developed method. In the following, the evaluation ob-
jectives are discussed in more detail. 
Decision support for all phases of a nuclear accident 
The method is intended to be applied several times and particularly in each phase 
throughout an accident. The case study shows that appropriate strategies are sug-
gested for each phase taking into account the implementation order of measures. 
Moreover, historical accidents and especially experiences made with implementing 
measures as well as already compiled expert knowledge such as handbooks help to 
avoid pitfalls. The type of decision support slightly varies throughout the phases. 
During the pre-release and release phases the focus is on (i) identifying appropriate 
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strategies in a fast and timely manner to be effective, (ii) categorizing an accident 
according to its scale and particularly size of affected area and number of affected 
people and (iii) to assess the feasibility of strategies. The added value of the CBR 
method particularly lies in countering the acute time pressure and uncertainty the 
decision-makers are faced with by referring to knowledge that was already com-
piled before an accident in a structured manner. As soon as more information on 
the source term and weather prognosis are available, the method indicates running 
a simulation system to obtain more exact results on the area size and number of 
affected people. With reference to the case study, the CBR method indicates earlier 
a larger evacuation radius, which helps to avoid repeated evacuation. Furthermore, 
the CBR method suggests to implement evacuation and sheltering together with 
iodine thyroid blocking. The real advice of the national government on implement-
ing iodine thyroid blocking came a few days later and hence lead to a reduced ef-
fectiveness. Furthermore, the foreign governments did not agree on iodine thyroid 
blocking. In addition, the CBR method reveals false official event classifications, 
helps to categorize the accident, and also refers to transnational recommendations, 
which is helpful for foreign countries to give harmonized advice to their nationals.  
During the transition and long-term post-accident phases the focus is on (i) identi-
fying appropriate strategies and particularly taking into account the implementa-
tion order of measures for different exposure pathways, (ii) providing analysis ca-
pabilities according to duration and required resources and particularly their 
uncertainties, and (iii) providing means to compare different strategies according 
to several criteria in a structured manner. In contrast to other multi-criteria  
approaches in nuclear emergency management in the literature, already developed 
strategies of similar problem descriptions are reused in the analysis. Furthermore, 
as also could be seen in the case study, there is a lack of knowledge on coherent 
strategies, especially in respect of decontamination. The CBR method fills this gap 
by promoting the development of scenarios in advance of an accident and by reus-
ing these scenarios for decision support in emergency management. The added 
value of the method lies in suggesting measures and their implementation order as 
well as indicating potential pitfalls on the basis of validated scenarios, multi-criteria 
assessment, and historical accidents. This approach particularly counters the lack of 
experience and multitude of decision criteria the decision-makers are faced with. 
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Suggesting strategies throughout an accident requires sufficient cases in the case 
base. As a starting point, the different defined weather, population distribution, and 
scale categories as well as season for different accident phases can be used as basis 
for scenario construction. Furthermore, targets with high contributions to the dose 
can be taken into account in the first instance. The potential of enriching the case 
base by refining the categories defined so far, is especially discussed in the summary 
and outlook chapter of this thesis. 
Handling uncertainty in nuclear emergency management 
The issue of uncertainty is addressed in several ways. First of all, the core method, 
CBR has an inherent way to handle uncertainty by working with similarities and 
especially approximate reasoning. This approach implies that decisions cannot be 
made straightaway but draw upon similar problematic situations and their solu-
tions. The main sources of uncertainty in nuclear emergency management are the 
source term and the weather prognosis. The first is owed to the uncertain conditions 
in the nuclear power plant and triggering events whose consequences are difficult 
to assess. The rare occurrences and hence lack of experience complicate the han-
dling of the uncertainty as well. The approach is to integrate attributes in the re-
trieval that describe information that is reflected by the source term: the substances 
that are to be released and the consequences that are to be expected by such a  
release. The iodine equivalent, the accident scenario type, characteristics of the  
nuclear power plant, as well as release duration and category can be regarded as 
compensating attributes. A further approach is, also having time pressure in mind, 
to work with categories instead of demanding exact numerical values. This applies, 
for instance, for the weather condition that can be assigned to a predefined category. 
The characteristics of these categories are particularly taken into account in the local 
similarity functions of the retrieval step. In addition, preparedness and in particular 
elaborating scenarios in advance of an accident are means to handle uncertainty as 
well by referring to accidents and appropriate strategies that have already been 
thought through and particularly taking these as starting point for further discus-
sions. As in the beginning of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident, 
the source term was not available and the output of simulation systems were not 
taken into account in the decisions on strategies. Furthermore, source term estima-
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tions in the European countries were not harmonized in the beginning. The devel-
oped method, as shown in the case study, particularly provides support without 
the exact knowledge of the source term in terms of area sizes and number of affected 
people and particularly for roughly categorizing the entire accident. The method 
cannot predict exact areas for the early measures but which is left to the simulation 
systems. 
Besides uncertainty in the beginning of such an accident, the method provides 
means to conduct analyses concerning possibly uncertain parameters in respect of 
strategy implementation. Due to a lack of experience with regard to selecting and 
implementing measures during the later phases, simulations taking into account 
uncertainty as well as a structured assessment of several possible strategies are of-
fered as additional decision support. The strength of the CBR method particularly 
lies in an integrated approach to handle various characteristics of uncertainty. 
Integrating experience and expert knowledge for decision support 
Experience and expert knowledge are integrated in the case base through historical 
accidents provided by experts, scenarios confirmed by experts, knowledge com-
piled of handbooks or project results as well as results of the task force in Europe 
set up after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident. Retrieval and re-
use partly result from discussions with experts during the PREPARE project as well. 
To name a few, in terms of distinguishing between release by day and night or by 
integrating the accident scenario type as well as by taking into account waste stor-
age possibilities in the decisions on decontamination strategies. 
Taking into account different stakeholders with partially conflicting objectives 
The combination of CBR and MCDA enables to assess different possible strategies 
taking into account various criteria. As an advantage, the strategies gained by CBR 
are further used for the multi-criteria assessment. Hence, strategies do not have to 
be developed to be then further assessed. Instead, strategies that are based on sim-
ilar problematic situations are reused to be assessed additionally to radiological 
quantities and are aligned to current circumstances. The latter refers, for instance, 
to public acceptance, which may vary for different countries and affected areas and 
which may contrast to cost and the amount of waste produced by certain measures. 
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As mentioned before, soil removal may give the public a better feeling in terms of 
reducing contamination than diluting contamination by digging or ploughing and 
hence transporting contamination to deeper soil layers. The multi-criteria assess-
ment helps to structure the problem, reduce its complexity, and promotes discus-
sions of the stakeholders involved. The advantage of this approach is particularly 
emphasized in several publications (Papamichail & French, 2013) but which is in 
the framework of this thesis, particularly combined with CBR and embedded in an 
entire decision support method addressing all phases of a nuclear accident. 
Supporting harmonization work in Europe and the interaction with other tools for emer-
gency management 
The harmonization work in Europe is particularly addressed by integrating the 
HERCA-WENRA approach and results from European projects such as PREPARE 
and HARMONE. The generic scenarios developed are independent of specific 
country regulations and take into account international recommendations such as 
recommendations of the IAEA. As shown in the case study, the method comple-
ments existing simulation systems. However, the latter are also used to determine 
effectiveness values of certain strategies. Hence, for a comprehensive multi-criteria 
analysis, especially in the later phases, the interaction with other tools such as  
JRodos are necessary. Figure 7.14 gives an overview of the interaction with other 
tools. 
 
Figure 7.14:   Interaction of the CBR application with other tools in emergency management 
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Demonstrating applicability by means of a prototypical implementation 
The basic components of the method are implemented as illustrated in chapter 7.1. 
The prototype is capable of configuring the retrieval step and calculating similar 
cases from the case base as well as combine several strategies to address all targets 
of interest. The application can be accessed via a web browser and hence is inde-
pendent of any local installations. This design is particularly interesting for nuclear 
emergency management where several advisory bodies do not need to be located 
at the same place. The application particularly supports the exchange of results. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1 the results of this thesis have been elaborated in the 
framework of the PREPARE project and particularly have partly been integrated in 
the ‘Analytical Platform’ to be used by experts for analyses and information ex-
change and the public community to obtain information about an incident. Experts 
particularly should discuss their preliminary conclusions aiming at getting a com-
mon picture transcending national borders. 
The Analytical Platform was evaluated according to perceptions and expectations 
of potential users about the usefulness, trustworthiness, interaction with other users 
and governance offered by the system as well as the willingness and interest to join 
and contribute with expertise (Montero, Sala, Trueba, & Baudé, 2016). The persons 
interviewed were part of the NERIS community and partner of PREPARE (73 or-
ganizations) where 47% responded. The system was regarded as more useful for 
experts than public to be used in a distant accident or after the emergency phase to 
centralize information and enhancing collaboration and exchange between experts. 
In general, the interest to participate was great where clear rules for operating 
shared information was demanded. Furthermore, political support from organiza-
tions involved clearly contribute to the success of such a system. 
7.2.2 Discussion of the Evaluation Method 
The evaluation has been conducted in the frame of a case study to demonstrate the 
achievement of the objectives. Due to a limited time frame, an evaluation including 
experts has not been conducted. To assess the strategies and the decision support 
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provided by the CBR method, papers and reports dealing with emergency manage-
ment during the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident have been used. 
They present the strategies implemented as well as the difficulties in deciding on 
them. The evaluation particularly demonstrates how the CBR method overcomes 
some of the issues in decision-making namely the time pressure and uncertainty in 
the beginning of an accident and the large number of possible measures in the later 
phases and their reasonable combination to a strategy taking into account partially 
diverging preferences. The added value of the CBR method is particularly shown 
by comparing the identified strategies with real implemented strategies as well as 
by discussing how issues that arose can be overcome. However, the saving of time 
is not expressed numerically, for example. For this purpose, experiments with  
experts need to be conducted. Furthermore, the general suggestions for handling 
uncertainty are to (i) work with rough classifications rather than demanding exact 
numerical values to (ii) prepare scenarios in advance of an accident to better handle 
upcoming uncertainties, and to (iii) make use of similar already developed scenar-
ios in the course of an accident. The evaluation of this thesis does not include an 
expert survey in respect of this issue aiming at measuring numerically how uncer-
tainty decreased. However, the added value of these approaches is argumented 
with the help of related studies that either investigate directly decision-making in 
nuclear emergency management (T. Comes et al., 2015; French et al., 2017) or inves-
tigate generally experts in situations in which the stakes are high (Klein, 2008; Meso 
et al., 2002; Paton & Flin, 1999; Riesbeck & Schank, 1989). 
With regard to the later phases, the lack of cases does not make comprehensive  
experiments possible, since cases in the case base, which are confirmed by experts, 
just cover few possible accidents. However, the importance of such an approach is 
underpinned by the various studies after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power 
plant accident and by the specific case study presented in the chapter before.  
It is important to note that although the method has been developed after the  
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident, the scenarios referred to in the 
case study, represent knowledge that was available before the accident. Hence, the 
accident itself has been excluded for demonstrating the achievement of the objec-
tives defined in this thesis. 
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8 Conclusions and Outlook 
Decision-making in the course of nuclear disasters is challenging due to uncertainty 
in respect of decisive information, a short time frame available for identifying  
appropriate strategies as well as a multitude of possible measures and stakeholders 
with partially conflicting objectives. Hence, developing decision support methods 
and tools requires diverse approaches for countering the just as diverse issues in 
disaster management. This thesis presents a novel approach in nuclear emergency 
management that builds upon experience and expert knowledge, where the deci-
sion consists in choosing one or several appropriate measures and to combine them 
to a strategy. 
To achieve the objective of developing a decision support method that identifies 
appropriate strategies throughout a nuclear accident taking into account uncer-
tainty and multiple stakeholders, case-based reasoning (CBR) is enhanced by the 
development of scenarios. CBR is oriented towards the decision-making behavior 
of experts under time pressure and uncertainty and provides a framework for stor-
ing and reusing experience in a structured manner. The main idea is to reuse solu-
tions of similar problems to solve a current problem whereas similar problems also 
help to avoid mistakes. CBR can be applied in domains that are not fully understood 
being advantageous in respect of the exceptionality of nuclear accidents. Further-
more, strategies can be identified more quickly and do not need to be generated 
from scratch. Besides many applications examples in the general disaster manage-
ment domain, the transparent process of deriving a strategy is advantageous for the 
later success in practice. Scenarios are fictitious nuclear accidents and appropriate 
strategies. Their development supports preparedness in general and enhances the 
case base by possible nuclear accidents. Developing scenarios and reusing them in 
the course of an incident saves time and helps to avoid mistakes by thinking 
through possible consequences in advance. The development of scenarios is an im-
portant research field in nuclear emergency management. The new approach in this 
thesis is particularly the structured integration for later reuse in the framework of a 
decision support method. Scenarios are particularly results of simulations building 
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a bridge between elaborated decision support systems such as JRodos and the new 
approach of this thesis. 
Furthermore, a strategy model based on High-level Petri nets (HLPNs) is developed 
for capturing combinations of measures and particularly their order of implemen-
tation. Petri nets are used in a variety of emergency management applications and 
are suitable to model strategies in a structured and unambiguous manner. Further-
more, they enable an automated reuse in the framework of CBR and have analysis 
capabilities of structure and dynamic behavior and allow for analyses with regard 
to the feasibility of a strategy. The latter is particularly useful if several strategies 
are available for selection. The strategy model developed is generic and allows for 
enhancements in various directions such as according to time and uncertainty in 
available resources, for example. Further decisive factors, such as the radionuclides 
involved, can be integrated as well. 
CBR is also combined with multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) to particularly 
address various preferences that need to be respected in the final decision. MCDA 
supports a transparent and structured decision-making process taking into account 
various objectives. Being subject of current research in nuclear emergency manage-
ment and successfully combined with CBR in related areas, MCDA is integrated in 
the reuse step of CBR within the framework of this thesis. The aim is to assess sev-
eral strategies by means of diverse criteria that have become established in terms of 
strategy assessment. The novel approach in this thesis is to integrate these different 
perspectives taking into account possible future developments, effectiveness,  
resources as well as confidence in the strategies retrieved by the decision support 
method. 
This chapter is structured as follows: At first, the achievement of the objectives is 
discussed in more detail (Chapter 8.1). Chapter 8.2 points out some open questions 
and directions for future research. 
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8.1 Key Findings and Conclusions 
Decision-making in the course of nuclear disasters is complex, since the release of 
radioactive substances may lead to long-term and transnational health risks for hu-
mans and environmental contamination. Decisions on strategies define the funda-
mental procedures of protecting the public and have to be made in balance with 
intervening in people’s life and in a societal consensus. Besides the multitude of 
possible measures, measures need to follow a specific order to be effective and their 
selection needs to be aligned to the current frame conditions that change with each 
accident. Current decision support methods and tools help in constructing a strat-
egy by ad hoc projections of the radiological situation and analyses in respect of 
measure combinations, for example with regard to their effectiveness – either com-
puter-based or with the help of handbooks. The latter particularly indicates possible 
side effects and constraints. However, strategies need to be newly constructed with 
each new event and results of simulation systems are subject to uncertainties as 
well, amongst others, due to uncertain input parameters. Further research focuses 
on MCDA and the development of scenarios for supporting long-term decisions 
and preparedness. However, there is no mechanism that makes this already elabo-
rated knowledge reusable. This thesis proposes a new approach building upon cur-
rent research and insights gained after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant 
accident and pursues a completely new direction in terms of the core, particularly 
experience-based, problem-solving paradigm. The objective of developing a deci-
sion support method consists of several sub-objectives where the following section 
briefly shows how each of these objectives has been achieved.  
Providing a decision support method that can be applied throughout an accident 
supports consistent decision-making since information already integrated for  
describing the current problem situation and deriving a solution can be directly uti-
lized. Information on the release, for example, is important for decisions in the long-
term as well. The comprehensive decision support method of this thesis uses infor-
mation included in the initial phases for the long-term phases as well, notably with 
updates, if available. The method is particularly developed to be applied several 
times during an accident providing decision support for all accident phases. The distinc-
tion into accident phases addresses phase-specific issues and supports elaborating 
appropriate strategies for each accident phase. The type of decision support slightly 
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varies throughout the phases in alignment with the changing issues. During the pre-
release and release phases the focus is on (i) identifying appropriate strategies in a 
fast and timely manner to be effective, (ii) categorizing an accident according to its scale 
and particularly size of affected area and number of affected people and (iii) to assess 
the feasibility of strategies. The latter two points particularly address the issues of a 
non-harmonized response of foreign countries observed in the past. During the 
transition and long-term post-accident phases the focus is on (i) identifying appro-
priate strategies and particularly taking into account the implementation order of 
measures for different exposure pathways, (ii) providing analysis capabilities accord-
ing to required resources and particularly their uncertainties, and (iii) providing 
means to compare different strategies according to several criteria in a structured man-
ner. The decision support provided for the later phases particularly counters the 
present lack of experience concerning long-term strategies. In general, the CBR 
method not only provides decision support by means of suggesting strategies but 
also by indicating potential pitfalls and experiences made in the past with imple-
menting strategies. The strategy model developed enables to capture strategies in a 
structured and unambiguous manner taking into account their order of implementa-
tion. Besides a reasonable combination of measures to a strategy, the order of im-
plementation directly influences the effectiveness of the entire strategy. The strategy 
model is generic, integrating events causing the endangerment of a target and  
effects resulting from implementing a measure making an automated reuse and  
adaptation possible. The latter especially refers to the problem statement how to 
combine several strategies where each strategy only covers a part of the problem. The 
proposed merging approach focuses on the commonalities of the strategies and 
merges several Petri nets at a syntactical level. The strategy model particularly of-
fers further analysis possibilities which, embedded in the entire decision support 
approach, takes a completely new direction in nuclear emergency management. 
Uncertainty in nuclear emergency management is still a crucial issue and current 
research focuses on enhancing methods and tools to enable robust decision-making. 
The core method proposed by this thesis has an inherent way to handle uncertainty 
by working with approximate reasoning and without demanding complete 
knowledge on the current problem situation. The main sources of uncertainty are 
the source term and the weather prognosis. The approach of this thesis is to inte-
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grate compensating attributes in the retrieval such as the iodine equivalent, the acci-
dent scenario type, characteristics of the nuclear power plant, as well as release  
duration and category. Furthermore, symbolic attributes and categories, respectively, 
are integrated instead of demanding exact numerical values. This applies, for in-
stance, for the weather condition that can be assigned to a predefined category. The 
characteristics of these categories are particularly taken into account in the local 
similarity functions of the retrieval step. In addition, preparedness and in particular 
elaborating scenarios in advance of an accident are means to handle uncertainty as 
well by referring to accidents and appropriate strategies that have already been 
thought through and particularly taking these as starting point for further discus-
sions. Furthermore, besides initial uncertainties, the developed provides means to 
conduct analyses concerning possibly uncertain parameters in respect of strategy imple-
mentation. The strength of the CBR method particularly lies in an integrated  
approach to handle various characteristics of uncertainty. 
Experience and expert knowledge build the core of the entire decision support method 
consisting of historical accidents provided by experts, scenarios confirmed by experts, 
knowledge compiled of handbooks, as well as acknowledged results such as general 
frameworks for decision-making established by international task forces. The CBR 
method reflects and integrates current practice in a structured manner providing 
appropriate knowledge in a suitable form. 
Especially in the later phases, multiple stakeholders enter the decision process. Deci-
sions on long-term strategies that may affect property rights and have consequences 
on the willingness to return, have to be made in a societal consensus. Particularly, 
decisive criteria may now conflict or manifest very individually for different coun-
tries. The multi-criteria assessment helps to structure the problem, reduce its com-
plexity, and promotes discussions of the stakeholders involved. In particular, the 
case-based strategies are further used for the multi-criteria assessment where sev-
eral perspectives are integrated. In particular, the trust in the suggested strategies 
are reflected by means of a confidence value. In contrast to criteria defined in the 
literature that purely refer to decision objectives, the underlying decision support 
method is taken into account as well. Furthermore, effectiveness, resources, and  
robustness are objectives regarded. The latter particularly considers possible future 
uncertainties. The multi-criteria assessment is mainly developed for the later phases 
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but can also be applied in the early phases of an accident with appropriate prepa-
rations that accelerate the assignment of attribute values. 
The CBR method integrates different methods but also results from other decision 
support methods and systems, such as a rule-based approach supporting the harmo-
nization work in Europe or simulation results of JRodos promoting the interaction with 
other tools for emergency management. The latter particularly refers to the exchange of 
results with an MCDA tool as well. The prototype particularly demonstrates the  
applicability of the developed method where the user can configure retrieval and simi-
larity calculation individually. The application can be accessed via a web browser 
and hence is independent of any local installations. This design is particularly  
interesting for nuclear emergency management where several advisory bodies do 
not need to be located at the same place. 
8.2 Directions for Future Research 
The case-based decision support method takes a new path and provides the basis 
for further exploring experience-based decision-making in nuclear emergency man-
agement. Consequently, the single components developed and shaped in the frame-
work of this thesis, open up new research directions for further extensions and  
enhancements. These refer to enhancing merging at a semantic level, extending the 
problem model and the case base, and transferring the decision support method 
developed to other disaster types. 
8.2.1 Enhancing Merging at a Semantic Level 
Merging aims at suggesting a comprehensive strategy solving the entire problem at 
hand where partially solving strategies are retrieved from the case base. Here, ‘solv-
ing’ refers to the set of targets that are specified in the query. Merging is realized at 
a syntactical level where equally labeled transitions and their corresponding pre- 
and post-mappings are merged. Here, the sets of types and transition modes of the 
single Petri nets are united. Hence, the merging preserves the original runs of the 
Petri nets and identifies possible new runs for newly combined targets. The latter 
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particularly refers to choices of possible measures, also. The pre- and post-map-
pings for common transition modes can be chosen from the pre-and post-mappings 
of the respective Petri nets that are merged. An application example is the choice of 
resources that would arise if the single strategies imply different resources for the 
same measure. The pre- and post-mappings of transitions that are not merged re-
main unchanged. The merging approach is generic and neither linked to a specific 
event nor measure type. So far, the strategy model integrates two decisive factors 
for measure selection i.e., the targets and the resources needed for implementation. 
For example, enhancements are possible through additional types. However, the 
merging so far does not detect inappropriate combinations of measures or inappro-
priate orders of implementation. Inappropriate combinations refer to measures 
whose targets are of different sensibility such as playgrounds or industrial areas 
and possible impacts on neighboring targets are crucial. Furthermore, inappropri-
ate combinations make measures redundant such as cleaning indoor surfaces and 
removing indoor objects. Inappropriate orders of implementation refer to orders 
that make measures not implementable such as mechanical digging before grass 
cutting. Hence, the focus here is on (i) combinations of measures, whose possible 
impacts are crucial for targets being located next to each other, (ii) combinations of 
measures, whose targets depend on each other, and (iii) orders of implementation 
that are not possible due to logical inconsistencies.  
Merging assumes that if at least one transition corresponds in different Petri nets, 
the nets can be merged. Furthermore, if not explicitly modeled, merging assumes a 
concurrent implementation of measures. Hence, merging states what may be possible, 
which can be justified, on the one hand, through the common transition(s), but also 
through the similarity value, which is a determining factor for a strategy to be  
included in the merging. A possible approach is to explicitly capture inappropriate 
combinations or implementation orders of measures and to restrict possible runs of 
the merged net. Related research areas are, for example, history-dependent process 
dynamics in Petri nets by means of transition guards (van Hee, Serebrenik, 
Sidorova, Voorhoeve, & van der Werf, 2007), to explicitly forbid certain behavior 
during merging and particularly by run-time adaptation of process dynamics 
(Fahland & Woith, 2009), or rule-based Petri net transformations for constructing 
system behavior from single components (Hartmut Ehrig et al., 2008). Thus, en-
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hancements of the merging approach as well as adaptations after merging are pos-
sible future research directions. In summary, merging at a syntactical level allows 
local considerations whereas merging at a semantic level requires a global ap-
proach. 
8.2.2 Extending the Problem Model and the Case Base 
The problem model comprises finitely many attributes, which are defined as pairs 
of unique label and domain. The chosen attributes are comprehensive and espe-
cially in respect of the symbolic attributes, domains are defined to enable fast rea-
soning in times of time pressure and uncertainty. The decision support method  
developed is notably useful for understanding and categorizing an event in a for-
eign country and thus particularly assuming that very little information is available. 
The domains of the symbols resulted from the project and served as basis for the 
scenarios generated with the help of JRodos. However, further investigations are 
important to extend the domain of certain symbolic attributes to retrieve more pre-
cise solutions. For example, weather categories can be refined by applying learning 
algorithms to simulation results of JRodos. Weather data over an extended period, 
different source terms, and different sites may serve as input for JRodos, which  
determines area sizes of early measures, for example. The learning algorithm may 
now identify appropriate categories for a weather situation aiming at classifying an 
event according to the implementation size for specific early measures. In this con-
nection, one may detect subtler differences of possible consequences of a release by 
night and by day or in different types of areas. So far, urban, rural, and metropolitan 
areas are distinguished. However, the installation site and the surrounding area, 
which are respected in the simulations of JRodos, have consequences on the disper-
sion and deposition of radioactive substances. Thus, refining the categories defined 
so far facilitates more appropriate results. 
The core of the decision support method is the case base storing problem descrip-
tions and appropriate solution descriptions to be reused to solve a current problem. 
As Figure 4.5 illustrates, the distribution over the accident phases is not balanced. 
Hence, as also indicated in Chapter 7.2, problems referring to relocation or remedi-
ation in general, cannot be handled so far, since the corresponding cases are missing 
in the case base. From a methodical point of view, this thesis is not limited to specific 
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problems assigned to release or decontamination, for example. However, the con-
crete implementation and application of the decision support method requires 
enough cases particularly referring to the competence of a CBR system (Chapter 
2.1.4), which is particularly important with regard to the maintenance of the case 
base where knowledge is added, deleted, or modified. Furthermore, collecting cases 
for the transition and long-term post-accident is challenging and requires a close 
cooperation of experts. Strategies cannot be generated automatically but need to be 
reviewed by experts for approval. In general, scenario-based analyses are important 
for handling the various uncertainties in the course of a nuclear accident and par-
ticularly to take into account variations in the weather prognosis and the source 
term (French et al., 2017). This thesis especially suggests to store this knowledge and 
to elaborate appropriate strategies in the course of uncertainty analyses. Future  
research must particularly be devoted to the topic knowledge elicitation. 
8.2.3 Transferring to Further Disaster Types 
The case-based decision support method that integrates CBR, the development of 
scenarios, HLPNs, and MCDA, is, from a methodical point of view, transferrable to 
other disaster types, since the approach of identifying appropriate strategies expe-
rience-based is independent of the underlying triggering event. However, one may 
not directly transfer the method developed without (i) clearly define the objectives 
of decision support and (ii) adapt the models to the disaster type to be investigated. 
With regard to the first point, the overarching objective in nuclear emergency man-
agement is to protect public and environment, where the measures chosen need to 
be commensurate and decided in a societal consensus. Thus, decision support par-
ticularly aims at helping in identifying strategies that define a fundamental procedure 
to achieve the overarching objective. Hence, the decision support method devel-
oped can be transferred to further application examples, where, generally speaking, 
a course of actions is searched for. However, as indicated before, the models that 
are part of the decision support method need to be adapted to the new disaster type. 
This refers to the problem model and the choice of attributes describing a problem 
as well as the solution model and the attributes reflecting the effectiveness of a so-
lution. In this context, similarity functions need to be adapted too, since domain 
properties need to be investigated for each attribute individually. The attribute-
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based representation of cases is very flexible whereas for each new event, appropri-
ate attributes need to be elaborated with domain experts. The case base has a flat 
organization facilitating the transfer to other disaster types. However, this form of 
representation does also mean that problems are solved locally as the assumptions 
in Chapter 1 indicate: The whole problem in the course of a (potential) nuclear acci-
dent, not knowing which strategy is appropriate to protect public and environment 
from a possible radiation exposure, is divided into several sub-problems that partic-
ularly focus on specific areas during specific accident phases. Thus, although being 
part of an accident, an aspect that is particularly captured in the database, each case 
in the case base describes a stand-alone problem and regarding this, retrieval is or-
ganized. Accordingly, the method developed supports solving problems locally 
but, for example, does not indicate conflicting solutions in neighboring areas. To 
compensate, an approach is re-organizing the case base and deliberately link cases 
through case characteristics and enhance retrieval respectively. However, this kind 
of case base representation would imply complex scenario construction and thus 
has been excluded in the framework of this thesis. Another approach is to determine 
strategies locally and then to merge them for analyzing the gained solution affecting 
a larger area. Here, it is important to remain in one accident phase since solutions 
for different accident phases cannot be combined. 
In summary, the reason for focusing on nuclear accidents is, besides the scientific 
relevance, the possibilities given for elaborating the models in more detail. From a 
methodical point of view, the case-based method is transferrable to other decision 
problems, where a decision consists in choosing one or several measures and to 
combine them appropriately. However, the method derives first possible solutions 
heuristic-based to be analyzed according to several criteria afterwards. Hence, trans-
ferability has to be judged according to validity of the main assumption that similar 
problems have similar solutions. The new decision support method in this thesis 
particularly facilitates decision-making in complex situations where diverse issues 
prevail, notably by combining intuitive with analytical approaches 
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Appendix A Sources for the 
Attribute Catalogue 
Method of Risk Analysis for Civil Protection 
Table A.1:   Attributes to describe the reference area (Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster 
Assistance 2011, p. 24) 
Category Information 
Man 
Number of inhabitants 
Population density 
Number of households 
Environment 
Protected areas 
Agricultural land 
Economy 
Economic performance 
Business tax receipts 
Supply 
Infrastructures of water supply 
Infrastructures of electricity supply 
Infrastructures of gas supply 
Infrastructures of telecommunication 
Immaterial Cultural assets 
Table A.2:   Parameters to describe a scenario (Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster 
Assistance 2011, p. 26) 
Parameter 
Hazard Development 
Scene of occurrence Notice time for warning (refers to the expec-
tancy of an event and the ability of the pop-
ulation and the public authority to prepare) 
Spatial dimension Who is affected? 
Intensity Reference incidents (refers to comparable 
events in the past) 
Time Further information (refers to preparedness 
of authorities, relief units and helpers, dam-
age susceptibility and robustness of persons 
or elements) 
Duration  
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Table A.3:   Impact parameters (Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance 2011, p. 30 f.) 
Category Damage parameter 
Man 
Fatalities 
Injured 
Persons in need longer than 14 days 
Persons in need up to 14 days 
Environment 
Impairment of protected area 
Impairment of water bodies 
Impairment of ground water 
Impairment of agricultural land 
Economy 
Physical damage 
Consequential damage 
Loss of economic performance 
Loss of economic profitability 
Supply 
Disruption of water supply 
Disruption of energy supply 
Disruption of gas supply 
Disruption of telecommunication 
Immaterial 
Impact on public order and safety 
Political implications 
Psychological implications 
Damage to cultural assets 
 
Disaster Inventory System (DesInventar) 
Table A.4:   Basic effects of a disaster (DesInventar Project 2009, p. 19-22) 
Basic Effects 
Deaths 
Loss value (local currency/US$ according to exchange rate on the date of the disaster) 
Routes affected (length of transport networks destroyed and/or rendered unusable) 
Other losses (e.g. religious buildings, monuments, architectural or cultural heritage 
buildings, theatres and public installations, public administrations buildings, vehicles or 
buses lost, bridges) 
Missing 
Crops and woods 
Observations about the effects 
Wounded, sick 
Livestock 
Affected 
Educational centers 
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Basic Effects 
Relocated 
Health Sector 
Homes affected 
Evacuees 
Victims (persons whose goods have been damaged directly associated with the event) 
Homes destroyed 
Qualitative fields (affected or not affected): 
Transport 
Communications 
Aid organization installations  
Agriculture and fishing 
Aqueduct 
Sewerage 
Education 
Energy 
Industry 
Health 
 
Tactical Situation Object (TSO) 
Table A.5:   Data elements of Tactical Situation Object (CEN, 2009a, p. 15-24) 
Element name Definition 
Id Identifier of the event 
Name Name for the event 
Main event id Link to the main event 
Category Scenario that leads to the event 
Actor Type of endangered objects 
Location type Location where the event takes place 
Environment Context of the event 
Scale Severity of the event 
Certainty Percentage probability of occurrence of the event 
Occurrence time Date and time of the occurrence of the event which may be in  
future 
Status  Status of the event (complete, in progress, not started, under 
control) 
Risk assessment Predicted evolution of the event (increasing, decreasing or sta-
ble) 
Casualties Actual or predicted casualties 
Decontaminated Number of casualties needing treatment against CBRN agents 
Triage red Number of casualties at the “red” priority level 
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Element name Definition 
Triage yellow Number of casualties at the “yellow” priority level 
Triage green Number of casualties at the “green” priority level 
Triage black Number of casualties at the “black” priority level 
Missing Number of individuals reported or presumed missing 
Displaced Number of people who are moved due to the event 
Evacuated Number of individuals who undergoing the process of being 
moved 
Geographical location Geographical location of the event 
Type of area Type of area 
Weather Weather at the location 
Cause Accidental, deliberate, natural 
Resource type Description of the resource 
Capability of resource Main domains of capabilities and competencies of the resource 
Characteristics of  
resource 
Information about the main physical characteristics (height, 
weight, size etc.) 
Name of resource Name for the resource 
Quantity of resource Quantity of resource 
 
Real-time On-line Decision Support System for Off-site Emergency Management 
in Europe (RODOS) 
Table A.6:   Input data of JRodos (Ehrhardt et al. 2002, p.28-44) 
Fix data 
Model parameter (customization to national conditions) 
Geographical data (information necessary for the presentation of 
results on maps and data relating to special objects, such as  
human settlements, transport networks etc.) 
Statistical data (for calculating consequences – population distri-
bution, economic data to estimate costs, agricultural production 
data) 
Nuclear power plant data (type, description, inventory) 
Countermeasure data (frame conditions and planning funda-
mentals such as intervention levels, EU maximum levels of  
activity concentration of food and feed, planning sectors, evacu-
ation routes and availability of transport vehicle) 
Real-time data 
Actual radiological and meteorological data obtained from fixed 
and mobile monitoring stations 
Prognostic data 
Source term, atmospheric dispersion and meteorological forecast 
data 
Additional source 
term information 
End of chain reaction 
Begin of release 
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Release height 
Released thermal output 
Proportion of iodine 
Release of nuclides 
 
 

 265 
Appendix B Attribute Catalogue 
Table B.1:   Attributes describing the event 
Attribute Description Attribute type Domain 
accident type 
 
symbolic nuclear power plant 
accident    
explosion of radiologi-
cal dispersal service    
radiological accident 
with fire 
endangered  
objects 
types of endangered  
objects taken from TSO 
symbolic see TSO 
 
remark: the taxonomy of 
endangered objects is very 
general and should be  
specified 
  
 
motivation: countermeas-
ures are targeted at sur-
faces, production systems 
etc. that are likely to 
be/have been contaminated 
  
 
Suggestion: additional  
endangered objects 
symbolic see EURANOS hand-
books 
location type describes the type of loca-
tion where the event is  
taking place 
symbolic see TSO 
environment describes the general envi-
ronment or context of the 
event 
symbolic see TSO 
scale describes the severity of 
the event 
numeric see TSO 
certainty provides a percentage 
probability of occurrence 
of the event 
numeric [0,1] 
occurrence 
time 
describes the date and time 
of the occurrence of the 
event  
temporal 
 
 
This may refer to a future 
occurrence. 
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Attribute Description Attribute type Domain 
risk  
assessment 
states the predicted evolu-
tion of the event 
symbolic increasing 
decreasing    
stable 
type of area type of area symbolic see TSO 
weather describes the weather at 
the location 
symbolic see TSO 
cause cause of the event symbolic accidental 
   
deliberate 
   
natural 
source term 
   
release height 
 
numeric,  
meter 
 
release  
duration 
 
numeric, 
hours 
 
time of release categories for release time symbolic day 
   
night 
dose 
 
numeric, Sv 
 
exposure  
pathways 
 
symbolic inhalation 
   
ingestion 
   
skin 
   
external radiation soil 
   
external radiation 
cloud 
shielding 
 
symbolic yes 
   
no 
size of area size of affected area numeric, ha 
 
number of 
people  
affected 
number of people affected numeric 
 
Table B.2:   Attributes describing the nuclear power plant 
Attribute Description Attribute type Domain 
name 
 
textual 
 
type 
 
symbolic 
 
gross output 
 
numeric, MW 
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Attribute Description Attribute type Domain 
net output 
 
numeric, MW 
 
number of 
blocks 
 
numeric 
 
burnup 
 
numeric, 
GWd/tHM 
 
 
Table B.3:   Attributes describing radionuclides 
Attribute Description Attribute type Domain 
symbol       
name 
 
symbolic see EURANOS hand-
books 
alpha  
 
numeric, MeV 
 
alpha  
percentage 
 
numeric 
 
beta 
 
numeric , MeV 
 
beta  
percentage 
 
numeric 
 
gamma 
 
numeric, KeV 
 
gamma  
percentage 
 
numeric 
 
dominant  
radiation type 
 
symbolic alpha 
beta    
gamma 
radioactive 
half-life 
 
numeric 
 
 
Table B.4:   Attributes describing the location 
Attribute Description Attribute type Domain 
population 
size 
  numeric   
population 
density 
mean value per km2  numeric 
 
number of 
households 
 
numeric 
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Attribute Description Attribute type Domain 
population  
distribution 
 
symbolic rural 
urban    
metropolitan 
groups: 
   
school  
children 
percentage of numeric [0,1] 
religious 
groups 
percentage of numeric [0,1] 
patients percentage of numeric [0,1] 
prisoners percentage of numeric [0,1] 
tourists percentage of numeric [0,1] 
movements: 
   
commuters percentage of numeric [0,1] 
students percentage of numeric [0,1] 
holidaymakers percentage of numeric [0,1] 
time popula-
tion spend 
outdoors 
mean value of time popu-
lation spend outdoors 
numeric, 
hours 
 
accommoda-
tion available 
number of availability of 
and provision of resources 
for  
accommodation/housing 
numeric 
 
availability of 
transport 
percentage of private car  
ownership 
numeric [0,1] 
transport  
infrastructure 
   
roads scale symbolic few 
   
many 
railways scale symbolic few 
   
many 
protected  
areas 
percentage of whole area numeric [0,1] 
 
information on areas textual 
 
agricultural 
land 
percentage of whole area numeric [0,1] 
gross domestic  
product 
 
numeric 
 
business tax 
receipts 
 
numeric 
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Attribute Description Attribute type Domain 
infrastructure 
of water  
supply 
   
infrastructure 
of electricity 
supply 
 
numeric, 
hours 
 
infrastructure 
of gas supply 
 
  
infrastructure 
of telecommu-
nication 
 
  
cultural assets  
  
hospital number of numeric 
 
school number of numeric 
 
rest home number of numeric 
 
kindergarten number of numeric 
 
prison number of numeric 
 
type of  
buildings 
   
construction 
method 
   
configuration 
 
symbolic multi-storey 
   
terraced 
   
semi-detached 
   
detached 
location fac-
tors 
 
  
air exchange/ 
ventilation 
 
  
background 
dose rates 
 
numeric, Sv 
 
experience experience from other  
emergencies,  
textual 
 
 
acceptability of types of  
management 
  
 
Two types of consequences or damages have to be regarded. The first type of 
damages result from the incident itself, which are potentially location-dependent 
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damages. The second type of damages result from implemented measures, which 
are important to evaluate measures.  
Table B.5:   Attributes for describing consequences 
Attribute Description Attribute type Domain 
fatalities number of numeric   
injured number of numeric 
 
decontaminated number of numeric 
 
displaced number of numeric 
 
impairment of  
protected areas 
protected areas which are dam-
aged due to the incident 
numeric, ha 
 
 
(protected areas, national parks, 
biosphere reservations, landscape 
protection areas, natural parks) 
  
impairment of  
water bodies 
living space in surface waters or 
in the sea which are damaged due 
to the incident (rivers, canals, 
brooks, lakes, ponds) 
numeric, 
km/ha 
 
impairment of 
groundwater 
ground water which is contami-
nated due to the incident 
numeric, ha 
 
impairment of  
agricultural land 
agricultural land which is dam-
aged due to the incident 
numeric, ha 
 
 
decrease in biodiversity  
  
 
loss of plants and shrubs 
  
 
risk of soil erosion 
  
 
partial or full loss of soil fertility 
  
 
landscape changes 
  
 
contamination of soil due to 
chemicals used for tie-down  
option 
  
 
disrepair of restricted areas  
  
physical damage/ 
direct costs: 
sum of the replacement value of 
the direct material damage 
numeric, 
monetary 
value 
 
cost of protection 
measures  
 
numeric, 
monetary 
value 
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Attribute Description Attribute type Domain 
labour 
 
numeric, 
monetary 
value 
 
loss of production 
 
numeric, 
monetary 
value 
 
consumables and 
equipment neces-
sary for options 
 
numeric, 
monetary 
value 
 
communication, 
support, transpor-
tation and the need 
to verify laboratory 
analyses or screen-
ing techniques for 
quality assurance 
 
numeric, 
monetary 
value 
 
   
   
consequential dam-
age/indirect costs: 
includes:  
impacts on soil structure, fertility, 
risk of erosion, reduction or loss of 
tourism, relocation costs or busi-
ness closures etc. 
numeric, 
monetary 
value 
 
loss of economic  
performance 
 
numeric, 
monetary 
value 
 
loss of economic 
profitability 
business tax losses due to the inci-
dent 
numeric, 
monetary 
value 
 
disruption of water 
supply 
duration numeric, 
hours 
 
disruption of water 
supply, people  
affected 
number  of numeric 
 
disruption of  
energy supply 
duration numeric, 
hours 
 
disruption of en-
ergy supply, people 
affected 
number of numeric 
 
disruption of gas 
supply 
duration numeric, 
hours 
 
disruption of gas 
supply, people  
affected 
number of  numeric 
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Attribute Description Attribute type Domain 
disruption of tele-
communication 
duration numeric, 
hours 
 
disruption of tele-
communication, 
people affected 
number of numeric 
 
impact on public 
order and safety 
extent of the consequences of the 
incident on public safety 
textual 
 
 
(e. g. public protests, violence 
against persons/objects) 
  
political  
implications 
extent of the consequences of the 
incident on the political-adminis-
trative sector (e. g. call for state ac-
tions, public calls for resignations) 
textual 
 
psychological  
implications/ 
social impacts 
extent of the loss of trust in public 
authorities (e.g. government,  
administration) 
textual 
 
damage to cultural 
assets 
cultural assets according to the 
Hague Convention which is  
numeric  
 
 
damaged due to the incident 
  
 
number and degree of damage 
  
with/without im-
plementation of a 
strategy 
 
symbolic with 
without 
 
The EURANOS handbook for contaminated inhabited areas provides 48 recovery 
and 11 pre-release emergency measures whereat they can be implemented in the 
early or medium-long phase. The handbook for food production systems provide 
58 measures and the handbook for drinking water further 10 measures. For each 
measure a datasheet exists. The handbooks include a detailed description for each 
attribute. 
Table B.6:   Attributes describing measures 
Attribute Description Attribute type Domain 
name   symbolic see EURANOS 
handbooks 
objective 
 
textual 
 
other benefits 
 
textual 
 
Appendix B Attribute Catalogue 
273 
Attribute Description Attribute type Domain 
management option descrip-
tion 
 
textual 
 
target 
 
textual 
 
targeted radionuclides 
 
textual 
 
scale of application 
 
textual 
 
exposure pathway pre inter-
vention 
 
textual 
 
time of application 
 
textual 
 
legal constraints 
 
textual 
 
environmental/ 
technical constraints 
 
textual 
 
effectiveness  
 
textual 
 
for inhabited areas: 
   
reduction in contamination 
on the surface 
 
textual 
 
reduction in surface dose 
rates 
 
textual 
 
reduction in resuspension 
 
textual 
 
technical factors influencing 
effectiveness 
 
textual 
 
social factors influencing  
effectiveness 
 
textual 
 
required specific equipment 
 
textual 
 
required ancillary equipment 
 
textual 
 
required utilities and infra-
structure 
 
textual 
 
required consumables 
 
textual 
 
required skills 
 
textual 
 
required safety precautions 
 
textual 
 
other feasibility limitations 
 
textual 
 
amount and type of waste 
 
textual 
 
possible transport, treatment 
and storage routes for waste 
 
textual 
 
factors influencing waste is-
sues 
 
textual 
 
averted doses 
 
textual 
 
factors influencing averted 
doses 
 
textual 
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Attribute Description Attribute type Domain 
additional doses 
 
textual 
 
incremental dose 
 
textual 
 
operator time for implement-
ing the option 
 
textual 
 
factors influencing costs 
 
textual 
 
cost of equipment 
 
textual 
 
cost of consumables 
 
textual 
 
compensation costs 
 
textual 
 
waste costs 
 
textual 
 
assumptions influencing  
intervention costs 
 
textual 
 
communication needs 
 
textual 
 
environmental impact 
 
textual 
 
social impact 
 
textual 
 
ethical considerations 
 
textual 
 
agricultural impact 
 
textual 
 
other side effects 
 
textual 
 
(FARMING Network) stake-
holder opinion 
 
textual 
 
practical experience 
 
textual 
 
comments 
 
textual 
 
Table B.7:   Example taxonomy of the domain of the attribute 'location type' (CEN, 2009b, p. 23 f.) 
Higher 
levels  Code  Definition  Additional description  
  COAST  Coastal area  The land next to the sea, seashore  
  INW  
Inland  
waterway 
A body of water, such as a river, canal or lake. It 
may be navigable if it is deep and wide enough for 
a vessel to pass and there are no obstructions  
  NAT  Natural/rural  Natural/rural environment environment  
  OSEA  Open Sea  Open Sea  
  OTH  Other  Other  
  PRIVAT    
The location of the event is a private property, 
which may mean that the access to the location 
may require the authorization of the owner 
Appendix B Attribute Catalogue 
275 
Higher 
levels  Code  Definition  Additional description  
  RAIL  
Rail infra-
structure  Rail infrastructure  
  ROAD  
Road infra-
structure  
Smoothed or paved surface, made for travelling by 
motor & other vehicles  
  UDGN  
Under-
ground  Underground location  
  URB  Urban area  Urban area location  
/COAST BNK Beach/bank  Boundary between land and water 
/COAST CLF Cliff  
Either the incident is on the cliff face, or on a nar-
row strip between the cliff and water 
/COAST CSTW 
Coastal  
Water  
Sea, but possible navigation hazards between the 
open sea and the land 
/COAST EST Estuary  
Open water, but with navigation hazards depend-
ent on the tide  
Tidal waters at the mouth of a river, or Fjord 
/COAST FEN Fen  
Boat access probably required wetland with open 
water 
/INW  BOG  Marsh  Access difficult wetland with little open water  
/INW  CAN  
Canal water-
way  
Navigable waterway, potentially with waterside 
access  
Artificial waterway 
/INW  ICELK  Iced lake  Lake, or pond covered by ice  
/INW  LKE  Lake  Lake or pond, including loch and inland sea  
/INW  RIV  River  
Crossing limited to bridges or by boat  
River, greater than 5m  
/NAT  CRP  Crop  Arable farmland  
/NAT  GRS  Grassland  Pasture and open grassland, including parkland  
/NAT  HFR  High forest  
Characterised by dense woodland, with trees typi-
cally over 20 m  
Vehicular access by road only.  
/NAT  HLS  Hillside  Hilly areas with limited road access  
/NAT  HMT  
High Moun-
tain  Mountain above the area accessible by vehicle  
/NAT  LMT  
Mountain 
side  Mountainous areas with limited road access 
/NAT  SSSI  
Sites of scien-
tific interest  Sites designated of special Scientific Interest (SSSI)  
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Higher 
levels  Code  Definition  Additional description  
/OSEA  OFF  Sea Platform  
Installation is offshore, including oil and gas plat-
forms, associated accommodation platforms 
Also piers. 
/OTH  CUT  Cutting  
Limited access from the side, may be fire hazard  
A road or railway or canal below ground level   
/OTH  ELV  
Elevated  
Section  
No access from the sides  
A road or railway or canal elevated above the nor-
mal ground level by a bridge or viaduct  
/OTH  EMB  
Embanked 
Section 
Limited access from the side, may be fire hazard  
A road or railway  or canal elevated by embank-
ment  
/OTH  LFR  Woodland  
Characterised by open woodland  
Little vehicular access off road 
/OTH  SRB  Scrub  
Characterised by bushes and occasional trees  
Potential limited vehicular access  
/PRIVAT OWNRSC  
Site with 
own rescue 
team  
Private property belonging to an organization that 
owns a private rescue team (for example, an in-
dustrial site with an internal fire service)  
/RAIL  TRK  
Railway 
track  
Railway track restricts access from the sides and 
difficult to drive along  
A standard gauge railway track  
/ROAD  1RD  
One-way 
Road  
Road with single direction of travel, limiting the 
access direction  
A one-way road (not part of a dual carriageway), 
including slip roads on interchanges  
/ROAD  DCA  
Dual  
Carriageway  
Dual carriageway, including motorway or auto-
bahn so that the approach must be from an appro-
priate direction  
A road divided into two, such that crossing sides 
is not practical  
/ROAD  NOR  
Open 
Ground  
Area with no road or path, but may be accessible 
in part to most vehicles  
An area which a road vehicle may be able to cross, 
but without any road or track  
/ROAD  PTH  Path  
Footpath  
A route unsuitable for road vehicles  
/ROAD  RRD  
Restricted 
Road  
Road not suitable for all vehicles, e.g. due to low 
bridge  
A road with a notified restriction on traffic move-
ment, such as a height restriction, a weight re-
striction, etc.  
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Higher 
levels  Code  Definition  Additional description  
/ROAD  SRD  Side Road  
Minor road which may restrict access to large ve-
hicles, or traffic flow or prevent vehicles turning  
A road which is restricted by its width, or in urban 
areas, by parked cars, such that traffic in one direc-
tion must allow traffic in the other to pass  
/ROAD  TRK  Trackway  
Off-road, but a hard surface for vehicles  
An unmade-up road which traversable by light  
vehicles  
/UDGN  MIN  Mine  Underground working, possibly disused  
/UDGN  TUN  Tunnel  
Tunnel  
A road, railway or canal in a tunnel  
/UDGN  UND  
Under-
ground 
building  
Underground building / commercial / industrial 
area   
/URB  ASR  
Assembly 
area  An assembly or a recreational area  
/URB  HOSP  Hospital  Health institution (hospital, elderly house, etc.)  
/URB  IND  
Industrial 
area  Industrial area  
/URB  MALL  Mall  The location of the event is a commercial centre  
/URB  OFF  Office area  Office area  
/URB  PRK  Park place  Park place  
/URB  RES  
Residential 
area  Residential area (house, residential dwelling, etc.)  
/URB  STRT  Street  Public area (street for example)  
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Appendix C Evaluation Form for 
Impact Assessment 
MAN
Classification
disastrous > x > x
significant x - y x - y
moderate x - y x - y
minor x - y x - y
insignificant ≤ x ≤ x
REMARKS
ENVIRONMENT
Classification
disastrous river > x km > x ha
> x  ha or lake > x ha > x  ha
or sea > x ha
> x  ha > x  ha
significant river > x km x - y ha
> x - y ha or lake > x ha > x - y ha
or sea > x ha
> x - y ha > x - y ha
moderate river > x km x - y ha
> x - y ha or lake > x ha > x - y ha
or sea > x ha
> x - y ha > x - y ha
minor river > x km x - y ha
> x - y ha or lake > x ha > x - y ha
or sea > x ha
> x - y ha > x - y ha
insignificant river ≤ x km ≤ x ha
≤ x  ha or lake ≤ x ha ≤ x  ha
or sea ≤ x ha
≤ x  ha ≤ x  ha
REMARKS
ECONOMY
Classification
disastrous > x > x > x > x
significant x - y x - y x - y x - y
moderate x - y x - y x - y x - y
minor x - y x - y x - y x - y
insignificant ≤ x ≤ x ≤ x ≤ x
REMARKS
SUPPLY
Classification
disastrous > x  persons > x  persons > x  persons > x  persons
for > x  hours/days for > x  hours/days for > x  hours/days for > x  hours/days
significant x - y persons x - y persons x - y persons x - y persons
for x - y hours/days for x - y hours/days for x - y hours/days for x - y hours/days
moderate x - y persons x - y persons x - y persons x - y persons
for x - y hours/days for x - y hours/days for x - y hours/days for x - y hours/days
minor x - y persons x - y persons x - y persons x - y persons
for x - y hours/days for x - y hours/days for x - y hours/days for x - y hours/days
insignificant ≤ x  persons ≤ x  persons ≤ x  persons ≤ x  persons
for ≤ x  hours/days for ≤ x  hours/days for ≤ x  hours/days for ≤ x  hours/days
REMARKS
IMMATERIEL
Classification
disastrous Extent Extent Extent Extent
significant Extent Extent Extent Extent
moderate Extent Extent Extent Extent
minor Extent Extent Extent Extent
insignificant Extent Extent Extent Extent
REMARKS
or temporarily
fatalities injured
Please determine values for x and y.
long term
impairment of protected area
impairment of water 
bodies
disruption of telecommunicationdisruption of gas supply
impairment of agricultural land
physical damage consequential damage
loss of economic 
performance
loss of economic 
profitability
or temporarily
long term
or temporarily
long term
or temporarily
or temporarily
long term
or temporarily
long term
damage to 
cultural 
assets
impairment of ground water
impact on 
public order 
and safety political Implications
psychological 
Implications
disruption of water supply disruption of energy supply
long term
or temporarily
or temporarily
long term
long term
or temporarily
long term
or temporarily
long term
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Appendix D Evaluation of the 
Attribute Catalogue 
   E
v
en
t attribute 
pre- 
release release 
transi-
tion 
long-term 
post- 
accident notes  
accident type 4 4 4 4   
 endangered  
objects 4 4 4 4 
merge to one  
attribute ‘target’ 
and update the 
taxonomy 
 
additional  
endangered  
objects 4 4 4 4 
 
location type 4 4 4 4 
merge with 'type 
of area' and up-
date domain 
 
environment 4 4 3 3 
change attribute 
into 'other envi-
ronmental haz-
ards'; 
 scale 4 4 4 4 INES  
 
certainty 4 3 0 0 
certainty = proba-
bility of  
release; differ-
ences due to defi-
nition problems 
 
occurrence time 4 4 2 1 
merge attribute 
with 'time of  
release' and offer 
categories 
(day/night; season 
etc.) 
 risk assessment 4 4 2 2   
 type of area 3 4 4 4 delete 
 
weather 4 4 2 0 
weather at  
release; update 
domain 
 cause 3 3 1 0   
 source term 4 4 4 4   
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   E
v
en
t attribute 
pre- 
release release 
transi-
tion 
long-term 
post- 
accident notes 
 release height  4 4 2 0   
 release duration 4 4 2 0   
 time of release 4 4 0 0 delete  
 dose 4 4 4 4   
 exposure  
pathways 4 4 4 4   
 shielding 4 4 2 0   
 
size of area 4 4 4 4   
 number of  
people affected 4 4 4 4   
 
dispersal  
process type 2 4 3 3 
add; type of pro-
cess leading to the 
release; fire,  
explosion 
 accident  
scenario type         add   
 
 
N
u
clear 
p
o
w
er p
lan
t attribute 
pre- 
release release 
transi-
tion 
long-term 
post- 
accident notes  
name           
 type 4 4 0 0   
 gross output 3 3 0 0   
 net output 3 2 2 0   
 number of blocks 3 3 0 0   
 burnup 4 4 1 0   
 
additional attributes 
to describe a nuclear 
power plant          
             
 inventory 4 4 1 1 add; in Bq 
 thermal Power 4 4 0 0 add  
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  L
o
catio
n
 attribute 
pre- 
release release 
transi-
tion 
long-term 
post- 
accident notes  
population size 4 4 4 4 
delete; same 
as affected 
people 
 population density 4 4 4 4 per km2 
 number of house-
holds 4 4 4 4 per km2 
 population  
distribution 4 4 4 4   
 groups:           
 
school children 4 4 4 4 
in taxonomy 
of targets: 
children 
 religious groups 0 0 2 2 delete 
 
patients 4 4 2 1 
specification 
of percentage 
directly with 
targets 
 prisoners 2 2 2 1 delete 
 
tourists 3 3 2 1 
Integrate in 
the taxonomy 
of targets 
 movements:           
 commuters 2 2 2 2 delete 
 students 0 0 0 0 delete 
 holidaymakers 2 2 0 2 delete 
 time population 
spend outdoors 3 4 3 2   
 accommodation 
available 4 4 4 3   
 availability of 
transport 4 4 3 0   
 transport infrastruc-
ture:           
 
roads 4 4 2 0 
implicitly in 
population 
distribution 
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  L
o
catio
n
 attribute 
pre- 
release release 
transi-
tion 
long-term 
post- 
accident notes 
(urban, ru-
ral…) 
 
railways 4 4 2 0 
in taxonomy 
of  
endangered 
objects; delete 
 protected areas 3 4 3 4   
 textual descr 4 4 4 4   
 
agricultural land 4 4 4 4 
compare to 
land use, al-
ready in-
cluded in tax-
onomy of 
targets 
 gross domestic  
product 2 3 3 3  
 business tax receipts 0 2 3 3 delete 
 
infrastructure of  
water supply 4 4 4 3 
possible speci-
fications: 
number of 
people relying 
on it; cubic 
meter (un-
known  
importance 
for the popu-
lation); risk to 
be contami-
nated [0,1]; 
 infrastructure of  
electricity supply 2 4 4 3   
 infrastructure of gas 
supply 1 3 3 2   
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  L
o
catio
n
 attribute 
pre- 
release release 
transi-
tion 
long-term 
post- 
accident notes 
 
infrastructure of  
telecommunication 4 4 3 2 
possible speci-
fication: speed 
of connection 
can give an in-
sight about 
what type of 
information 
might be re-
ceived; higher 
bandwidths 
allow sharing 
photos and 
videos from 
the incident 
site; low 
bandwidths 
allow basic 
SOS and 112 
calls which 
can affect 
strategies for 
management 
 
cultural assets 2 2 3 4 
delete; implic-
itly included 
in taxonomy 
of targets 
 
hospital 4 4 4 2 
in taxonomy 
of targets 
 
school 4 4 4 4 
in taxonomy 
of targets 
 
rest home 4 4 2 2 
elderly is in 
taxonomy of 
targets 
 
kindergarten 4 4 4 4 
in taxonomy 
of targets 
 prison 2 2 2 1 delete 
 
type of buildings         
in taxonomy 
of targets 
 construction method 3 3 4 2   
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  L
o
catio
n
 attribute 
pre- 
release release 
transi-
tion 
long-term 
post- 
accident notes 
 configuration 3 4 3 2 delete 
 
location factors 4 4 3 4 
possible speci-
fications: dis-
tance from the 
source; vicin-
ity to natural 
objects (river, 
mounting); 
type of hous-
ing system 
(regular, cha-
otic) 
 
air exchange / venti-
lation 4 4 1 1 
possible speci-
fications: air 
exchanges per 
hour; pres-
ence/absence; 
type (forced/ 
natural) 
 background dose 
rates 3 3 3 4   
 
experience 4 4 4 4 
categories: ex-
perienced, less 
experienced, 
no experience 
 
R
ad
io
n
u
-
clid
e 
attribute 
pre- 
release release 
transi-
tion 
long-term 
post- 
accident notes  
symbol 4 4 4 4   
 name 4 4 4 4   
 alpha  4 4 4 4   
 alpha percentage 4 4 4 4   
 beta 4 4 4 4   
 beta percentage 4 4 4 4   
 gamma 4 4 4 4   
 gamma percentage 4 4 4 4   
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R
ad
io
n
u
-
clid
e 
attribute 
pre- 
release release 
transi-
tion 
long-term 
post- 
accident notes 
 dominant radiation 
type 4 4 4 4   
 radioactive half-life 4 4 4 4   
 
additional attributes 
to describe a radio-
nuclide           
 bioavailability         add 
 mobility eg KD         add 
 volatilisation         add 
 
physicochemical 
forms         
add; can be 
very im-
portant in 
early phase as 
some contami-
nants will 
give inhala-
tion dose and 
some not (due 
to e.g. aerosol 
size), and also 
in later time 
phases (gov-
erning the mi-
gration of 
some contami-
nants) 
 
 
C
o
n
se-
q
u
en
ce attribute 
pre- 
release release 
transi-
tion 
long-term 
post- 
accident notes 
 fatalities 0 4 2 2   
 injured 0 4 2 1   
 decontaminated 0 4 3 1   
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C
o
n
se-
q
u
en
ce attribute 
pre- 
release release 
transi-
tion 
long-term 
post- 
accident notes 
 
displaced 0 4 4 4 
specify dis-
placed (evac-
uated, relo-
cated or 
sheltered) 
 impairment of pro-
tected areas 0 3 4 4   
 impairment of water 
bodies 0 4 4 4   
 
impairment of 
groundwater 0 4 4 4 
specify 
groundwater 
because some 
locations use 
ground water 
for drinking 
water - others 
use surface 
waters or lake 
waters 
 impairment of agri-
cultural land 0 4 4 4   
 physical damage / 
direct costs: 0 4 4 3   
 
cost of protection 
measures  0 4 4 3 
delete; in-
cluded in  
description of 
a measure  
 
labour 0 4 3 4 
delete; in-
cluded in de-
scription of a 
measure 
 loss of production 0 4 3 4   
 consumables and 
equipment necessary 
for options 0 4 3 4 
delete; in-
cluded in de-
scription of a 
measure 
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C
o
n
se-
q
u
en
ce attribute 
pre- 
release release 
transi-
tion 
long-term 
post- 
accident notes 
 
communication, sup-
port, transportation 
and the need to verify 
laboratory analyses or 
screening techniques 
for quality assurance 
0 4 3 4 
delete;  
included in 
description of 
a measure 
           
           
 consequential damage 
/indirect costs: 0 4 3 4   
 loss of economic per-
formance 0 2 3 3   
 loss of economic prof-
itability 0 2 3 3   
 disruption of water 
supply 0 4 4 4   
 
disruption of water 
supply, people af-
fected 0 3 4 4   
 disruption of energy 
supply 0 4 4 3   
 
disruption of energy 
supply, people af-
fected 0 4 4 3   
 disruption of gas sup-
ply 0 3 3 2   
 disruption of gas sup-
ply, people affected 0 3 3 2   
 disruption of telecom-
munication 0 4 4 2   
 
disruption of telecom-
munication, people  
affected 0 4 4 2   
 impact on  
public order and 
safety 0 4 3 3 
categories:  
no impact, 
some negative 
impact, severe 
impact 
 political  
implications 0 3 3 3 
merge this at-
tribute with 
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C
o
n
se-
q
u
en
ce attribute 
pre- 
release release 
transi-
tion 
long-term 
post- 
accident notes 
impact on 
public order 
an safety 
 
psychological implica-
tions /social impacts 0 4 4 4 
categories:  
no impact, 
some negative 
impact, severe 
impacts 
 
damage to  
cultural assets 0 3 3 2 
merge this at-
tribute with 
damage to 
cultural assets 
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Appendix E Hierarchy of Targets 
Hierachy of targets, developed during the PREPARE project by Anne Nisbet. 
1. Inhabited Areas 
a. Buildings 
i. Residential 
1. Multi-story 
a. External surfaces 
i. Roofs 
ii. Walls 
iii. Gutters and downpipes 
b. Internal surfaces 
c. Precious objects 
2. Semi detached 
3. Detached 
4. Mobile homes and tents 
ii. Non residential 
1. Schools 
2. Hospital 
3. Offices 
4. Shops 
5. Recreational 
6. Cultural structures 
iii. Industrial 
iv. Infrastructure 
1. Roads 
2. Rail 
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3. Airports 
4. Ports 
5. Underground 
6. Sewage and water treatment 
7. Power generation 
v. Transport 
1. Cars, buses, motorbikes 
2. Overland and Underground trains 
3. Airplane 
4. Ships,  boats and submarines 
2. Open Spaces 
a. Parks and sports grounds 
b. Countryside 
i. Wild animals 
1. Game 
ii. Wild plants 
1. Mushrooms and berries 
2. Herbs 
iii. Sites of special scientific interest 
c. Beaches 
d. Mountains 
3. Water environment 
a. Drinking water supplies 
i. Reservoirs 
ii. Surface water 
iii. Ground water 
iv. Rainwater 
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b. Inland waterways 
i. Rivers 
1. Aquatic food 
ii. Canals 
c. Marine 
i. Coastal water 
1. Aquatic food 
ii. Deep sea 
1. Aquatic food 
4. Woods and Forests 
a. Woods 
b. Forests 
5. Agricultural areas 
a. Crop growing 
i. Cereals 
ii. Vegetables 
iii. Fruit 
iv. Fodder 
v. Industrial crops 
b. Livestock 
i. Beef cattle 
1. Meat 
ii. Dairy cows 
1. Milk 
2. Other dairy produce 
iii. Sheep 
1. Meat 
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2. Milk 
3. Wool 
iv. Goats 
1. Meat 
2. Milk 
v. Pigs 
1. Meat 
vi. Chickens 
1. Meat 
2. Eggs 
c. Horticulture 
6. People 
a. Adults 
i. Pregnant women 
ii. Elderly 
iii. Hospital patients 
iv. Nursing home patients 
b. Adolescents 
c. Children 
d. Babies 

Disasters are characterized by severe disruptions of the society’s functionality and ad-
verse impacts on humans, the environment, and economy that cannot be coped with 
by society using its own resources. Their causes can be of technical, human, or natural 
origin. Nuclear disasters pose greater demands on decision-makers, since the release of 
radioactive substances may lead to long-term and transnational health risks for humans 
and environmental contamination. A nuclear disaster can be divided into several phases 
that are characterized by diff erent measures for protecting the public. During the early 
phase, decision-making is challenged by a great uncertainty in decisive information, 
whereas during the later phase, the diffi  culties lie in a multitude of possible measures and 
stakeholders with partially competing objectives that need to be considered.
This work presents a decision support method that identifi es appropriate measures for 
protecting the public in the course of a nuclear accident. The method takes into account 
the issue of uncertainty in decision-making, the exceptionality of this type of disaster, the 
structured integration of experience and expert knowledge, the implementation order of 
measures, and the integration of stakeholders with diff erent preferences.
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